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INTRODUCTION 
ommercial actors have long been allowed to exercise a 
significant amount of autonomy over the substantive law 
that governs their legal controversies.1 Not only can parties 
choose to have the law of a particular state apply to their dis-
                                                                                                                                     
* Ph.D. (law), University of Cambridge; D.Phil., University of Oxford; J.D., 
Duke University; M.P.W., University of Southern California; B.A., University 
of California, Davis. The author, who is admitted to practice as an attorney in 
New York and Illinois and as a solicitor in England and Wales, is an Associ-
ate Professor of Law at the University of Missouri and Senior Fellow at the 
Center for the Study of Dispute Resolution. The author would like to thank 
the participants at the Brooklyn Law School Symposium, “What Law Gov-
erns International Commercial Contracts? Divergent Doctrine and the New 
Hague Principles,” for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article. All 
errors of course remain the author’s own. 
 1. See LAWRENCE COLLINS ET AL., DICEY, MORRIS AND COLLINS ON THE 
CONFLICT OF LAWS ¶¶ 32-004, 32-044, 32R-061 (14th ed. 2006). Party autono-
my regarding substantive choice of law appears to be higher in North Ameri-
ca and Europe than in Latin America. See Symeon C. Symeonides, The Hague 
C
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pute,2 they can also in a growing number of cases choose to 
adopt one of several forms of non-state law3 ranging from the 
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law 
(“UNIDROIT”) Principles of International Commercial Con-
tracts4 to the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) Convention on the International 
Sale of Goods (“CISG”)5 to the lex mercatoria.6
Parties’ procedural options are much more limited.7 Although 
international commercial actors can exercise a limited amount 
of discretion by deciding to take their disputes to arbitration or 
                                                                                                                                     
Principles on Choice of Law for International Contracts: Some Preliminary 
Comments, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 873, 875–76 (2013).
 2. The law does not necessarily need to have a connection to one of the 
parties or the dispute. See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND 
FORUM SELECTION AGREEMENTS: DRAFTING AND ENFORCING 169 (4th ed. 2013) 
[hereinafter BORN, DRAFTING].
 3. The ability to choose the substantive law that governs a dispute is 
somewhat wider in arbitration than in litigation, although that phenomenon 
may be changing. See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION 2243–44 (2009) [hereinafter BORN, ICA]; see also Permanent Bu-
reau, Hague Conference on Private International Law, Draft Commentary on 
the Draft Hague Principles on Choice of Law in International Contracts 14–
17 (Nov. 2013), available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/princ_com.pdf; 
Permanent Bureau, Hague Conference on Private International Law, Choice 
of Law in International Contracts: Draft Hague Principles and Future Plan-
ning, Annex I, art. 2 (Feb. 2013), available at 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/gap2013pd06en.pdf [hereinafter Draft 
Hague Principles]. 
4. See UNIDROIT, Principles of International Commerical Contracts, 
http://www.unidroit.org/news (select “Instruments”; then select “Commerical 
Contracts”; then follow links to access the various versions from 1994, 2004, 
and 2010) (last visited Apr. 5, 2014).
5. See United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale 
of Goods, opened for signature Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3. 
6. See BORN, ICA, supra note 3, at 2232–37. The term lex mercatoria is 
typically used to refer to various uncodified principles of international com-
mercial law, although there is a wide-ranging debate about the content, 
scope, and existence of lex mercatoria. See KLAUS PETER BERGER, THE 
CREEPING CODIFICATION OF THE NEW LEX MERCATORIA (2d ed. 2010); MATTI S.
KURKELA & SANTTU TURUNEN, DUE PROCESS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION 6–7 (2d ed. 2010) (suggesting the UNIDROIT Principles of In-
ternational Commercial Contracts constitute a codified version of the lex mer-
catoria); Abul F.M. Maniruzzaman, The Lex Mercatoria and International 
Contracts: A Challenge for International Commercial Arbitration?, 14 AM. U.
INT’L L. REV. 657, 665 (1999). 
7. See David A. Hoffman, Whither Bespoke Procedure? 2014 U. ILL. L.
REV. 389, 392–95, 402–25 (2014). 
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to a particular forum,8 once a matter is in litigation, the case is 
typically heard pursuant to the procedural norms of the forum 
court.9 
For many years, this practice was explained in terms of “a 
‘State sovereignty prerogative’” that was rooted in the fact that 
“judicial power is one of the three main . . . branches” of gov-
ernment.10 However, the procedural hegemony of the state has 
arguably begun to break down,11 and some commentators have 
suggested that it may now be possible to view judicial proce-
dures as “sticky default” rules12 rather than as immutable and 
“non-negotiable parameters.”13 
Although many domestic litigants would likely welcome an 
increased ability to choose the procedural law that governs 
their disputes, the desire for procedural autonomy may be 
heightened in international matters, since discrepancies in na-
tional practice can make it difficult for parties not only to pur-
sue their claims14 but also to have confidence in the legitimacy 
                                                                                                                                     
 8. See BORN, DRAFTING, supra note 2, at 4–14. 
 9. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 (1971); COLLINS 
ET AL., supra note 1, ¶¶ 7-002, 32-054, 32-060; Erin A. O’Hara O’Connor & 
Christopher R. Drahozal, Carve-Outs and Contractual Procedure (Vanderbilt 
Univ. Law Sch., Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 13-29, Law & 
Econ. Working Paper No. 13-16, 2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2279520 (noting little 
actual individualization). 
 10. Jorge A. Sánchez-Cordero Dávila, Preface to AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE 
(ALI) & UNIDROIT, PRINCIPLES OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE xxix, 
xxxiii (2006) (citation omitted); see also Gary Born, A New Generation of In-
ternational Adjudication, 61 DUKE L.J. 775, 780, 859 (2012) [hereinafter 
Born, Adjudication] (discussing the longstanding presumption that parties 
appearing in national court are subject to a single, uniform set of mandatory 
procedures established by the state). 
 11. Commentary is split on this point, and empirical research focuses pri-
marily on the domestic realm. See Kevin E. Davis & Helen Hershkoff, Con-
tracting for Procedure, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 507, 517 (2011); Hoffman, su-
pra note 7, at 392–93, 394–95, 403, 425; O’Connor & Drahozal, supra note 9 
(considering some international matters); Judith Resnik, Procedure as Con-
tract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 667–68 (2005). 
 12. Lauren E. Willis, When Nudges Fail: Slippery Defaults, 80 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1155, 1165 (2013). 
 13. Michael L. Moffitt, Customized Litigation: The Case for Making Civil 
Procedure Negotiable, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 461, 462 (2007). 
 14. Transnational litigation gives rise to a number of procedural problems 
not seen in domestic suits, including unusual difficulties relating to jurisdic-
tion and the enforcement of judgments. See Hannah L. Buxbaum, Transna-
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of the proceedings themselves.15 Furthermore, one party will 
often have a significant “home court” advantage in national lit-
igation16 unless the action has been brought in a neutral (unaf-
filiated) jurisdiction.17 
Concerns about procedural diversity in international disputes 
have typically led to calls for procedural harmonization.18 Per-
                                                                                                                                     
tional Regulatory Litigation, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 251, 272–93 (2006); Richard A. 
Nagareda, Aggregate Litigation Across the Atlantic and the Future of Ameri-
can Exceptionalism, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1, 19–41 (2009); S.I. Strong, Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in U.S. Courts: Problems and Possi-
bilities, 33 REV. LITIG. (forthcoming 2014) [hereinafter Strong, Judgments]. 
 15. For example, civil law lawyers typically regard U.S.-style discovery 
with “horror,” while U.S. lawyers find the absence of discovery to be akin to a 
denial of justice. See Javier H. Rubinstein, International Commercial Arbitra-
tion: Reflections at the Crossroads of the Common Law and Civil Law Tradi-
tions, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 303, 304 (2004); see also Jalal El Ahdab & Amal 
Bouchenaki, Discovery in International Arbitration: A Foreign Creature for 
Civil Lawyers?, in ARBITRATION ADVOCACY IN CHANGING TIMES, XV ICCA 
CONG. SER. (2010 Rio) 65, 73 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2011); Geoffrey C. 
Hazard, Jr., From Whom No Secrets Are Hid, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1665, 1694 
(1998) [hereinafter Hazard, Secrets]. 
 16. Not only will one party typically be more familiar with the procedures 
used in the forum court, it will also have structured its business dealings so 
as to comply with the underlying expectations of that national legal system. 
This phenomenon is perhaps most apparent in terms of evidentiary privileg-
es. A U.S. corporation will likely structure its internal communications so as 
to take full advantage of U.S. principles concerning the attorney-client and 
work product privilege. Other countries do not protect legal communications 
in the same manner, which means that a foreign company’s internal docu-
ments may be discoverable simply because that company was not in the habit 
of framing its communications to comply with U.S. law. See JEFF WAINCYMER, 
PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 800–15 (2012); 
Klaus Peter Berger, Evidentiary Privileges: Best Practice Standards Ver-
sus/and Arbitral Discretion, 22 ARB. INT’L 501, 517–18 (2006) [hereinafter 
Berger, Privileges]. Though courts make some efforts to address these issues, 
such initiatives are often unsatisfactory. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 139 (1971); WAINCYMER, supra, at 805. 
 17. See BORN, DRAFTING, supra note 2, at 3. However, not every legal sys-
tem is willing to accept jurisdiction over every dispute involving foreign par-
ties. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010) (concerning 
“foreign-cubed” actions). 
 18. See Simona Grossi, Rethinking the Harmonization of Jurisdictional 
Rules, 86 TUL. L. REV. 623, 625 (2012); Burkhard Hess, Procedural Harmoni-
sation in a European Context, in CIVIL LITIGATION IN A GLOBALISING WORLD 
159 (X.E. Kramer & C.H. van Rhee eds., 2012); Thomas O. Main, Book Re-
view, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 467, 467 (2013) [hereinafter Main, Review] (review-
ing CIVIL LITIGATION IN A GLOBALISING WORLD, supra); Richard Marcus, Bomb 
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haps the most notable initiative in this regard involves the 
American Law Institute (“ALI”) and UNIDROIT Principles of 
Transnational Civil Procedure, which attempt “to overcome 
fundamental differences between common-law and civil-law 
systems and, among common-law systems, to cope with the pe-
culiarities of the U.S. system.”19 However, the sometimes sig-
nificant disparities in national procedures and the vehemence 
with which such practices are defended have acted as signifi-
cant obstacles to harmonization.20 
As a result, some reformers have shifted their focus from 
harmonization to privatization.21 Some success has been 
                                                                                                                                     
Throwing, Democratic Theory, and Basic Values—A New Path to Procedural 
Harmonization?, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 475, 486 (2013) [hereinafter Marcus, 
Bomb]. 
 19. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., Reporters’ Preface to ALI & UNIDROIT, 
supra note 10, xxvii, xxvii; see also E. Bruce Leonard, Preface to ALI & 
UNIDROIT, supra note 10, at xxix, xxx. However, even the ALI and 
UNIDROIT take the view that “[t]he procedural law of the forum applies in 
matters not addressed in these Principles.” See ALI & UNIDROIT, supra 
note 10, at 16. 
 20. See RICHARD GARNETT, SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE IN PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 67–70 (2012) (noting limited successes); Marcus, Bomb, 
supra note 18, at 477; Thomas O. Main, The Procedural Foundation of Sub-
stantive Law, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 801, 836 (2010) [hereinafter Main, Sub-
stantive] (noting that many states “may be more likely to consider abandon-
ing their own substantive regimes of commercial law . . . than they would 
surrender their own procedure”). Thus, the ALI/UNDROIT Principles of 
Transnational Civil Procedure have not yet been adopted by any national 
legal system. See ALI & UNIDROIT, supra note 10, at xxix, xxxviii–xxxix 
(noting effect of the ALI/UNIDROIT Principles in Mexico); OSCAR G. CHASE ET 
AL., CIVIL LITIGATION IN COMPARATIVE CONTEXT 574–75 (Oscar G. Chase & 
Helen Hershkoff eds., 2007); Scott Dodson & James M. Klebba, Global Civil 
Procedure Trends in the Twenty-First Century, 34 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 
1, 23 (2011). However, the European Law Institute (ELI) has recently an-
nounced its intention to adapt the ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transna-
tional Civil Procedure for use in the European Union. See ALI & UNIDROIT, 
supra note 10; European Law Institute, Meeting of ELI Representative and 
Secretary-General of UNIDROIT, http://www.europeanlawinstitute.eu/news-
events/news-contd/article/discussions-underway-for-eliunidroit-joint-
conference-in-
au-
tumn/?tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=132848&cHash=dde59166ad7d6019d1594
7f19e5e7327 (last visited Apr. 6, 2014). 
 21. See ALI & UNIDROIT, supra note 10, at 3; H. Patrick Glenn, Prospects 
for Transnational Civil Procedure in the Americas, 8 REVUE DE DROIT 
UNIFORME [UNIFORM L. REV.] 485, 489–90 (2003). Procedural privatization 
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achieved in this regard, most notably in the form of the Con-
vention on Choice of Court Agreements (“COCA”), which in-
creases the ability of private commercial parties to choose the 
forum that will be used to resolve their disputes.22 Because 
choice of forum has traditionally dictated choice of procedure,23 
parties can use forum selection provisions as a means of exer-
cising a limited amount of procedural autonomy. However, as 
useful as COCA may be, it still does not permit parties to adopt 
individual procedures a la carte.24 
For years, this holistic approach to procedure was unques-
tioned. However, a number of recent developments have sug-
gested a possible shift in thinking about procedural autono-
my.25 For example, “some distinguished scholars now argue 
that parties’ greater ability to contract out of federal and state 
procedure [through arbitration agreements] entails the lesser 
power to modify it.”26 Other commentators have suggested that 
the high degree of judicial respect for freedom of contract and 
                                                                                                                                     
relates to autonomous procedural choices by individual parties, as opposed to 
procedural harmonization, which takes place at the state level. See Sánchez-
Cordero, supra note 10, at xxxiii. 
 22. See Hague Conference on Private International Law, Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements, June 30, 2005, reprinted in 44 I.L.M. 1294, 
available at http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=98 
[hereinafter COCA]. Although COCA has been finalized, it has not yet come 
into force. See id. Ratification in the United States has been delayed pending 
debate about the nature of the implementing legislation. See U.S. Depart-
ment of State Advisory Committee on Private International Law: Notice of 
Public Meeting of the Study Group on the Hague Convention on Choice of 
Court Agreements, 77 FED. REG. 72,904 (Nov. 29, 2012); Memorandum of the 
Legal Adviser Regarding U.S. Implementation of the Hague Convention on 
Choice of Courts Agreements (Jan. 19, 2013), available 
at http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/2013/206657.htm. 
 23. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 & cmt. a (1971) 
(stating that “[a] court usually applies its own local law rules prescribing how 
litigation shall be conducted even when it applies the local law rules of an-
other state to resolve other issues in the case”); COLLINS ET AL., supra note 1, 
¶¶ 7-002, 32-054, 32-060. 
 24. See COCA, supra note 22. 
 25. See Colter L. Paulson, Evaluating Contracts for Customized Litigation 
by the Norms Underlying Civil Procedure, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 471, 473 (2013); 
see also Glenn, supra note 21, at 490 (“There is thus a disguised or hidden 
rule of party autonomy within domestic procedural law.”). 
 26. Hoffman, supra note 7, at 391. 
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procedural waivers provides a sufficiently strong foundation for 
private procedural contracts.27 
However, some boundaries to procedural autonomy must 
necessarily exist, either as a matter of prudence, policy, or 
practice.28 Indeed, one need look no farther than arbitration to 
see that there are limits to what courts will allow in terms of 
procedural autonomy, even in jurisdictions that grant broad 
respect to arbitration.29 
The debate about the propriety of private procedural con-
tracts in the domestic context is extensive and ongoing.30 How-
                                                                                                                                     
 27. See Shutte v. Thompson, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 151, 159 (1872) (noting 
that “[a] party may waive any provision, either of a contract or of a statute, 
intended for his benefit”); Henry S. Noyes, If You (Re)Build It, They Will 
Come: Contracts to Remake the Rules of Litigation in Arbitration’s Image, 30 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 579, 595 (2007); G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the 
Modern Supreme Court, 81 CAL. L. REV. 431, 433 (1993). 
 28. For example, transactional costs may make individualized procedures 
too expensive to pursue. See O’Connor & Drahozal, supra note 9. Alternative-
ly, unbounded procedural autonomy could create situations that are proce-
durally unfair. See Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 11, at 551 (noting “contract 
procedure could produce a court system in which the rules of the game reflect 
a set of narrow interests and not the overall welfare”). 
 29. See Hall St. Assoc., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 588 (2008) 
(striking a provision purporting to expand the grounds of judicial review of an 
arbitral award); In re Wal-Mart Wage & Hours Emp’t Practices Litig., 737 
F.3d 1262, 1267–68 (9th Cir. 2013) (striking a contractual provision allegedly 
waiving the parties’ right to judicial review of an arbitral award); see also 
infra notes 262–386 and accompanying text. 
 30. An impressive body of literature already exists. See Robert G. Bone, 
Party Rulemaking: Making Procedural Rules Through Party Choice, 90 TEX. 
L. REV. 1329, 1362–67 (2012); Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 11, at 520–64; 
Jaime Dodge, The Limits of Procedural Private Ordering, 97 VA. L. REV. 723, 
776–83 (2011); Christopher R. Drahozal & Peter B. Rutledge, Contract and 
Procedure, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1103 (2011); Hoffman, supra note 7, at 426–28; 
David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral 
Amendments, 57 UCLA L. REV. 605, 607–08 (2010); Daphna Kapeliuk & Alon 
Klement, Contractualizing Procedure (Dec. 31, 2008) (unpublished manu-
script), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1323056; Daphna Kape-
liuk & Alon Klement, Changing the Litigation Game: An Ex Ante Perspective 
on Contractualized Procedures, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1475, 1475–77 (2013) [herein-
after Kapeliuk & Klement, Ex Ante]; David Marcus, The Perils of Contract 
Procedure: A Revised History of Forum Selection Clauses in the Federal 
Courts, 82 TUL. L. REV. 973, 974–75 (2008); Linda S. Mullenix, Another Choice 
of Forum, Another Choice of Law: Consensual Adjudicatory Procedure in Fed-
eral Court, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 291, 293–96 (1988); Paulson, supra note 25, 
at 471; Resnik, supra note 11, at 609–22; Robert J. Rhee, Toward Procedural 
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ever, no one appears to have yet considered the special case of 
international commercial litigation. This lacuna is somewhat 
surprising, since the United States Supreme Court has indicat-
ed on numerous occasions that the unique nature of interna-
tional commerce requires courts to give an increased amount of 
respect to existing forms of procedural contracts (i.e., forum se-
lection provisions and arbitration agreements).31 
To some extent, the absence of academic interest in cross-
border disputes may be explained by the overwhelming popu-
larity of international commercial arbitration.32 If parties can 
achieve the desired degree of procedural autonomy in arbitra-
tion, then there may be little need to develop similar principles 
in litigation. 
However, it is by no means clear that international commer-
cial arbitration is going to retain its status as the preferred 
means of resolving cross-border business disputes.33 Recent 
                                                                                                                                     
Optionality: Private Ordering of Public Adjudication, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514, 
516–17 (2009); Moffitt, supra note 13, at 462; Noyes, supra note 27, at 581; 
Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract De-
sign, 115 YALE L.J. 814, 856–69 (2006); John W. Strong, Consensual Modifica-
tions of the Rules of Evidence: The Limits of Party Autonomy in an Adversary 
System, 80 NEB. L. REV. 159, 160–61 (2001) [hereinafter Strong, Consensual]; 
David H. Taylor & Sara M. Cliffe, Civil Procedure by Contract: A Convoluted 
Confluence of Private Contract and Public Procedure in Need of Congressional 
Control, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 1085, 1085–86 (2002); Elizabeth Thornburg, De-
signer Trials, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 181, 183 (2006). 
 31. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 
614, 629 (1985); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516–17 (1974); 
M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. (The Bremen), 407 U.S. 1, 13–15 (1972). 
 32. International commercial arbitration is the preferred means resolving 
disputes arising out of international business transactions. See S.I. STRONG, 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A GUIDE FOR U.S. JUDGES 6 (2012) 
[hereinafter STRONG, GUIDE], available at 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/strongarbit.pdf/$file/strongarbit.pdf. 
Procedural autonomy is one of the primary reasons parties arbitrate their 
disputes, although arbitration provides a number of other benefits as well. 
See BORN, ICA, supra note 3, at 1748; JULIAN D.M. LEW ET AL., COMPARATIVE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION ¶ 21-3 (2003). 
 33. See WILLIAM W. PARK, ARBITRATION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
DISPUTES: STUDIES IN LAW AND PRACTICE 3–27 (2012); Loukas Mistelis, Inter-
national Arbitration—Corporate Attitudes and Practices—12 Perceptions 
Tested: Myths, Data and Analysis Research Report, 15 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 
525, 584 (2004); Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Mediation: The “New Arbitration,” 
17 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 61, 66–67 (2012); S.I. Strong, Increasing Legalism in 
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concerns about arbitration’s rising costs and increased formali-
ties have led many multinational companies to explore other 
dispute resolution options.34 One possibility involves so-called 
“bespoke” litigation, where parties can customize the proce-
dures used in court so as to lessen or eliminate any “home 
court” advantages and avoid any procedural practices that pose 
problems for domestic or foreign litigants.35
The interest in customized litigation processes goes beyond 
individual commercial parties. A number of institutional and 
industry groups have also indicated their support for private 
procedural contracts, thereby signaling the possibility that sig-
nificant change is afoot.36 For example, the International Insti-
tute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution (“CPR”) has recent-
ly created an Economical Litigation Agreement (known collo-
quially as the Model Civil Litigation Prenup)37 that allows par-
ties to individualize their dispute resolution procedures.38
Somewhat similarly, the international construction industry 
(often an innovator in dispute resolution procedures) has pro-
posed a process known as “guided choice,” whereby a neutral 
third party, similar to a mediator, helps parties create an indi-
                                                                                                                                     
International Commercial Arbitration: A New Theory of Causes, A New Ap-
proach to Cures, 7 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REV. 117, 117 (2013).
34. See Noyes, supra note 27, at 591. International commercial mediation 
has been touted as a promising alternative to arbitration, but there are a 
number of potential problems with that proposition. See Nolan-Haley, supra 
note 33, at 63–64; S.I. Strong, Beyond International Commercial Arbitration? 
The Promise of International Commercial Mediation, 42 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y (forthcoming 2014).
 35. U.S.-style discovery is one of the most often-mentioned concerns. See
Rubinstein, supra note 15, at 304 (noting foreign litigants react to U.S. dis-
covery “with horror”); Joanna C. Schwartz, Gateways and Pathways in Civil 
Procedure, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1652, 1657, 1671 (2013) (noting, with others, 
that discovery abuse leads even domestic parties to opt out of litigation). 
 36. Hoffman, supra note 7, at 389. Institutional support may be critical to 
the success of a particular procedural innovation. See id. at 429 (discussing 
“public credentialing moments”). 
37. See Introduction: Economical Litigation Agreement, INT’L INST. FOR 
CONFLICT PREVENTION & RESOLUTION,
http://www.cpradr.org/Resources/ADRTools/EconomicalLitigationAgreement.
aspx (last visited Apr. 6, 2014) [hereinafter CPR Economical Litigation 
Agreement].
38. Id. 
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vidualized dispute resolution procedure that is then used to re-
solve the underlying substantive concerns.39 
As useful as these and other initiatives may be, it is unknown 
whether and to what extent they will be embraced by U.S. and 
other courts.40 Furthermore, at this point there is no clear con-
sensus regarding how these sorts of agreements should be ana-
lyzed. For example, some commentators claim that analytical 
priority should be given to contract law, while other observers 
suggest that procedural law constitutes the proper conceptual 
paradigm.41 Finding an appropriate balance between the two 
disciplines can be difficult, given the hybrid nature of proce-
dural contracts.42 
Another issue that arises in the international realm involves 
the variations in how different jurisdictions approach proce-
dural and contract law.43 While detailed consideration of a sin-
gle nation’s law may be sufficient in the domestic setting, a 
broader focus is necessary in cross-border conflicts. 
Given these concerns, this Article adopts a new analytical 
paradigm that emphasizes structural and substantive issues 
rather than more narrow questions of contract or procedural 
law. In so doing, the Article overcomes the contract law-
                                                                                                                                     
 39. See Paul M. Lurie, Guided Choice: Early Mediated Settlements and/or 
Customized Arbitrations, 7 J. AM. C. CONSTR. LAW. 167, 169 (2013). 
 40. The propriety of a procedural contract may need to be considered from 
a variety of national perspectives, including that of the parties, the forum, 
and the place where the judgment will be enforced. 
 41. Compare Hoffman, supra note 7, at 430 (suggesting that “scholars of 
privatized procedure should spend more energy on contracts and less on pro-
cedure”), with Paulson, supra note 25, at 474 (suggesting that “contract pro-
cedure can be usefully evaluated by the norms underlying civil procedure”). 
Other commmentators emphasize potential differences that may arise de-
pending on whether the dispute is heard in federal court, state court, or regu-
latory proceedings. See Resnik, supra note 11, at 597–98; Mark D. Rosen, The 
Surprisingly Strong Case for Tailoring Constitutional Principles, 153 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1513, 1516 (2005). 
 42. Of course, the two lines of discussion reflect some overlap. For exam-
ple, contract-based discussions often focus on the limits of party autonomy in 
the face of institutional concerns about judicial administration while proce-
dure-oriented debates typically focus on due process considerations. See 
Hoffman, supra note 7, at 401–02; Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 11, at 551. 
 43. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Comparative Contract Law, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 899, 905–34 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard 
Zimmermann eds., 2008); Joachim Zekoll, Comparative Civil Procedure, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra, at 1327, 1327–61. 
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procedural law dichotomy and provides a more internationally 
oriented approach to procedural privatization. 
The discussion begins in Part I with a brief discussion of why 
parties may have a heightened need or desire for procedural 
contracts in international commercial disputes. This section 
also considers whether and to what extent parties will actually 
begin to adopt private procedural agreements if those agree-
ments are held to be enforceable. 
The Article continues in Part II with an introduction to vari-
ous structural concerns relating to private procedural con-
tracts. Structural issues arise as a result of state interests in 
preserving the constitutionally mandated role of public institu-
tions such as the courts.44 Although the concept of “regula-
tion”—which could be said to include questions relating to civil 
procedure—appears to be shifting away from a formal com-
mand-and-control model to a mixed public-private approach,45 
there still may be some elements of litigation that must remain 
immune from private contract. This section therefore provides 
both a theoretical and a practical evaluation of the structural 
limits on party autonomy in litigation and includes both conse-
quentialist and deontological analyses. 
Substantive issues are addressed in Part III. Substantive—
meaning content based—concerns are triggered by the “sub-
stantial state interest” in preserving the fairness of trial.46 If 
individualized procedures are to be allowed, courts must be as-
sured that due process and procedural fairness are properly 
                                                                                                                                     
 44. See Aziz Z. Huq, Standing for the Structural Constitution, 99 VA. L. 
REV. 1435, 1444, 1447 (2013). 
 45. For example, “[t]here is no consensus in policy or academic circles as to 
what exactly is connoted by the term regulation.” Colin Scott, Privatization 
and Regulatory Regimes, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC POLICY, 651, 
653 (Michael Moran et al. eds., 2006). One classic definition states that regu-
lation involves “sustained and focused control exercised by a public agency 
over activities that are socially valued,” although modern critics have ex-
panded the scope of application to include regulatory activity undertaken by 
private actors and other decentralized entities. Id. (citation omitted). Many of 
the changes come as a result of “new governance” theory. See id. at 651 (de-
scribing the privatization of regulatory regimes); Peer Zumbansen, Sustain-
ing Paradox Boundaries: Perspectives on Internal Affairs in Domestic and 
International Law, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 197, 201 (2004). 
 46. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1076 (1991); 
NCALJ Panel Discussion, ALJ Decisions—Final or Fallible?, 25 J. NAT’L 
ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 191, 199 (2005). 
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respected and protected. Although this subject could be ana-
lyzed from a variety of perspectives, this Article attempts to 
identify the outer bounds of procedural autonomy in litigation 
through comparisons to international commercial arbitration. 
This analogy appears appropriate not only because interna-
tional commercial arbitration addresses precisely those types of 
disputes that are at issue in this Article but also because vari-
ous scholars have linked the expansion of procedural autonomy 
in litigation to procedural autonomy in arbitration.47 
Part IV takes the analysis one step further by addressing 
various logistical concerns facing parties who wish to customize 
their litigation procedures. This discussion also analyzes sever-
al proposed models for private procedural contracts. 
Finally, the Article concludes by tying together the various 
strands of analysis and offering a number of observations re-
garding the future of private procedural contracts in the inter-
national commercial realm. Notably, although this Article fo-
cuses primarily on international commercial disputes, a num-
ber of the analyses and conclusions reflected herein apply 
equally to domestic matters. 
I. THE NEED (OR DESIRE) FOR PROCEDURAL AUTONOMY IN 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIPS 
A. Rationales Supporting Procedural Autonomy in Internation-
al Commercial Relationships 
This Article takes as its starting point the notion that there 
is something about international commercial disputes that 
leads to a heightened need or desire for procedural autonomy. 
Although there are a variety of ways of proving this hypothesis, 
the most commonly enunciated rationale for party autonomy in 
commercial affairs involves concerns about predictability. This 
principle can be illustrated by a series of decisions rendered by 
the United States Supreme Court in the late twentieth century, 
although the need for certainty in cross-border business trans-
actions has been recognized by numerous other authorities.48 
                                                                                                                                     
 47. See Bone, supra note 30, at 1331, 1334; Dodge, supra note 30, at 736; 
Hoffman, supra note 7, at 390–91. 
 48. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 
614, 629 (1985); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516 (1974); M/S 
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. (The Bremen), 407 U.S. 1, 11, 13–15 (1972) 
(noting England enforces forum selection provisions); Premium Nafta Prods. 
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The U.S. Supreme Court first considered procedural autono-
my in international commercial disputes in 1972, in M/S Bre-
men v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. (The Bremen).49 Although the 
Court had already upheld the validity of forum selection claus-
es in the domestic context,50 The Bremen was the first case to 
address such provisions in the international realm.51 
In its decision, the Supreme Court not only upheld the par-
ties’ agreement despite a historical antipathy to forum selec-
tion provisions,52 but the Court also recognized the special sta-
tus of international forum selection provisions, stating that 
[t]he expansion of American business and industry will hardly 
be encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist 
on a parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved un-
der our laws and in our courts. . . . We cannot have trade and 
commerce in world markets and international waters exclu-
sively on our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our 
courts.53 
Because “agreeing in advance on a forum acceptable to both 
parties is an indispensable element in international trade, 
commerce, and contracting,”54 the Court “eschewed a provincial 
solicitude for the jurisdiction of domestic forums” and upheld 
the forum selection provision.55 
A key element of the Court’s analysis involved the link be-
tween autonomy and predictability or, in the Court’s words, 
“certainty.”56 According to the Court, procedural autonomy ex-
ists so as to increase predictability in transnational com-
                                                                                                                                     
Ltd. v. Fili Shipping Co., [2007] UKHL 40, [26] (appeal taken from Eng.), 
aff’g Fiona Trust & Holding Corp. v. Privalov, [2007] EWCA (Civ) 20 (Eng.) 
(discussing enforcement of forum selection clauses and arbitration agree-
ments); BORN, DRAFTING, supra note 2, at 1. 
 49. See The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 1; Main, Review, supra note 18, at 475 
(citing the desire for procedural certainty as reflected in empirical studies). 
 50. See Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315–16 (1964). 
 51. See id.; see also The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9. 
 52. See The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9–10. 
 53. Id. at 9. 
 54. Id. at 13–14, as quoted in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 630 (1985). 
 55. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 630 (construing The Bremen, 407 
U.S. at 1). 
 56. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 13–14, 17. 
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merce.57 However, there are several different types of predicta-
bility. 
First, predictability can involve issues of substantive law. In-
terestingly, although The Bremen is often cited as support for 
procedural autonomy, the decision also discussed how forum 
selection provisions ensure predictability in the substantive 
law.58 This link between procedural and substantive law could 
be important to the current debate about customized procedur-
al contracts.59 
Second, predictability can refer to the place where the dis-
pute will be heard. This is the feature that is most commonly 
associated with forum selection clauses and was at the heart of 
the decision in The Bremen.60 Choice of court agreements facili-
tate a certain amount of procedural predictability because the 
law of the forum is presumed to control most, if not all, proce-
dural matters.61 
Third, predictability can relate to the enforceability of the 
judgment arising out of the chosen venue. This issue was not 
discussed in The Bremen, since that dispute involved the initial 
enforcement of a forum selection provision.62 However, forum 
selection clauses have not traditionally provided any assuranc-
es regarding the enforcement of a judgment resulting from liti-
gation in the preferred venue.63 Instead, judgments arising out 
of a forum selection provision are subject to the same compli-
cated, confusing, and often unpredictable process that applies 
to the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in oth-
er contexts.64 This feature is relevant to the debate about pro-
                                                                                                                                     
 57. See id. at 17. 
 58. See id. at 13 n.15 (noting that “[i]t is . . . reasonable to conclude that 
the forum clause was also an effort to obtain certainty as to the applicable 
substantive law”). 
 59. See infra notes 86–95 and accompanying text. 
 60. See The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 13–14. 
 61. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 (1971); COLLINS 
ET AL., supra note 1, ¶ 7-002. However, this rule is not always as clear cut as 
it seems. See infra notes 86–95 and accompanying text. 
 62. See The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 10. 
 63. See BORN, DRAFTING, supra note 2, at 19, 151–52. 
 64. The problem is linked to the absence of any multinational treaty con-
cerning the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. See id. at 19, 
151–52; Strong, Judgments, supra note 14. Although COCA may eventually 
provide some limited assistance in this regard, COCA is not yet in force. See 
COCA, supra note 22, arts. 1–2, 8–9; see also supra note 22. 
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cedural contracts because some of the difficulties associated 
with the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments 
arise because of concerns about the legitimacy of other states’ 
procedural practices.65 Thus, any process (including, perhaps, 
the use of a private procedural agreement) that helps harmo-
nize some of the differences associated with national procedur-
al practices could increase the international enforceability of 
civil judgments.66 
Fourth and finally, predictability may refer to the actual pro-
cedures that are used to resolve the dispute at hand. This issue 
was also not discussed in The Bremen.67 However, the common 
understanding, both then and now, is that the parties will ad-
here to the procedural rules applied by the forum court.68 Alt-
hough this approach may be defensible on policy grounds,69 it is 
important to recognize as a factual matter that application of 
the forum’s procedural law may not lead to the kind of predict-
ability that commercial actors require. For example, there is no 
guarantee that a court designated by the parties can or will ac-
cept jurisdiction over any particular matter.70 Furthermore, 
research has shown that procedures in the United States can 
                                                                                                                                     
 65. See Strong, Judgments, supra note 14 (discussing systemic and indi-
vidual due process concerns). 
 66. See Main, Review, supra note 18, at 471. 
 67. See The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 13–14. 
 68. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 & cmt. a 
(1971); COLLINS ET AL., supra note 1, ¶ 7-002. 
 69. Judicial efficiency and convenience appear to be the primary policy 
rationales, although uniformity can also play a role in some contexts. See 
GARNETT, supra note 20, at 10–15 (also discussing rationales based on natu-
ral justice, public law, and territorial sovereignty); Brainerd Currie, The Con-
stitution and the “Transitory” Cause of Action, 73 HARV. L. REV. 268, 271 
n.179 (1959); Michael Steven Green, Horizontal Erie and the Presumption of 
Forum Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1237, 1245 (2011); James R. Pielemeier, Con-
stitutional Limitations on Choice of Law: The Special Case of Multistate Def-
amation, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 381, 432 (1985). 
 70. For example, parties cannot contract around the requirement of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction in U.S. federal courts. See Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. 
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982). It is also possi-
ble for courts to set aside a forum selection provision. See The Bremen, 407 
U.S. at 16–17. Certain commentators have suggested that U.S. courts set 
aside foreign forum selection clauses with some frequency. See Paulson, su-
pra note 25, at 487–88. 
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differ significantly between individual state courts,71 between 
state courts and federal courts,72 and even between and within 
different federal courts.73 Litigation in the United States is also 
said to be subject to a number of unwritten rules of procedure 
that makes it difficult for parties, particularly foreign parties, 
to anticipate how a dispute will be resolved.74 Differences be-
tween the procedural rules of different countries are often even 
more extreme.75
                                                                                                                                     
71. See Bone, supra note 30, at 1339; Catherine T. Struve, Institutional 
Practice, Procedural Uniformity, and As-Applied Challenges Under the Rules 
Enabling Act, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1181, 1218–29 (2011). 
72. See Bone, supra note 30, at 1339; Struve, supra note 71, at 1218–29.
 73. Parties proceeding in federal court are subject not only to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure but also to the local rules of that particular court as 
well as the rules of the particular judge who hears the case. See FED. R. CIV.
P. Sometimes these rules can vary significantly. Compare Local Rules of 
United States District Courts for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New 
York, http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/courtrules.php, with Local Rules of Prac-
tice for the United States District Court for the Northern District of New 
York, http://www.nynd.uscourts.gov/news/nynd-2014-local-rules-effective-
112014; compare also Individual Rules and Procedures for Judge Shira A. 
Scheindlin of the District Court of the Southern District of New York, 
http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/judge/Scheindlin, with Individual Rules and 
Procedures for Judge Lewis A. Kaplan of the District Court of the Southern 
District of New York, http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/judge/Kaplan. These in-
dividual rules can sometimes be outcome-determinative. See Chevron Corp. v. 
Donziger, No. 11 Civ. 0691 (LAK), 2013 WL 5548913, *1–3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 
2013); BORN, DRAFTING, supra note 2, at 1. 
74. See Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, The Integration of Law and 
Fact in an Uncharted Parallel Procedural Universe, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1981, 1983 (2004) (discussing an informal procedural system that “has no 
procedural rulebook, is largely ignored in law schools, and is seldom men-
tioned by judges. Yet it is a methodical and logical system that civil litigators 
are aware of and, increasingly, rely upon as a necessary complement to the 
formal system”). Judges are also given a great deal of discretion in how they 
decide certain matters, which further compounds the litigants’ procedural 
uncertainty. See Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural 
Discretion, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 1963 (2007) (“If we were not so accus-
tomed to broad trial judge discretion over procedure, we would probably think 
it a rather strange way to manage the litigation environment.”); Robert E. 
Keeton, The Function of Local Rules and the Tension with Uniformity, 50 U.
PITT. L. REV. 853, 854–55 (1989) (noting excessive judicial discretion can vio-
late the rule of law); S.I. Strong, Jurisdictional Discovery in United States 
Federal Courts, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 489, 530–32 (2010) [hereinafter 
Strong, Discovery].
75. See Main, Review, supra note 18, at 468. 
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Together, these features suggest that the rules of civil proce-
dure may not be as uniform—and hence predictable—as is 
commonly believed to be the case.76 Indeed, Professor Judith 
Resnik has suggested that a variety of “mini-codes of civil pro-
cedure are being created by [U.S.] courts, agencies, and a mul-
titude of private providers.”77 As a result, “[t]he aspiration for a 
trans-substantive procedural regime embedded in the Federal 
Rules has been supplanted by an array of contextualized pro-
cesses.”78 
Although forum selection provisions were the first type of in-
ternational procedural contracts contemplated by the United 
States Supreme Court, they were not the last. The Court has 
also considered the validity of arbitration agreements as “spe-
cialized kind[s] of forum-selection clause[s].”79 Predictability 
also figures largely in discussions relating to these types of 
agreements. 
For example, one of the earliest cases on international com-
mercial arbitration, Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., stated that 
uncertainty will almost inevitably exist with respect to any 
contract touching two or more countries, each with its own 
substantive laws and conflict-of-laws rules. A contractual pro-
vision specifying in advance the forum in which disputes shall 
be litigated and the law to be applied is, therefore, an almost 
indispensable precondition to achievement of the orderliness 
and predictability essential to any international business 
transaction. Furthermore, such a provision obviates the dan-
ger that a dispute under the agreement might be submitted to 
a forum hostile to the interests of one of the parties or unfa-
miliar with the problem area involved. 
A parochial refusal by the courts of one country to enforce an 
international arbitration agreement would not only frustrate 
                                                                                                                                     
 76. See David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-
Substantivity in Federal Civil Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 373 (2010) 
[hereinafter Marcus, Past]. 
 77. Resnik, supra note 11, at 597–98. 
 78. Id. at 597. Some scholars have questioned whether it is even appropri-
ate to aspire to a trans-substantive approach to procedural law. See Robert 
M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 
YALE L. J. 718, 732–39 (1975). But see Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices 
and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. 
PA. L. REV. 2237, 2244–47 (1989) (defending trans-substantivity in procedural 
law). 
 79. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974). 
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these purposes, but would invite unseemly and mutually de-
structive jockeying by the parties to secure tactical litigation 
advantages.80 
Scherk therefore reinforced the principle enunciated in The 
Bremen that parties need predictability (and hence autonomy) 
with respect to both the place where a dispute will be heard 
and the substantive law that will apply.81 However, Scherk 
went one step further and also protected the parties’ ability to 
choose the procedures by which their dispute is resolved.82 In 
reaching its decision, the Court held that arbitration agree-
ments are enforceable to the same extent and for the same rea-
sons as forum selection clauses, particularly in the internation-
al realm.83 
The Supreme Court’s support for predictability in dispute 
resolution processes reached its zenith in Mitsubishi Motors 
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., which stated that 
concerns of international comity, respect for the capacities of 
foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the 
need of the international commercial system for predictability 
in the resolution of disputes require that we enforce the par-
ties’ agreement, even assuming that a contrary result would 
be forthcoming in a domestic context.84 
These decisions show how respect for procedural autonomy 
has evolved in the United States over time. In each of these 
cases, the Supreme Court has overcome a tradition of judicial 
hostility to the various practices due to the need to encourage 
                                                                                                                                     
 80. Id. at 516–17 (footnote omitted). 
 81. See id. at 518; see also M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. (The Bre-
men), 407 U.S. 1 (1972). 
 82. See Scherk, 417 U.S. at 519 (noting that an arbitration agreement 
“posits not only the situs of suit but also the procedure to be used in resolving 
the dispute”). The final type of predictability involves enforcement of the de-
cision arising out of the arbitration or litigation. Arbitration is clearly the 
better process in this regard, since parties can take advantage of one of the 
numerous international treaties facilitating the recognition and enforcement 
of foreign arbitral awards. See BORN, ICA, supra note 3, at 68–71. However, 
this principle was not discussed in Scherk, since the Court was addressing 
the enforcement of an arbitration agreement, not an arbitral award. See 
Scherk, 417 U.S. at 519–20. 
 83. See Scherk, 417 U.S. at 518–19 (citing The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9, 13–
14). 
 84. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 
614, 629 (1985) (emphasis added). 
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predictability in international commerce.85 As a result, private 
procedural contracts stand a good chance of being upheld if 
they can be shown to promote predictability in international 
commercial transactions. 
When making this argument, parties would be well-advised 
to demonstrate how private procedural contracts increase pre-
dictability in the interpretation and application of substantive 
law, since the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently focused on 
substantive concerns in its discussions of procedural autonomy. 
As it turns out, there are several ways to tie procedural con-
tracts to matters involving substantive law. For example, the 
notion that procedure is neutral with respect to outcome has 
come under increased attack in recent years,86 and parties are 
increasingly engaging in “forum shopping for jurisdictions in 
which procedural law has a likelihood of affecting the favoura-
ble resolution of a dispute when those transactions or relation-
ships sour.”87 As a result, it appears increasingly likely that 
parties in an international transaction will use both a forum 
selection provision and a choice of law agreement, which could 
mean that the court chosen to resolve a particular dispute is 
                                                                                                                                     
85. See id. at 625; Scherk, 417 U.S. at 516; The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9–10. 
Some of this antipathy was based on the influence of “Joseph Beale, the re-
porter for the First Restatement of Conflicts of Laws, who condemned choice-
of-law clauses as conferring the equivalent of legislative power on the con-
tracting parties” and noting judicial “hostility towards choice-of-law clauses 
was [based on] the sense that they represented an impermissible usurpation 
of state power.” Geoffrey P. Miller & Theodore Eisenberg, The Market for 
Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2073, 2076 (2009); see also Joseph H. Beale, 
What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract: III. Theoretical and Practical 
Criticisms of the Authorities, 23 HARV. L. REV. 260, 261 (1910). However, the-
se sentiments have been rejected not only with respect to substantive choice 
of law provisions but also with respect to forum selection clauses and arbitra-
tion agreements. See Miller & Eisenberg, supra, at 2076; see also The Bre-
men, 407 U.S. at 12 (discussing ouster of judicial jurisdiction through forum 
selection clauses); PETER B. RUTLEDGE, ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 
16–17 (2013) (discussing the concept that arbitration ousts the jurisdiction of 
the courts). 
86. See GARNETT, supra note 20, at 15–43; Sagi Peari, Book Review, 14 
MELB. J. INT’L L. 304, 309–10 (2013) (reviewing GARNETT, supra note 20) (dis-
cussing how damages calculations can be affected by the substantive-
procedural divide). 
 87. Donald K. Anton, Book Review, 60 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 489, 490 (2013) 
(reviewing GARNETT, supra note 20).
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not an expert in the substantive principles that apply.88 How-
ever, some parties could want to have their disputes heard by a 
court that is expert in the substantive law that has been chosen 
but not want to expose themselves to a particular procedure, 
such as U.S.-style discovery. Since it is highly improbable at 
this point that states will curtail parties’ ability to choose the 
substantive law that governs their contracts,89 other steps 
must be taken to minimize the effect that procedural dispari-
ties have on substantive outcomes. Individualized procedural 
contracts may be one way to address that issue. 
Another time-honored axiom that has recently come under 
fire involves the purported distinction between substance and 
procedure. Not only have numerous authorities recognized the 
impossibility of drawing strict lines between substance and 
procedure,90 but several scholars have noted how the substan-
tive law is often built on certain assumptions regarding the 
shape of the applicable procedural law.91 As a result, it could 
very well be argued that claims made under foreign law should 
be decided under the procedural laws of that jurisdiction, at 
least in some regards, so as to take into account the legal envi-
ronment that generated that particular substantive right and 
minimize the possibility of either underregulating or overregu-
lating certain behaviors through the use of foreign procedural 
mechanisms.92 A more liberal approach to procedural autonomy 
                                                                                                                                     
 88. See Anton, supra note 87, at 490 (noting that the “internationally dis-
parate procedural advantages and disadvantages tied to traditional lex fori 
rule can undermine the ‘uniformity’ of result of cases arising outside of the 
forum”). 
 89. Indeed, it appears as if states are moving toward increased autonomy 
in choice of substantive law. See Draft Hague Principles, supra note 3; 
Symeonides, supra note 1, at 875–76. 
 90. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 & cmt. b (1971); 
COLLINS ET AL., supra note 1, ¶ 7-004; Anton, supra note 87, at 489. 
 91. See Main, Substantive, supra note 20, at 802; see also Peari, supra note 
86, at 305. For example, a party might not be able to prove all the elements of 
a fraud claim arising under U.S. law unless U.S.-style discovery is permitted. 
Most civil law nations use adverse inferences and shifts in the burden of 
proof to avoid the need for discovery in these types of scenarios. See Hazard, 
Secrets, supra note 15, at 1682. However, it is unclear whether adverse infer-
ences and burden-shifting would lead to the same substantive outcome as 
U.S.-style discovery or vice versa. 
 92. At this point, international commercial arbitration appears to be supe-
rior to litigation because arbitration permits an increased amount of juris-
prudential consistency between substantive and procedural law while never-
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might increase consistency between substantive and procedural 
law. 
Finally, parties seeking to find a link between procedural 
contracts and predictability could attempt to demonstrate that 
the use of harmonized procedures could increase the enforcea-
bility of civil judgments across national borders.93 Although 
predictability of enforcement is not precisely the same as pre-
dictability of substantive choice of law, the two goals are mutu-
ally consistent, since an unenforceable judgment is as bad as 
(or worse than) a judgment rendered pursuant to the wrong 
substantive law.94 Therefore, courts could view any mechanism 
that increases the international enforceability of civil judg-
ments as an effective means of promoting international com-
mercial activity.95 
B. Frequency of Procedural Contracts in Practice  
Although private procedural contracts would appear to in-
crease predictability in international commercial litigation, it is 
unclear whether and to what extent parties are actually at-
                                                                                                                                     
theless allowing the parties to exercise procedural autonomy in other regards. 
This phenomenon does not arise as a result of any formal requirement that 
parties and arbitrators choose procedures that align with the substantive law 
governing the dispute. Instead, the alignment of procedure and substance 
occurs as a result of international arbitration’s core values of procedural flex-
ibility and harmonization of common law and civil law practices. Because 
arbitrators are allowed to adopt procedures that are tailored to the dispute 
and the parties, arbitral awards may be more consistent with judgments of 
the courts whose law has been chosen to control the substance of the dispute 
than judgments from foreign courts, since judges are at this point unable or 
unwilling to adopt procedures akin to those used in the country whose law 
controls the substance of the dispute. 
 93. See supra notes 67–75 and accompanying text. 
 94. A judgment rendered pursuant to the wrong substantive law might 
still reach the same outcome as would have occurred under the law chosen by 
the parties. However,”[a]n unenforceable judgment is at best valueless; at 
worst a source of additional loss.” Alexander Hansebout, The International 
Dimension of the Attachment of Debts, 4 DISP. RESOL. INT’L 219, 219 (2010). 
 95. Notably, a procedural contract could increase international enforce-
ment in two ways. First, a procedural contract may make a party more ame-
nable to suit in a jurisdiction where assets are located, thereby removing the 
need to seek international enforcement of the resulting judgment. Second, a 
procedural contract may make the litigation process more familiar to a for-
eign court that will then be more inclined to recognize and enforce the result-
ing judgment. See Strong, Judgments, supra note 14 (discussing systemic and 
individual due process concerns). 
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tempting to adopt such contracts in practice.96 Indeed, there 
are a number of reasons why parties may be disinclined to 
adopt these sorts of provisions. 
For example, some parties may worry about the enforceabil-
ity of individualized procedural contracts.97 Other parties may 
prefer to use arbitration, particularly in international disputes, 
because arbitration offers various benefits—such as the easy 
enforceability of foreign awards—in addition to the possibility 
of customized procedures.98 Still other parties may simply be 
unaware that individualized court procedures are possible. Fi-
nally, some parties may be influenced by inertia, or what might 
be called “the norm-creating power of the factual.”99 
This final proposition is particularly intriguing because it can 
be tied to the notion of defaults, a concept that is of some inter-
est in the area of procedural contracts.100 For example, some 
theorists believe that 
when lawmakers anoint a contract term [or legislative provi-
sion as] the default, the substantive preferences of contracting 
parties shift—that term becomes more desirable, and other 
competing terms becoming less desirable. Put another way, 
contracting parties view default terms as part of the status 
quo, and they prefer the status quo to alternative states, all 
other things equal.101 
Although parties may prefer to retain the status quo, re-
search suggests that individuals will begin to exercise their 
right (or, in more innovative contexts, test their right) to opt 
out of a default provision if and when the default becomes un-
desirable under a standard cost-benefit analysis.102 This phe-
                                                                                                                                     
 96. See Bone, supra note 30, at 1346; Hoffman, supra note 7, at 393–94. 
 97. See BORN, DRAFTING, supra note 2, at 161; Hoffman, supra note 7, at 
424–25. 
 98. See Bone, supra note 30, at 1351–52; Hoffman, supra note 7, at 423–
24; S.I. Strong, Enforcing Class Arbitration in the International Sphere: Due 
Process and Public Policy Concerns, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1, 70–81 (2008) [here-
inafter Strong, Due Process]. 
 99. Gunnar Beck, Legitimation Crisis, Reifying Human Rights and the 
Norm-Creating Power of the Factual: Reply to “Reifying Law: Let Them Be 
Lions,” 26 PENN. ST. INT’L L. REV. 565, 568 (2008) (citation omitted). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 
CORNELL L. REV. 608, 611–12 (1998). 
 102. See Michael Klausner, Fact and Fiction in Corporate Law and Govern-
ance, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1325, 1329 (2013). An interesting notion relates to how 
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nomenon is illustrated in the procedural realm through the rise 
in national103 and international104 arbitration as satisfaction 
with similar forms of litigation fell. 
Conventional wisdom holds that legal developments take 
place steadily and incrementally.105 However, empirical re-
search suggests that innovation occurs “when sufficient, highly 
salient, exogenous shocks commence to rattle the status 
quo.”106 Interestingly, the world of procedural law seems to 
have recently experienced two of these types of “shocks.”107 
First, the United States Supreme Court’s recent decisions 
concerning class arbitration have caused numerous commenta-
tors to question the limits of procedural autonomy in both arbi-
tration and litigation.108 For years, observers had believed that 
parties would be unable to waive class proceedings in arbitra-
tion because such actions were assumed to be impermissible in 
the judicial realm.109 However, scholars are now wondering 
whether the Supreme Court’s decision to uphold various types 
                                                                                                                                     
hard it is to contract out of a default provision. See Brett H. McDonnell, 
Sticky Defaults and Altering Rules in Corporate Law, 60 SMU L. REV. 383, 
390 (2007); see also infra notes 106–07 and accompanying text. 
 103. For example, the increase in domestic arbitration in the United States 
can be tied to corporations’ desire to limit the possibility of class action litiga-
tion, which was seen as both expensive and risky. See S.I. STRONG, CLASS, 
MASS, AND COLLECTIVE ARBITRATION IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
¶ 1.16 (2013) [hereinafter STRONG, CLASS]. 
 104. The increased use of international commercial arbitration can be 
linked to parties’ desire to reduce the unpredictability and expense of trans-
national litigation. See BORN, ICA, supra note 3, at 76–78, 85–86. 
 105. See Hoffman, supra note 7, at 425, 428; see also Stephen J. Choi & G. 
Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts: An Empirical Examination 
of Sovereign Bonds, 53 EMORY L.J. 929, 929 (2004). 
 106. Hoffman, supra note 7, at 428; see also id. at 425 (suggesting the “more 
common pattern is for the market as a whole to shift rather quickly to a new 
term or set of terms after a period of experimentation and innovation in dif-
ferent possibilities” rather than through slow, incremental change). 
 107. Id. at 428; see also Dodge, supra note 30, at 729; Paulson, supra note 
25, at 473. 
 108. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 
(2013); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1751–53 (2011); 
STRONG, CLASS, supra note 103, ¶¶ 4.76–4.121; Bone, supra note 30, at 1362–
67; Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 11, at 520–64; Dodge, supra note 30, at 
776–83; Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 30, at 1103; Hoffman, supra note 7, 
at 428; Paulson, supra note 25, at 471; Resnik, supra note 11, at 609–22. 
 109. See Hans Smit, Class Actions and Their Waiver in Arbitration, 15 AM. 
REV. INT’L ARB. 199, 203 (2004). 
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of class waivers in arbitration can be read as supporting an ex-
pansive view of procedural autonomy that extends beyond the 
arbitral context.110 
Second, globalization has led to an ever-increasing amount of 
transnational litigation,111 thereby generating a “growing need 
for legal certainty in a world where people and corporations 
have seemingly unfettered mobility.”112 Up until this point, in-
ternational commercial actors’ desire for both predictability 
and familiarity has been met through arbitration. However, a 
growing dissatisfaction with the cost and formality of interna-
tional commercial arbitration could drive parties to consider 
the use of individualized procedural contracts.113 Modified 
forms of litigation may be particularly attractive to the ever-
increasing number of small and medium sized enterprises 
(“SMEs”) that are now engaged in transnational commerce, 
since many of these smaller entities either may be unaware of 
the benefits of international commercial arbitration or may 
find the costs associated with arbitration to be prohibitively 
high.114 
                                                                                                                                     
 110. See Bone, supra note 30, at 1333; Dodge, supra note 30, at 781; 
Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 30, at 1106–07; Hoffman, supra note 7, at 
428; Resnik, supra note 11, at 599. 
 111. See Katy Dowell, International Litigants in London Rise by a Third in 
Three Years, LAWYER (May 7, 2013), http://www.thelawyer.com/news-and-
analysis/practice-areas/litigation/international-litigants-in-london-rise-by-a-
third-in-three-years/3004520.article (noting rise of U.S. litigants in English 
courts); Marcus S. Quintanilla & Christopher A. Whytock, The New Multipo-
larity in Transnational Litigation: Foreign Courts, Foreign Judgments, and 
Foreign Law, 18 SW. J. INT’L L. 31, 37 (2011); William F. Sullivan et al., A 
Global Concern: The Rise of International Securities Litigation, BLOOMBERG 
L. (Apr. 8, 2013), http://about.bloomberglaw.com/practitioner-contributions/a-
global-concern-the-rise-of-international-securities-litigation/. 
 112. Sánchez-Cordero, supra note 10, at xxxiv; see also Grossi, supra note 
18, at 627. 
 113. See Sánchez-Cordero, supra note 10, at xxxv (noting the need for “effi-
ciency, transparency, predictability, and procedural economy” in transnation-
al litigation); supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text. 
 114. See Giuseppe de Palo & Linda Costabile, Promotion of International 
Commercial Arbitration and Other Alternative Dispute Resolution Techniques 
in Ten Southern Mediterranean Countries, 7 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 
303, 303–04 (2006); Mistelis, supra note 33, at 582 (concluding “international 
[commercial] arbitration is at least as expensive as litigation for middle and 
smaller sized cases”). While international transactions were at one time con-
ducted almost entirely by large, multinational corporations, improvements in 
technology and communication have opened global markets to a wide variety 
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II. STRUCTURAL CONCERNS ABOUT PROCEDURAL AUTONOMY IN 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LITIGATION 
Having described how and why parties in international com-
mercial transactions have a heightened need or desire for pro-
cedural autonomy, it is now time to consider various structural 
concerns relating to the exercise of that autonomy through con-
tracts creating individualized litigation procedures. Although 
the relevant issues can be viewed from a variety of perspec-
tives,115 perhaps the most compelling way of framing structural 
concerns is in terms of a presumption that national rules of civ-
il procedure are non-derogable as a result of “a ‘State sover-
eignty prerogative.’”116 This approach holds that states are the 
only entities entitled to identify procedural norms in litigation 
because states are the only bodies that have the right and the 
responsibility of ensuring procedural fairness in national 
courts.117 Under this model, private attempts to customize pro-
cedural rules are presumptively improper because such efforts 
necessarily conflict with the state’s conception of procedural 
justice.118 
Although the notion of a state procedural prerogative domi-
nated the jurisprudential landscape for many years, commen-
tators have recently identified a possible distinction between 
the law relating to litigation procedures and the law relating to 
judicial organization.119 Under this model, some matters (such 
as those involving the relationship between the parties inter se) 
might be amenable to private procedural agreements even 
though other issues (such as those involving judicial admin-
                                                                                                                                     
of participants, including SMEs. See Michael B. Carsella, Payment Methods 
in International Trade, in DOING BUSINESS WORLDWIDE: THE FOURTH ANNUAL 
INTERNATIONAL LAW FORUM FOR THE PRACTITIONER AND INTERNATIONAL 
BUSINESS EXECUTIVE sec. G, 1, 2 (1998). 
 115. For example, it is possible to describe structural concerns in terms of 
threats to democratic values. See Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 11, at 551. 
 116. Sánchez-Cordero, supra note 10, at xxxiii; see also Born, Adjudication, 
supra note 10, at 780, 859. 
 117. See Resnik, supra note 11, at 595–98. States may also have other in-
terests (such as institutional or judicial efficiency) that they wish to further 
in litigation. See Andrew Le Sueur, Access to Justice Rights in the United 
Kingdom, 5 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 457, 473 (2000). 
 118. See Resnik, supra note 11, at 596; see also Hoffman, supra note 7, at 
392. 
 119. See Sánchez-Cordero, supra note 10, at xxxiii (citing authorities). 
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istration or the relationship between the parties and the court) 
remained within the exclusive control of the state.120 
Distinguishing between those procedures that are amenable 
to privatization and those that are not can be a difficult task. 
In considering these matters, it is useful to adopt both a theo-
retical and practical methodology, as in the discussion below. 
A. Theoretical Perspectives 
Structural concerns relating to procedural contracts are par-
ticularly well-suited to theoretical analyses, since constitution-
al and political philosophers have considered questions relating 
to institutional design at length and in a variety of contexts. As 
a result, matters relating to the privatization of litigation can 
be addressed from several different theoretical perspectives. 
For example, some commentators have analyzed procedural 
contracts through the lens of law and economics.121 This ap-
proach suggests “rethink[ing] the rules of procedure as a set of 
defaults. To set such defaults, scholars suggest that we look not 
simply at typical public law goals, such as distributive fairness 
and efficiency, but dynamically, focusing on parties’ strategy, 
and consequently on the role of information exchange through 
rulemaking.”122 
Default rules provide the means of  
fill[ing] a gap in a contract where the parties have not select-
ed a different rule. Default rules can be contracted around if 
the parties make an explicit choice to do so. . . . On the other 
                                                                                                                                     
 120. See id. Some sources define “judicial administration” as including mat-
ters relating to “the proper form of action, service of process, pleading, rules 
of discovery, mode of trial and execution and costs.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §122 & cmt. a (1971). However, other authorities use 
“judicial administration” to describe matters relating to internal organization 
and institutional design. See Zoltán Fleck, A Comparative Analysis of Judi-
cial Power, Organisational Issues in Judicature and the Administration of 
Courts, 27 IUS GENTIUM 3, 11–23 (2014); Russell R. Wheeler, Roscoe Pound 
and the Evolution of Judicial Administration, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 943, 943 
(2007). This Article will adopt the latter convention unless otherwise indicat-
ed. 
 121. See Bone, supra note 30, at 1391; Dodge, supra note 30, at 755; Hoff-
man, supra note 7, at 394 Kapeliuk & Klement, Ex Ante, supra note 30, at 
1492; see also PROCEDURAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Chris William Sanchirico 
ed., 2012). 
 122. Hoffman, supra note 7, at 394; see also Glenn, supra note 21, at 490. 
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hand, a mandatory or immutable rule is one that the parties 
cannot contract around. . . . 
Efficiency theory, in general, supports the use of default rules, 
not mandatory rules. Indeed, law and economics scholars 
have long fought against the use of “immutable rules, includ-
ing those based on public policy.”123 
Therefore, proponents of a law and economics approach 
would permit parties to adopt individualized procedural con-
tracts so long as the parties can adequately protect their inter-
ests.124 Since no evidence yet exists suggesting that procedural 
contracts result in an abuse of rights, proponents of law and 
economics would permit parties to engage in these sorts of pri-
vate contracts. 
This model doubtless will be persuasive to some observers. 
However, a pure law and economics approach to procedural 
contracts gives rise to several concerns. First, efficiency-based 
arguments have been said to be problematic in cases involving 
procedural rights because “[i]n many private relations, . . . 
courts and other decisionmakers have not allowed what would 
be the most efficient ‘Coasean’ result.”125 
                                                                                                                                     
 123. Wendy Netter Epstein, Contract Theory and the Failure of Public-
Private Contracting, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2211, 2232 (2013) (citation omitted). 
 124. See Robert Gertner & Ian Ayres, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: 
An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 88 (1989) (“Immutabil-
ity is justified only if unregulated contracting would be socially deleterious 
because parties internal or external to the contract cannot adequately protect 
themselves.”). 
 125. Michael I. Swygert & Katherine Earle Yanes, A Unified Theory of Jus-
tice: The Integration of Fairness into Efficiency, 73 WASH. L. REV. 249, 261 
(1998); see also Paulson, supra note 25, at 526. Indeed, litigation currently 
reflects a multitude of inefficient practices that have been adopted for various 
reasons, including those relating to procedural fairness. See Janet Cooper 
Alexander, Judges’ Self-Interest and Procedural Rules: Comment on Macey, 
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 647, 647 (1994); Steven S. Gensler, Judicial Case Man-
agement: Caught in the Crossfire, 60 DUKE L.J. 669, 723 (2010); Jonathan R. 
Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public Choice, and the Rules of Procedure, 23 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 627, 627 (1994). Furthermore, one of the United States’ most 
hallowed procedural practices, U.S.-style discovery, is extremely inefficient. 
See Martin H. Redish, Pleading, Discovery, and the Federal Rules: Exploring 
the Foundations of Modern Procedure, 64 FLA. L. REV. 845, 849 (2012); 
Schwartz, supra note 35, at 1690. Other jurisdictions achieve similar ends 
without the same degree of inefficiency. See Strong, Discovery, supra note 74, 
at 509–12. 
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Second, using law and economics to consider the propriety of 
procedural contracts seems inappropriate to many observers, 
given the type of issues that are at stake.126 For example, pro-
ponents of law and economics have suggested that “the focus of 
civil procedure rules should be to minimize transaction costs, 
not to maximize procedural justice.”127 Although there is value 
in trying to find ways to rationalize various fields of law, many 
people would be hesitant to set aside procedural fairness in fa-
vor of transactional efficiency. 
However, law and economics is not the only theory available. 
It is also possible to analyze private procedural contracts from 
a deontological perspective.128 One potential model involves 
John Rawls’s concept of “justice as fairness,” which has been 
said to constitute the strongest and most popular response to 
consequentialist legal theories such as law and economics.129 
Rawls’s work also provides a useful response to the preceding 
analysis because he “has, on the whole, provided a much more 
penetrating account of our basic constitutional liberties than 
the law and economics movement has been able to articu-
late.”130 
Rawls’s work is also particularly relevant here because the 
method by which he constructs his theory of justice as fairness 
is highly analogous to the way in which procedural contracts 
are most likely to arise. For example, his concept of “justice as 
fairness” is based on the concept of the “veil of ignorance,” 
which involves 
                                                                                                                                     
 126. See Robin Bradley Kar, Contract Law and the Second-Person Stand-
point: Why Efficiency-Maximization Principles Can Neither Explain Nor Jus-
tify the Expectation Damages Remedy, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 977, 980 (2007). 
 127. Hoffman, supra note 7, at 402. 
 128. See Beck, supra note 99, at 579–80. 
 129. Compare JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT (2001) 
[hereinafter RAWLS, RESTATEMENT], and JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 
(1971) [hereinafter RAWLS, THEORY], with RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW § 1.2 (7th ed. 2007), and Beck, supra note 99, at 579–80 
(noting law and economics constitutes a consequentialist theory). Rawls’s 
work has also been described as contractarian, which would correspond nicely 
with the types of issues at stake in this discussion. See Swygert & Yanes, 
supra note 125, at 300; see also Jeremy N. Sheff, Marks, Morals, and Mar-
kets, 65 STAN. L. REV. 761, 775 (2013) (discussing Rawls’s place among social 
contract theorists). 
 130. Kar, supra note 126, at 979 n.10. 
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what agreement the parties would reach if they were able to 
bargain costlessly and ex ante, assuming that they have full 
knowledge of all of the costs, benefits, and alternatives avail-
able to each of them, but that they do not know which party to 
the agreement they will be. Any agreement that the parties 
would reach under these assumptions is one that will resolve 
the distortions caused by disparities in bargaining power 
within non-competitive markets. Any consequent agreement 
will be mutually accommodative in attempting to preserve 
each party’s original utility gain. In short, it will be based on 
a hypothetical consensus involving a condition of hidden iden-
tity and a principle of constructive empathy, together with the 
influence of the social norms of risk aversion and perceived 
fairness.131 
Although this passage was written with Rawls’s work in 
mind, the text also describes the type of bargaining that goes 
on when commercial parties are deciding what kind of dispute 
resolution mechanism to include in their transactional docu-
ments.132 Since it is extremely difficult to anticipate at the time 
of contracting precisely what kinds of disputes might eventual-
ly arise, commercial actors have to identify a mechanism that 
will be fair regardless of how the parties are eventually situat-
ed to one another.133 
The methodological similarities between the construction of 
justice as fairness and individualized procedural contracts sug-
                                                                                                                                     
 131. Swygert & Yanes, supra note 125, at 264–65; see also RAWLS, 
RESTATEMENT, supra note 129, at 15–18; RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 129, pt. 
1, ch. III, § 24. Although this passage focuses on justice as “empathy,” the 
concept of empathy is simply a more particularized means of describing jus-
tice as fairness. See Swygert & Yanes, supra note 125, at 291–95. Fairness 
can also be framed in the terms described herein (i.e., as synonymous with 
the principles of equality of arms and the ability to present one’s case). See 
infra notes 338–40 and accompanying text. 
 132. See BORN, DRAFTING, supra note 2, at 13–14. 
 133. See id. Some commentators suggest that the lack of knowledge can be 
problematic. See Paulson, supra note 25, at 525; Thomas Schultz, Human 
Rights: A Speed Bump for Arbitral Procedures? An Exploration of Safeguards 
in the Acceleration of Justice, 9 INT’L ARB. L. REV. 1, 14 (2006) (suggesting 
pre-dispute waivers of procedural rights may only be possible if there is “true 
informed consent” or if special circumstances exist). However, the rules com-
mittee of the Judicial Conference operated in a similar type of information 
vacuum when it created trans-substantive rules of procedure, so there is liti-
gation-oriented precedent for allowing pre-dispute agreements relating to 
procedure to stand. See supra note 78 (discussing propriety of trans-
substantive approach to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 
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gest that Rawls would be in favor of these types of private 
agreements. However, the fit between Rawls’s theory and pro-
cedural contracts is not perfect. For example, some people 
might object to using justice as fairness as a means of legitimiz-
ing procedural contracts because 
[t]he conventional view of Rawlsian political philosophy is 
that the private law lies outside the scope of the two princi-
ples of justice—it is not part of the “basic structure” of society, 
which, in this view, is limited to basic constitutional liberties 
and the state’s system of tax and transfer.134 
Of course, this sort of public law-oriented approach may be pre-
cisely what makes Rawls’s work so appropriate in the current 
context, since questions of procedure have traditionally been 
treated as public law concerns falling within the sovereign pre-
rogative.135 
Problems and possibilities therefore exist at both ends of the 
ideological spectrum. However, the two theories do not neces-
sarily have to be viewed as polar opposites, at least in this con-
text.136 Instead, it may be possible to identify a third approach 
to procedural contracts based on “a unified theory of justice in 
which a concept of fairness . . . is integrated into an efficiency 
                                                                                                                                     
 134. Kevin A. Kordana & David H. Tabachnick, Rawls and Contract Law, 
73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 598, 598, 632 (2005); see also Swygert & Yanes, supra 
note 125, at 258. Interestingly, the law and economics approach has met with 
similar criticisms about its suitability in certain areas of law, including pri-
vate law. See Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three 
Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 830 (2003) (“[T]he economic 
approach does not explain the current system of contract law, nor does it pro-
vide a solid basis for criticizing and reforming contract law.”). 
 135. See Sánchez-Cordero, supra note 10, at xxxiii; see also Born, Adjudica-
tion, supra note 10, at 780. There are also ways in which contract law can be 
brought within the Rawlsian fold, although such analyses are beyond the 
scope of the current Article. See Kordana & Tabachnick, supra note 134, at 
600 (suggesting that “private ordering, specifically contract law, must be 
viewed as subject to the demands of the two principles of justice” and that 
“Rawlsian political philosophy, properly understood, is not neutral over con-
ceptions of private ordering. For Rawlsianism, contract law is properly un-
derstood as one of the many loci of distributive justice”); Swygert & Yanes, 
supra note 125, at 258 (noting that “[a]lthough Rawls never applied his thesis 
to allocations of private rights and entitlements, two UCLA professors, Wes-
ley Liebeler (law) and Armen Alchian (economics), have done so by develop-
ing a Hobbsean-Rawlsean ex ante contractarian rationale”). 
 136. See Swygert & Yanes, supra note 125, at 255–57. 
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construct that acknowledges and responds to influences of so-
cial norms.”137 Thus, for example, 
Rawls’s assumption that the parties to a consensus have lim-
ited knowledge about themselves under a “veil of ignorance” 
provides a theoretical way to create constructive empathy. 
Although Rawls primarily applied this restrictive knowledge 
assumption to the derivation of principles for public law, . . . 
by adding to the Coase Theorem a condition of “hidden identi-
ty,” both efficiency and fairness considerations can be inte-
grated into the realm of private law.138 
This blended approach seems to resolve a number of the prob-
lems associated with each of the two theories in their pure form 
and provides a useful theoretical justification for privatized 
procedural contracts. Not only does this third model explain 
past behavior in this area of law (i.e., why courts have allowed 
procedural autonomy in cases involving forum selection clauses 
and international commercial arbitration), it also provides a 
useful analytical paradigm describing how parties can over-
come various structural obstacles relating to the proper roles of 
public and private actors. Thus, there appears to be a sufficient 
amount of theoretical support for private parties to create their 
own procedural contracts, since such agreements not only allow 
individuals to maximize their own procedural efficiency but al-
so allow the state to assert its institutional role in protecting 
certain fundamental notions of procedural fairness.139 
B. Practical Perspectives   
As useful as theoretical models can be, problems can arise 
when those theories are put into practice, since reality may 
generate the need to make certain distinctions and exceptions 
to the original construct.140 Therefore, it is useful to consider 
procedural contracts in practical context.141 
                                                                                                                                     
 137. Id. at 251. 
 138. Id. at 264. 
 139. See infra notes 330–53 and accompanying text (describing the stand-
ards of procedural fairness). 
 140. See Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, Legal Phenomena, 
Knowledge, and Theory: A Cautionary Tale of Hedgehogs and Foxes, 77 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 683, 693 (2002) (concluding that “judges . . . are looking for an-
swers to discrete questions, not solutions grounded in grand theory”); Carrie 
Menkel-Meadow, Correspondences and Contradictions in International and 
Domestic Conflict Resolution: Lessons from General Theory and Varied Con-
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1. Unbundling the Analysis 
One of the problems in this area of law is the tendency to 
consider all procedural practices as analytically similar when 
in fact different procedural rules serve different structural 
purposes. For example, some procedures govern matters of ju-
dicial administration while others dictate the relationship be-
tween the litigants and the court.142 Still other rules can be in-
terpreted as involving no one but the parties themselves.143 
Therefore, it is necessary to deconstruct the analysis so as to 
understand precisely what is at stake in any individual situa-
tion.144 
Interestingly, it has only recently become necessary to make 
these sorts of fine distinctions, since the earliest forms of pro-
cedural contracts (i.e., forum selection clauses) were made on a 
holistic basis, with parties simply choosing a particular forum 
and accepting that court’s procedural requirements in toto.145 
                                                                                                                                     
texts, 2003 J. DISP. RESOL. 319, 329 (2003); Jordan M. Steiker, “Post” Liberal-
ism, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1059, 1063 (1996) (reviewing ROBERT C. POST, 
CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT (1995)) 
(discussing problems of overgeneralization in grand theory); Jane Stapleton, 
Comparative Economic Loss: Lessons from Case-Law-Focused “Middle Theo-
ry,” 50 UCLA L. REV. 531, 532 (2002) (suggesting “middle theory” is more 
persuasive to judges). 
 141. Some commentators believe there is a relative paucity of available case 
law in this field, although that view is not universally held. Compare Hoff-
man, supra note 7 at 393 (suggesting there is little case law in this field) with 
Noyes, supra note 27, at 599 (stating that “[c]ourts have enforced ex ante 
contracts that modify a broad array of litigation rights and rules,” including 
those involving “constitutional rights, statutory rights, rights set forth in the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and rights set forth in the Federal Rules of 
Evidence”). 
 142. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 & cmt. a (1971); 
Sánchez-Cordero, supra note 10, at xxxiii. 
 143. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 & cmt. a (1971); 
Sánchez-Cordero, supra note 10, at xxxiii. 
 144. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 140, at 329 (suggesting the usefulness 
of narrower analyses). 
 145. See Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 134 S.Ct. 568, 579–80 
(2013); Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595–97 (1991); M/S 
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. (The Bremen), 407 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1972). The 
Restatement reflects this type of approach to the extent it contemplates the 
selection of one public procedural system over another rather than the choice 
of a private system of procedure over a public set of rules. See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §122 & cmts. a, b (1971); Dodge, supra note 
30, at 739, 744. 
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However, the question now is whether and to what extent par-
ties can bypass the kind of “bundled” procedural choices inher-
ent in choice of forum provisions (i.e., an undifferentiated com-
bination of “forum, decision maker, and procedural rules”) and 
instead opt for an “unbundled” approach that allows the selec-
tion of “individual procedures to create a customized ‘mini-code 
of civil procedure.’”146 Under the latter model, parties would be 
permitted to dispose of the rules set out by the forum and 
“agree to a different pleading standard, different timing and 
other conditions for raising defenses, limitations on joinder of 
additional parties, limitations on discovery, different summary 
judgment standards, shortened time for the pretrial stage, and 
so on.”147 
Critics of procedural contracts have claimed that “[t]he con-
version of procedural rules from publicly created, mandatory 
guarantors of procedural justice to default rules subject to 
market forces” is problematic from a structural standpoint, 
since such measures could “alter[] the nature and function of 
civil procedure at a basic level.”148 However, there may be a 
way to differentiate between various procedures so as to identi-
fy those rules that may be amenable to customization. 
a. Public Versus Private Concerns 
The first way to separate permissible from impermissible 
procedural contracts is to focus on whether the procedure in 
question is private in nature (i.e., only implicating the relation-
ship between the parties inter se) or whether it is public (i.e., 
affecting the court in some way).149 Structurally, there can be 
few concerns if the agreement is entirely private.150 
The problem of course is that distinctions between public and 
private concerns are far easier to make in the abstract than in 
                                                                                                                                     
 146. Dodge, supra note 30, at 732. 
 147. Bone, supra note 30, at 1345; see also Dodge, supra note 30, at 746. 
Parties in the United States can also agree to waive the constitutional right 
to a jury or agree not to enter objections to the introduction of certain types of 
evidence. See Bone, supra note 30, at 1348–49; see also U.S. CONST. art. III, 
§ 2; Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 391–98 (1987). 
 148. Dodge, supra note 30, at 725; see also Hoffman, supra note 7, at 401–
02. 
 149. See supra notes 119–20 and accompanying text. 
 150. Of course, various substantive concerns could arise, as discussed be-
low. See infra notes 262–386 and accompanying text. 
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practice. Indeed, almost every procedural matter can be framed 
in terms of both public and private concerns.151
For example, procedural contracts purporting to modify the 
rules of pleading could be characterized as entirely private in 
nature. Under this perspective, parties could be seen as simply 
expressing a desire to clarify the type of information that must 
be provided to each other at the time of filing in a post-Iqbal,
post-Twombly world.152 Private agreements regarding pleading 
issues might even be seen as economically prudent because 
such agreements can decrease costly litigation about pleading 
standards153 and increase the likelihood of settlement by 
providing more or better information about the facts underly-
ing a particular claim or defense at the time of filing.154
However, pleading issues can also be framed as affecting pub-
lic rights or interests.155 For example, making pleading stand-
ards more lenient could affect institutional design issues by al-
lowing parties to bring cases that might otherwise be facially 
insufficient as a matter of law, thereby clogging judicial dock-
ets.156 Making pleading standards more rigorous could affect 
other institutional design concerns by limiting parties’ ability 
to assert particular claims or defenses, thereby affecting the 
substantive rights of the parties and perhaps even leaving 
                                                                                                                                     
 151. Some commentators have suggested that matters relating to timing of 
various procedures, class action status, bonds relating to injunctions, burdens 
of proof, discovery, and the introduction of evidence might be considered 
purely private procedures. See Hoffman, supra note 7, at 398–400; Strong, 
Consensual, supra note 30, at 161. However, other commentators have op-
posed this view. See Kapeliuk & Klement, Ex Ante, supra note 30, at 1493–
94; Paulson, supra note 25, at 511–22 (arguing that rules relating to evidence 
are public in nature).
152. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544 (2007).
 153. There is some confusion about how the Supreme Court decisions in 
Iqbal and Twombly are to be applied. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 662; Twombly,
550 U.S. at 544; Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in 
Court, and Trials on the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal 
Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 339 (2013). 
154. See Miller, supra note 153, at 358. 
155. See Hoffman, supra note 7, at 398–402; Miller, supra note 153, at 365–
67. 
156. See Paulson, supra note 25, at 528. Alternatively, customizing the 
pleading standard could be framed as “impracticable.” BORN, DRAFTING, supra 
note 2, at 161. 
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them without a remedy.157 While a defensible compromise posi-
tion does exist (i.e., parties may agree to make their individual 
pleading standard more rigorous than that established as a 
matter of law but may not agree to a more lenient standard), 
this exercise demonstrates the kinds of matters that must be 
considered before a court can determine whether a particular 
procedure is amenable to customization as a structural matter. 
When attempting to determine whether a particular proce-
dure is public or private in nature, it may be helpful to ask 
whether “the contract require[s] the judge (as opposed to the 
parties) to act in a different way or make a decision under a 
different standard” and whether “the contract impose[s] a bur-
den on the court that is inconsistent with sound judicial admin-
istration.”158 These two questions address the two main struc-
tural concerns associated with procedural contracts, namely 
procedures that affect the relationship between the court and 
the parties and procedures that affect judicial administration. 
Another way to frame these types of structural analyses is to 
consider whether the procedural contract in question somehow 
affects certain core values of public adjudication.159 Professor 
Robert Bone has suggested that this inquiry could be carried 
out through a functional comparison of litigation and arbitra-
tion.160
In Bone’s view, litigation involves the quintessentially public 
task of enforcing the substantive law while arbitration focuses 
                                                                                                                                     
 157. Some commentators have suggested that procedural contracts should 
not change the outcome of a dispute. See Paulson, supra note 25, at 524, 529. 
However, this perspective seems somewhat anomalous, since parties are able 
to choose the substantive law that governs their dispute, regardless of the 
fact that such decisions will often have a bearing on the outcome of the mat-
ter. See Bakalar v. Vavra, 619 F.3d 136, 143–44 (2d. Cir. 2010) (noting differ-
ence of outcome under New York versus Swiss law).
 158. Paulson, supra note 25, at 528. 
 159. For example, some commentators claim that the core duties of a judge 
are restricted by procedural contracts because the court is a necessary third 
party participant in the contract. See id. at 475–76. Other authors dispute 
this characterization. See Noyes, supra note 27, at 632. However, the analogy 
to third party contracts may be relevant to some types of contracts (i.e., those 
that affect matters of institutional design) but not others (i.e., those that af-
fect the relationship between the parties inter se).
160. See Bone, supra note 30, at 1386–88; see also Ralf Michaels, The Func-
tional Method of Comparative Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 43, at 339, 342, 357 (describing equivalence 
functionalism). 
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solely on the resolution of a particular dispute.161 However, the 
“core distinctiveness” of litigation 
lies in its commitment to reasoning from general principle 
and doing so in a way that engages the facts of particular cas-
es. Although respecting precedent does not follow inevitably 
from this commitment, it is closely linked to it either prag-
matically (e.g., following precedent limits cognitive error, 
saves decision costs, or protects reliance interests) or morally 
(e.g., following precedent is required by equal concern and re-
spect or a norm of integrity, which also supports the core 
commitment to principled reasoning).162 
Bone’s observations “point[] us in a productive direction for 
thinking about party rulemaking. If parties choose procedural 
rules that undermine the capacity of judges, and perhaps even 
juries, to engage in principled reasoning of the right sort, then 
perhaps their choices should not be honored.”163 However, Bone 
admits that this approach “is just a beginning, . . . for we must 
explain how procedure is connected to principled reasoning and 
why parties to a particular case should be constrained if they 
bear the risks and costs of their own choices.”164 
These commentators appear to suggest the need to conduct 
case-by-case analyses of various procedures to determine 
whether and to what extent those practices affect public versus 
private concerns. Although this process may appear labor-
intensive, courts have already begun to address these issues, as 
discussed in the practical analysis below. 
b. Efficiency   
Another structural issue that courts and commentators may 
wish to consider when evaluating the propriety of individual-
ized judicial procedures involves efficiency and the associated 
                                                                                                                                     
 161. See Bone, supra note 30, at 1386–88. 
 162. Id. at 1388 (citation omitted). Because Bone is writing from the U.S. 
perspective, his analysis is largely rooted in principles associated with the 
common law tradition. Translating his hypothesis into a civil law context 
would require judges to keep faith with the relevant statutes. Interestingly, 
some people believe that U.S. law is becoming more like the civil law, due to 
the increased incidence of statutory and regulatory law. See GUIDO 
CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 5–7 (1982). 
 163. Bone, supra note 30, at 1388. 
 164. Id. 
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need for uniformity.165 While this Article’s foray into legal theo-
ry has suggested that procedural contracts should not be eval-
uated solely in light of efficiency rationales, a hybrid approach 
that takes efficiency concerns into account does appear appro-
priate.166 
The traditional conflict of law rule regarding procedure (i.e., 
that the procedural law of the forum court prevails on a holistic 
basis) is based in large part on the assumption that uniformity 
in procedural matters is necessary because it promotes efficien-
cy in the courts.167 Because most jurisdictions assert a state 
interest in judicial efficiency,168 the longstanding assumption 
appears to have been that there must necessarily be a state in-
terest in procedural uniformity.169 
However, this analysis reflects a type of syllogistic fallacy 
that fails as a matter of logic.170 Furthermore, the underlying 
assumptions demonstrate a number of factual errors. 
First and foremost, the current rules of civil procedure are 
not as uniform as some people appear to believe. For example, 
                                                                                                                                     
 165. See Paulson, supra note 25, at 479–84; see also Main, Review, supra 
note 18, at 471–74 (discussing the rationales underlying the desire for uni-
formity). 
 166. See supra notes 121–39 and accompanying text. 
 167. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 & cmt. a (1971); 
Edward J. Janger, Universal Proceduralism, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 819, 819 
(2007); Keeton, supra note 74, at 854, 860 (noting consistency also promotes 
justice by avoiding arbitrariness); Glenn S. Koppel, Toward a New Federal-
ism in State Civil Justice: Developing a Uniform Code of State Civil Proce-
dure Through a Collaborative Rule-Making Process, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 
1250 (2005). 
 168. See Le Sueur, supra note 117, at 473. 
 169. While it is possible that a need for uniformity could exist as a substan-
tive matter, that issue should be considered separately from structural con-
siderations. See infra notes 262–386 and accompanying text. Indeed, an ex-
cessive wish for uniformity could, like an excessive desire for efficiency, lead 
to unjust ends. See Adam A. Samaha, Undue Process, 59 STAN. L. REV. 601, 
651–52 (2006) (discussing Robert Dworkin and the possibility of diminishing 
returns in terms of procedural processes). Furthermore, scholars have ques-
tioned the wisdom of a fully trans-substantive procedural regime as well as 
the extent to which trans-substantivity currently exists in the United States. 
See supra note 78. 
 170. See IRVING M. COPI & CARL COHEN, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 189 (13th 
ed. 2008) (discussing the problem of the undistributed middle term); Stephen 
M. Rice, Indiscernible Logic: Using the Logical Fallacies of the Illicit Major 
Term and the Illicit Minor Term as Litigation Tools, 47 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 
101, 116–20 (2010). 
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not only do many jurisdictions “delegate broad discretion to tri-
al judges to tailor procedures to case-specific circumstances,”171 
but many countries also allow a significant amount of diversity 
between and within different courts operating within the same 
legal system.172 This lack of commitment to uniformity by pub-
lic institutions and actors suggests that procedural contracts 
cannot be considered jurisprudentially suspect simply because 
they result in a certain degree of procedural variation.173 
Second, existing rules of civil procedure are not always effi-
cient.174 A number of these inefficiencies can be explained by a 
need to take other concerns, such as procedural fairness, into 
account.175 However, some inefficiencies arise as a result of 
other, more questionable influences.176 These latter practices 
give rise to doubts about whether the state has a defensible in-
terest in efficiency such that private parties should not be able 
to customize their litigation procedures. 
Third and finally, there does not appear to be any demon-
strable link between efficiency and uniformity. While proce-
dural diversity could very well create logistical problems (and 
therefore adjudicatory inefficiencies) when parties attempt to 
affect the relationship between the parties and the court, it is 
difficult to identify any efficiency-related concerns in cases 
where the parties want to alter the relationship between the 
parties inter se. Indeed, some commentators have claimed that 
individualized procedures can actually promote efficiency for 
both the parties and the courts.177 For example, 
terms that specify the location in which disputes will be re-
solved can allow parties to minimize travel costs. Contractual 
provisions to curtail discovery might make sense . . . in dis-
putes that are expected to turn on a court’s interpretation of a 
                                                                                                                                     
 171. Bone, supra note 30, at 1371 (citation omitted). 
 172. See Resnik, supra note 11, at 597–98; see also supra notes 71–73 and 
accompanying text. 
 173. See Bone, supra note 30, at 1371–72. 
 174. See Alexander, supra note 125, at 647; Gensler, supra note 125, at 723. 
 175. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
 176. For example, it has been said that “the rules of procedure are formu-
lated by judges. If the self-interest of those judges conflicts with the efficiency 
criterion, it would seem plausible that the judges will formulate procedural 
rules that further their own interests rather than the interests of efficiency.” 
Macey, supra note 125, at 627; see also Samaha, supra note 169, at 665–66. 
 177. See Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 11, at 526–29, 531–32; see also 
Dodge, supra note 30, at 746. 
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limited number of documents. . . . Terms that designate a 
bench trial allow parties to choose adjudicators with profes-
sional expertise and avoid any additional delay or uncertainty 
associated with jury trials. Terms that provide for confiden-
tial proceedings allow parties to protect sensitive trade se-
crets. Terms that restrict class actions allow parties to fore-
stall frivolous litigation initiated by self-interested attor-
neys.178 
These types of savings inure primarily to the parties. Howev-
er, the public can also benefit from efficiencies relating to indi-
vidualized litigation procedures.179 For example, 
[s]uppose A and B agree to a strict pleading rule that screens 
frivolous suits. If the presence of frivolous suits in litigation 
makes it more difficult for parties to settle meritorious suits, 
as is likely, a strict pleading rule in a case between A and B 
should make it easier for parties to settle and thereby save 
the public cost of a trial.180 
The possibility that private procedural contracts can result in 
public savings may be particularly relevant in light of the 
budget constraints currently facing the U.S. and other judicial 
systems.181 Indeed, many courts are now under an explicit or 
implicit duty to consider and encourage appropriate cost-saving 
mechanisms.182 
However, some caution must be exercised when considering 
questions of efficiency because there is not always a direct cor-
relation between public and private costs. In fact, some party-
                                                                                                                                     
 178. Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 11, at 526–27. 
 179. See Bone, supra note 30, at 1356–57. 
 180. Id. at 1356 (citations omitted). 
 181. See Federal Judiciary Braces for Broad Impact of Budget Sequestra-
tion, THIRD BRANCH NEWS (Mar. 12, 2013), http://news.uscourts.gov/federal-
judiciary-braces-broad-impact-budget-sequestration. 
 182. See Neil Andrews, Relations Between the Court and the Parties in the 
Managerial Age, in THE CULTURE OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: RULE OF LAW 
AND WORLD PEACE (Shimon Shetreet ed., forthcoming 2014); Máximo Langer 
& Joseph W. Doherty, Managerial Judging Goes International, but Its Prom-
ise Remains Unfulfilled: An Empirical Assessment of the ICTY Reforms, 36 
YALE J. INT’L L. 241, 242 n.2, 296–97 (2011); Judith Resnik, Managerial 
Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 422–24 (1982); see also Glenn, supra note 21, at 
490 (suggesting that managerial judging supports the concept of private pro-
cedural contracts). 
2014] PROCEDURAL CHOICE OF LAW 1067 
made rules that would initially appear to limit public costs 
could have the opposite effect.183 For instance, 
an agreement to limit discovery could increase public costs if 
the expectation of a less onerous discovery burden and limited 
access to information reduced the size of the settlement sur-
plus and with it the likelihood of settlement, thereby increas-
ing the risk of trial. Also, by restricting access to information, 
discovery limits could generate trial or settlement outcomes 
with a higher-than-optimal error risk, thereby undermining 
deterrence goals. To be sure, parties will take account of pri-
vate costs when they negotiate their contract, but there is no 
reason for them to take account of public costs like these.184 
 
However, “[i]t is extremely difficult to identify cases where 
party rulemaking generates costs substantially in excess of 
those already created by the current system.”185 Therefore, this 
issue should not prove fatal to individualized procedures, at 
least as a general matter. 
c. Timing 
The third structural concern that courts and commentators 
should consider involves timing.186 Some commentators believe 
that most examples of procedural individualization arise in the 
context of pre-trial stipulations, which could suggest that par-
ties are not able to create procedural contracts until the nature 
of the dispute is known.187 
                                                                                                                                     
 183. See Bone, supra note 30, at 1357, 1374. 
 184. Id. at 1357 (citations omitted). 
 185. Id. at 1374 (citation omitted). 
 186. See Hoffman, supra note 7, at 396; Kapeliuk & Klement, Ex Ante, su-
pra note 30, at 1493–94; Paulson, supra note 25, at 491; see also RUTLEDGE, 
supra note 85, at 184–89; Schultz, supra note 133, at 10–12; infra notes 390–
94 and accompanying text. 
 187. See Dodge, supra note 30, at 767; Hoffman, supra note 7, at 398–99; 
Noyes, supra note 27, at 603; Paulson, supra note 25, at 514. This approach 
may be the result of the presumption of flexibility, with the attendant oppor-
tunity for procedural individualization, inherent in certain aspects of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16, 26, 29; Hoffman, su-
pra note 7, at 396; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 6, 23, 65 (implying, rather than 
stating, the possibility of procedural amendments); Hoffman, supra note 7, at 
398–99. Parties may also agree to limit enforcement of a judgment to a par-
ticular jurisdiction or curtail the type of remedies that are available. See 
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If true, this requirement could create some problems, since 
past experience with forum selection clauses and international 
commercial arbitration suggests that business entities may be 
most likely to enter into individualized procedural contracts 
before the dispute arises, when the “veil of ignorance” encour-
ages parties to agree to mutually beneficial procedures free 
from the kind of tactical constraints that arise once the conflict 
has begun.188 
To some extent, forum selection provisions and arbitration 
agreements support the notion that procedural contracts may 
be entered into on a pre-dispute basis, since forum selection 
provisions and arbitration agreements involve more compre-
hensive procedural variations than would likely be the case 
with private procedural contracts.189 However, forum selection 
clauses and arbitration agreements could be distinguished from 
customized procedural contracts on the grounds that the first 
two types of agreements involve the withdrawal from a particu-
lar legal system rather than the alteration of that legal sys-
tem’s procedural norms. 
Although concerns about timing may arise in particular cir-
cumstances, there are examples of courts upholding the parties’ 
right to alter litigation procedures through contracts created 
prior to the time of the dispute. Perhaps the most prominent of 
these decisions comes from the U.S. Supreme Court, when it 
upheld a cognovit note contained in a pre-dispute contract and 
noted that the defendant “may not have been able to predict 
                                                                                                                                     
Bone, supra note 30, at 1350; Dodge, supra note 30, at 727. Other procedural 
alterations may also be possible. See Moffitt, supra note 13, at 467–78. 
 188. See BORN, DRAFTING, supra note 2, at 13–14; Hoffman, supra note 7, at 
396–97 (identifying four types of dispute provisions and noting that most re-
cent literature has focused on “Type 1” provisions, which involve pre-dispute, 
arms-length bargains); see also RAWLS, RESTATEMENT, supra note 129, at 15–
18; RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 129, pt. 1, ch. III, § 24; supra notes 131–33 
and accompanying text. Some commentators find pre-dispute agreements to 
be more jurisprudentially challenging than post-dispute agreements, alt-
hough there is little discussion as to why that is so. See Hoffman, supra note 
7, at 397. 
 189. See Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 134 S.Ct. 568, 579–80 
(2013); Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595–97 (1991); 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629 
(1985); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516–17 (1974); M/S Bre-
men v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. (The Bremen), 407 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1972); 
RUTLEDGE, supra note 85, at 182–89; Hoffman, supra note 7, at 398. 
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with accuracy just how or when [the plaintiff] would proceed 
under the confession clause if further default by [the defend-
ant] occurred, . . . but this inability does not in itself militate 
against effective waiver” of the defendant’s procedural rights.190 
Other judicial decisions can also be interpreted as supporting 
pre-dispute agreements concerning procedural matters, as the 
following discussion shows. 
2. Putting Theory into Practice 
At this point, most of the commentary concerning individual-
ized procedural contracts has focused on theoretical rather 
than practical concerns, largely because of an alleged shortage 
of case law considering private agreements relating to litiga-
tion procedure.191 This phenomenon is potentially problematic, 
since courts are often more interested in practical applications 
of particular principles than in theoretical analyses.192 
This is not to say that theory and practice cannot be mutually 
re-enforcing. Indeed, the recent case of Delaware Coalition for 
Open Government v. Strine may be particularly helpful in this 
regard.193 Although Strine does not discuss procedural con-
tracts per se, both the District Court of Delaware and the Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit considered a number of mat-
ters that are commonly associated with these types of agree-
ments and demonstrate some of the analytical techniques dis-
cussed in the previous subsections.194 
The facts of the case are relatively straightforward. The dis-
pute arose out of a constitutional challenge to a statute enacted 
                                                                                                                                     
 190. D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 187 (1972). 
 191. There is some debate on this issue. Compare Hoffman, supra note 7, at 
393 (suggesting there is little case law in this field), with Noyes, supra note 
27, at 599 (stating that “[c]ourts have enforced ex ante contracts that modify 
a broad array of litigation rights and rules,” including those involving “consti-
tutional rights, statutory rights, rights set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and rights set forth in the Federal Rules of Evidence”). 
 192. See Allen & Rosenberg, supra note 140, at 693; Stapleton, supra note 
140, at 533. 
 193. See Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493 (D. Del. 
2012), aff’d, 733 F.3d 510 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1551 (2014). 
 194. See Strine, 733 F.3d at 510; Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 493. For a de-
tailed discussion of the lower court decision and the propositions asserted in 
the appeal, see Thomas J. Stipanowich, In Quest of the Arbitration Trifecta, 
or Closed Door Litigation?: The Delaware Arbitration Program, 6 J. BUS. 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 349, 357–60 (2013). 
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by the Delaware legislature that attempted to create a judicial-
ly supported form of arbitration in the Delaware state courts.195 
The law only contemplated arbitration of commercial matters 
“by agreement or by stipulation” of the parties and with the 
participation of all parties in the arbitral hearing.196 
The procedure itself was largely innocuous. Arbitrations were 
to be initiated through the filing of a petition that outlined “the 
nature of the dispute, the claims made, and the remedies 
sought,” and the arbitrator was to hold a preliminary confer-
ence within ten days of the initial filing.197 The preliminary 
conference was to be followed by a preliminary hearing to iden-
tify “the claims of the case, damages, defenses asserted, legal 
authorities to be relied upon, the scope of discovery, and the 
timing, length, and evidence to be presented at the arbitration 
hearing” as well as “the possibility of mediation or other non-
adjudicative methods of dispute resolution.”198 The law also re-
quired the merits hearing to take place within ninety days of 
the filing of the petition.199 
The statute explicitly allowed the use of a number of proce-
dures, including U.S.-style discovery, that are more common in 
litigation than in arbitration.200 For example, 
[p]rior to the arbitration hearing, the parties exchange “in-
formation necessary and appropriate for the parties to pre-
pare for the arbitration hearing and to enable the Arbitrator 
to understand the dispute.” The parties can agree to the scope 
of information to be exchanged or can have the arbitrator de-
cide the scope of discovery. Court of Chancery Rules 26 
through 37, which govern depositions and discovery in all 
Chancery Court matters, apply to the arbitration proceeding 
                                                                                                                                     
 195. The law was intended to “preserve Delaware’s pre-eminence in offering 
cost-effective options for resolving disputes, particularly those involving 
commercial, corporate, and technology matters.” Del. H.B. No. 49, 145th Gen. 
Assembl., at 4 (2009), as quoted in Strine, 733 F.3d at 512. 
 196. Strine, 733 F.3d at 512. 
 197. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 495. 
 198. Id. (citation omitted). 
 199. See id. Although this type of expedited timeline is not unheard-of in 
arbitration, it is unusual in litigation, even in Delaware, where court proceed-
ings are considered relatively speedy. See William B. Chandler III & Anthony 
A. Rickey, Manufacturing Mystery: A Response to Professors Carey and Shep-
herd’s “The Mystery of Delaware Law’s Continuing Success,” 2009 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 95, 127–28 (2009). 
 200. See Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 495. 
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unless the parties and arbitrator together agree to different 
rules. Some discovery matters, such as the procedure for issu-
ing subpoenas, must be created by the parties and the arbi-
trator.201 
The importation of judicial rules of discovery is remarkable in 
a proceeding that purports to establish a new form of arbitra-
tion, since one of the primary benefits of arbitration is the elim-
ination (or at least the curtailment) of discovery.202 However, 
the Delaware approach is less problematic if the proceeding is 
characterized as a type of customized litigation, with judicial 
rules of procedure existing as a default mechanism.203 
The Delaware statute granted arbitrators broad but relative-
ly standard powers, including “the power to issue a final award 
and to make interim, interlocutory, or partial rulings during 
the course of the proceeding.”204 The final award, which could 
“be enforced as any other judgment or decree,” was required to 
include the basis for the arbitrator’s decision.205 The statute 
allowed arbitral awards to be stayed or vacated, but only in ac-
cordance with the terms set forth in the Federal Arbitration 
Act (FAA).206 
All of these elements passed judicial scrutiny.207 However, 
some aspects of the Delaware statute were more problematic. 
Three items—the confidentiality of the proceedings, the meth-
od by which the arbitrators were appointed, and the possible 
infringement on mandatory judicial duties—give rise to partic-
ular concerns. 
                                                                                                                                     
 201. Id. (citations omitted). 
 202. Although arbitration often contemplates a limited exchange of docu-
ments, the scope of such disclosures is usually much narrower than in litiga-
tion. See BORN, ICA, supra note 3, at 1877–78, 1893–1905. Furthermore, it is 
rare to see judicial rules on discovery explicitly imported into arbitration. See 
id. at 1887, 1921; LEW ET AL., supra note 32, ¶ 21-11; STRONG, GUIDE, supra 
note 32, at 77–78. 
 203. See supra notes 12–13, 121–24 and accompanying text. 
 204. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 495–96. 
 205. Id. at 496 (noting final awards should “include ‘any remedy or relief 
that the Arbitrator deems just and equitable and within the scope of any ap-
plicable agreement of the parties’”). 
 206. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2013); Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 496. 
 207. See Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510, 522 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(Fuentes, J., concurring) (“Nothing in [the] decision should be construed to 
prevent sitting Judges of the Court of Chancery from engaging in arbitrations 
without those confidentiality provisions.”). 
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a. Confidentiality of the Proceedings 
According to the Delaware legislature, the new form of statu-
tory arbitration was to be “considered confidential and not of 
public record until such time, if any, as the proceedings are the 
subject of an appeal. In the case of an appeal, the record shall 
be filed by the parties with the Supreme Court in accordance 
with its rules.”208 This language provided the basis for the un-
derlying legal challenge, which involved a number of journal-
ists claiming that their First Amendment right of access to le-
gal proceedings had been infringed upon as a result of the stat-
ute.209 
Although both the district and circuit courts agreed that the 
confidential nature of the Delaware proceedings invalidated 
that aspect of the law,210 the requirement that procedures be 
public rather than private does not create any real problems for 
proponents of individualized procedural contracts. So long as 
parties agree to have their dispute heard publicly, they can 
avoid this particular obstacle.211 However, the debate about 
confidentiality in Strine provides several insights into other 
issues relating to private procedural contracts. 
First, the majority opinion by Judge Sloviter reinforces the 
notion that litigation and arbitration are very similar in terms 
of functionality.212 Although the discussion was meant to iden-
                                                                                                                                     
 208. 10 Del. C. § 349(b); see also Strine, 733 F.3d at 513. The scope of confi-
dentiality was quite broad and encompassed “all parts of the proceeding, in-
cluding all filings and all contacts between the arbitrator and any party.” 
Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 496 (quoting Del. Ch. Ct. R. 97(a)(4), 98(b)). “Only 
parties [were] allowed to attend the arbitration hearing unless they agree[d] 
otherwise,” and “[a]ll ‘memoranda and work product contained in the case 
files of an Arbitrator’ and ‘[a]ny communication made in or in connection with 
the arbitration that relates to the controversy being arbitrated’ [were] like-
wise confidential.” Id. (citations omitted). Although the statute required the 
court to enter a judgment in conformity with the arbitrator’s final award, the 
award itself was not to be made public, and details about the parties were not 
to be included in the judgment. See id. at 496–97 (noting the judgments are 
available on an electronic database under the title “arbitration judgments”). 
 209. See Strine, 733 F.3d at 521. 
 210. See id. at 513–21; Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 502, 504. Judge Fuentes 
noted that “[n]othing in [the] decision should be construed to prevent sitting 
Judges of the Court of Chancery from engaging in arbitrations without those 
confidentiality provisions.” Strine, 733 F.3d at 522 (Fuentes, J., concurring). 
 211. Some proceedings may still be heard “under seal.” FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2. 
 212. See Strine, 733 F.3d at 513–21; see supra note 160 and accompanying 
text. 
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tify any differences between judicial and arbitral actions so as 
to determine whether the Delaware procedure must be open to 
the public, the analysis instead demonstrated the numerous 
ways in which litigation and arbitration overlap in terms of 
purpose and procedure.213 This observation is not only im-
portant as a structural matter,214 it is also relevant to the sub-
stantive analyses that are conducted below.215 
Second, several of the judges hearing this case suggested that 
states may allow parties to adopt procedures that are very dif-
ferent from standard litigation, so long as the requisite consent 
exists.216 While a number of the procedural elements in Strine 
were initially devised by the state rather than by the parties 
themselves, the Delaware arbitration scheme nevertheless re-
quired the parties’ consent to implement those procedures.217 
Furthermore, the statute appeared to give the parties and the 
arbitrators a great deal of discretion in adapting the procedure 
by which the dispute was to be heard.218 Finally, there is no in-
dication that the parties’ consent had to arise post-dispute, 
which suggests that pre-dispute agreements regarding custom-
ized procedures are enforceable.219 As a result, Strine can be 
read as providing structural support for individualized proce-
                                                                                                                                     
 213. See Strine, 733 F.3d at 513–21. 
 214. See supra note 160 and accompanying text. For example, it could be 
argued that any procedure that may be made subject to arbitration can also 
be made subject to a private procedural contract, since the two procedures are 
functional equivalents. See Hoffman, supra note 7, at 391 (noting that “some 
distinguished scholars now argue that parties’ greater ability to contract out 
of federal and state procedural rules [through arbitration agreements] entails 
the lesser power to modify them”); see also Michaels, supra note 160, at 342, 
357 (discussing equivalence functionalism). While a full exploration of this 
subject is beyond the scope of the current Article, the issue is nevertheless 
intriguing. 
 215. See infra note 317 and accompanying text (suggesting the limits be-
tween litigation and arbitration are semi-permeable). 
 216. This principle is most clearly enunciated by Judge Fuentes in his con-
currence and by the district court. See Strine, 733 F.3d at 522 (Fuentes, J., 
concurring); Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493, 495 (D. 
Del. 2012), aff’d, 733 F.3d 510 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1551 
(2014). 
 217. Strine, 733 F.3d at 512. 
 218. See Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 495. 
 219. See supra notes 186–190, 390–394 and accompanying text. 
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dural contracts, so long as the procedure is public220 and con-
sensual.221 
b. Appointment of Arbitrators 
The second area of concern involves the means by which arbi-
trators are appointed under the Delaware statute. Although 
neither the district court nor the circuit court discussed this 
feature at length, the Delaware legislature indicated that pro-
ceedings were to be presided over by “a member of the Court of 
Chancery, or such other person as may be authorized under 
rules of the Court.”222 
If the proceedings are to be considered as some form of arbi-
tration, then this provision is highly problematic, since “virtu-
ally all authorities . . . accept that arbitration is a process by 
which parties consensually submit a dispute to a non-
governmental decision-maker, selected by or for the parties.”223 
Furthermore, the district court noted that while “[t]he Alterna-
tive Dispute Resolution Act, which creates court-annexed arbi-
tration in the federal courts, seems to allow magistrate judges 
to serve as arbitrators[,] . . . neither the parties nor [the] Court 
could find evidence of that practice.”224 Of course, the appoint-
ment of a judge to hear the dispute is not at all problematic if 
the proceedings constitute a form of customized litigation, 
which is how the Delaware courts eventually framed the proce-
dure.225 
                                                                                                                                     
 220. See Strine, 733 F.3d at 513–21. 
 221. Id. at 512. 
 222. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 494 (quoting 10 Del. C. §349(a)); see also 
Strine, 733 F.3d at 512. 
 223. BORN, ICA, supra note 3, at 217. 
 224. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 502 (citing 28 U.S.C. §653(b) (2013)); see also 
DDI Seamless Cylinder Int’l, Inc. v. Gen. Fire Extinguisher Corp., 14 F.3d 
1163, 1165–66 (7th Cir. 1994); Brandt v. MIT Development Corp., 552 F. 
Supp. 2d 304, 315 (D. Conn. 2008); Hameli v. Nazario, 930 F. Supp. 171, 182 
(D. Del. 1996); Ovadiah v. New York Ass’n for New Americans, Nos. 95 Civ. 
10523 (SS), 96 Civ. 330 (SS), 1997 WL 342411, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 
1997); Heenan v. Sobati, 96 Cal. App. 4th 995, 1000–03 (2002); Elliott & Ten 
Eyck P’ship v. City of Long Beach, 57 Cal. App. 4th 495, 503–04 (1997); 
Charles H. Smith, When Is an “Arbitration” Not an Arbitration? When a Sit-
ting Judge Serves as a Private Arbitrator, 60 DISP. RESOL. J. 29, 33 n.23 
(2005); Stipanowich, supra note 194, at 359; infra notes 241–45 and accom-
panying text. 
 225. While some questions might arise as to whether the procedures per-
mitted under the Delaware statute infringed upon the judge’s core adjudica-
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The Delaware statute also indicated that the arbitrator-judge 
was to be appointed by the Chancellor of the Court rather than 
by the parties.226 This element could appear to create difficul-
ties at first glance because parties in arbitration are usually 
entitled to choose their decision-maker themselves.227 However, 
it is possible for parties to delegate selection of the arbitrator to 
an arbitral institution or court, so this mechanism passes mus-
ter.228
c. Mandatory Judicial Duties  
The third and perhaps most intriguing aspect of Strine in-
volves the district court’s distinction between adjudicators who 
are judges and adjudicators who are private citizens (i.e., arbi-
trators).229 According to the court, “[a] judge bears a special re-
sponsibility to serve the public interest. That obligation, and 
the public role of that job, is undermined when a judge acts as 
an arbitrator bound only by the parties’ agreement.”230 Fur-
thermore, “the judge’s obligation in his public role as a judicial 
officer” cannot be altered, even with the parties’ consent.231
This aspect of Strine is extremely useful, since it reinforces 
theoretical notions regarding the sanctity of judges’ core adju-
dicative duties.232 Unfortunately, the court does not go on to 
explain precisely what is encompassed within a judge’s “public 
role as a judicial officer,” as opposed to the responsibilities of 
“an arbitrator bound only by the parties’ agreement.”233 Com-
                                                                                                                                     
tive or public duties, those issues are less problematic if the procedure is ap-
proved by the legislature, since the state is generally considered competent to 
define proper litigation procedures as a structural matter. 
226. See Strine, 733 F.3d at 512. 
227. See BORN, ICA, supra note 3, at 217. 
228. See id.; LEW ET AL., supra note 32, ¶¶ 16-11 to 16-29. 
229. See Strine, 733 F.3d at 500. This issue has been addressed by commen-
tators as well. See BORN, ICA, supra note 3, at 217; RENÉ DAVID, ARBITRATION 
IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 5 (1985); EMMANUEL GAILLARD & JOHN SAVAGE,
FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
¶ 7 (1999). 
 230. Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493, 502 (D. Del. 
2012), aff’d, 733 F.3d 510 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1551 (2014).
231. Id. at 503. 
 232. For example, this aspect of Strine is reminiscent of discussion relating 
to the core values of public adjudication and the distinction between matters 
of public and private concern. See supra notes 149–64 and accompanying 
text. 
233. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d. at 502–03. 
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mentary provides scant assistance on this point, since there is 
little scholarship comparing the nature of arbitration and liti-
gation234 outside of some limited inquiries involving the differ-
ences between judges’ and arbitrators’ duties of independence 
and impartiality235 and the ways in which judges and arbitra-
tors can or should apply public policy.236 
                                                                                                                                     
 234. See LARRY E. EDMONSON, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 1:1, at 
1–3 (2010) (noting arbitration coexists with litigation as “part of the Ameri-
can system of administering justice”); id. § 1:3, at 1-8 to 1-9 (indicating that 
early precedent distinguished between commercial arbitration as a substitute 
for litigation and labor arbitration as a substitute for avoiding industrial 
strife, but suggesting that these distinctions may no longer apply); Cindy G. 
Buys, The Arbitrators’ Duty to Respect the Parties’ Choice of Law in Commer-
cial Arbitration, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 59, 93–94 (2005) (noting differences 
between arbitration and litigation); Pierre Mayer, Comparative Analysis of 
Power of Arbitrators to Determine Procedures in Civil and Common Law Sys-
tems, in PLANNING EFFICIENT ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS: THE LAW APPLICABLE 
IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, XII ICCA CONG. SER. (1994 Vienna) 24, 25–
26 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 1996) (noting arbitration is sometimes con-
sidered “a substitute for State justice, albeit of a private nature, but never-
theless pursuing the same ends”); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Keeping Arbitrations 
From Becoming Kangaroo Courts, 8 NEV. L.J. 251, 260 (2007) (noting “arbi-
tration is a substitute for adjudication by litigation”); Jean R. Sternlight, 
Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1673 
(2005) (concluding arbitration is not the same as litigation); S.I. Strong, Does 
Class Arbitration “Change the Nature” of Arbitration? Stolt-Nielsen, AT&T 
and a Return to First Principles, 17 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 201, 241–45 (2012) 
[hereinafter Strong, First Principles] (discussing the nature of arbitration); 
see also Elliott & Ten Eyck P’ship v. City of Long Beach, 57 Cal. App. 4th 495, 
503 (1997). 
 235. Although arbitrators are expected to behave in an independent, impar-
tial, and (in the international context) neutral manner, arbitrators are not 
always held to precisely the same standard as judges, since arbitrators are 
expected to be part of the business world. Compare Commonwealth Coatings 
Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 148–49 (1968), with AT&T Corp. 
v. Saudi Cable Co., [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 127 (appeal taken from Eng.) (Ct. 
App.). 
 236. Some commentators believe that arbitrators are either more willing or 
more able than judges to take the public policies of foreign states into ac-
count. See Stefan Michael Kröll, The “Arbitrability” of Disputes Arising from 
Commercial Representation, in ARBITRABILITY: INTERNATIONAL AND 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 317, ¶¶ 16-57 to 16-65 (Loukas A. Mistelis & 
Stavros L. Brekoulakis eds., 2009). However, problems can arise if an arbi-
trator is too reliant on public policy, since arbitral tribunals are not empow-
ered to act like common law courts. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds 
Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 673–74 (2010); Strong, First Principles, supra note 
234, at 240. This principle can be taken too far, however, since some courts 
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Although Strine does not discuss the nature of judicial adju-
dication directly, careful reading of the two opinions neverthe-
less yields some useful information.237 For example, both the 
district and circuit courts appeared to suggest that the proce-
dural innovations proposed by the Delaware legislature did not 
infringe on the judge’s public duties in any way, once the confi-
dentiality provisions were struck.238 Thus, expedited timelines 
and customized methods of taking and presenting evidence do 
not appear to violate the judge’s “public role as a judicial of-
ficer.”239 
This reading of Strine is consistent with a Seventh Circuit 
decision concerning a purported attempt to have a federal mag-
istrate preside over a private arbitration.240 In an opinion writ-
ten by Judge Richard Posner, the Court concluded that “arbi-
tration is not in the job description of a federal judge, including 
. . . a magistrate judge. . . . Federal statutes authorizing arbi-
tration . . . do not appear to authorize or envisage the appoint-
ment of judges or magistrate judges as arbitrators.”241 As a re-
sult, the magistrate judge would have been acting beyond his 
judicial capacity if his actions were construed as arbitration.242 
However, the Seventh Circuit did not stop there. Instead, 
Judge Posner wrote that 
[a]n alternative characterization to ultra vires of what the 
magistrate judge did is possible. It is that the parties stipu-
lated to an abbreviated, informal procedure for his deciding 
                                                                                                                                     
have suggested that arbitrators not only have the ability but in some cases 
the duty to consider the application of public policy and mandatory law. See 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 
n.19 (1985); see also United Paperworkers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, 
Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 42–44 (1987) (indicating that public policy that can be as-
certained by reference to the relevant law can and should be considered in 
arbitral context, lest the award be rendered unenforceable); BORN, ICA, supra 
note 3, at 2181; Strong, First Principles, supra note 234, at 240. 
 237. See Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510, 512 (3d Cir. 
2013); Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d. at 502–03. 
 238. See Strine, 733 F. 3d at 521–23 (Fuentes, J., concurring). 
 239. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d. at 503; see also id. at 495. 
 240. See DDI Seamless Cylinder Int’l, Inc. v. Gen. Fire Extinguisher Corp., 
14 F.3d 1163 (7th Cir. 1994); Stipanowich, supra note 194, at 366. 
 241. DDI Seamless Cylinder, 14 F.3d at 1165. 
 242. Id. Framing a matter as “arbitration” carries several benefits, includ-
ing a strictly limited form of judicial review rather than appeal on the merits. 
See id. at 1166; see also Strong, First Principles, supra note 234, at 218. 
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the case in his judicial capacity. Parties are free within broad 
limits to agree on simplified procedures for the decision of 
their case. They can agree for example to waive the right to 
present oral testimony and instead to treat the summary 
judgment proceeding as the trial on the merits. They can 
agree that the hearing on a preliminary injunction shall be 
deemed the trial on the merits as well. They can agree to a 
trial on stipulated facts. They can, of course, agree to binding 
arbitration, albeit before an arbitrator rather than a judge. 
They can agree to waive appeal: that is possible even in crim-
inal cases, by a plea agreement. One way to describe what the 
parties and the judge did in this case is that they agreed that 
the judge would make a decision on a record consisting of the 
auditor’s report plus the parties’ objections, after oral argu-
ment by the parties conducted (as is increasingly common in 
federal district courts) over the telephone, and that they 
would not appeal the decision. So viewed, the procedure was 
not improper. Of course the parties should have avoided ref-
erence to “arbitration,” a mode of dispute settlement distinct 
from adjudication. They should simply have said that this was 
the procedure they had agreed upon.243 
Both the Third and the Seventh Circuits therefore appear to 
agree that parties may contractually agree to amend standard 
rules of procedure relating to a variety of issues, including dis-
covery.244 This view is consistent with that taken by commenta-
tors who consider discovery to be one of the easiest practices to 
regulate by private procedural contract.245 
Not everyone agrees that matters relating to the taking and 
presentation of evidence can be made subject to private proce-
dural contracts. Indeed, some scholars have argued that limit-
ing discovery can negatively affect certain core judicial du-
ties.246 This claim appears to be based on the common law no-
tion that judges need “to understand the whole case” before 
making a decision, in contrast to civil law judges, who only 
need to know “[w]hat evidence is required to reach a justifiable 
decision.”247 However, it is not clear that broad, U.S.-style dis-
covery and long, drawn-out trials can or should be considered a 
                                                                                                                                     
 243. DDI Seamless Cylinder, 14 F.3d at 1166 (citations omitted). 
 244. See id.; Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 503. 
 245. See Bone, supra note 30, at 1331; Dodge, supra note 30, at 745; Noyes, 
supra note 27, at 609–10. 
 246. See Paulson, supra note 25, at 476, 511–15. 
 247. El Ahdab & Bouchenaki, supra note 15, at 72. 
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necessary part of the adjudicative process. Indeed, there are 
several reasons why that presumption does not appear to be 
true as a matter of fact or theory. 
First, the United States is exceptional, even within the com-
mon law world, in its approach to pre-trial discovery. Even 
those jurisdictions that adopt a common law, “whole case” view 
of judicial decision-making take a much narrower view of the 
necessary scope of pre-trial disclosures.248 Furthermore, crimi-
nal procedure does not contemplate anywhere near the same 
amount of discovery that is seen in the civil context, and no one 
has ever claimed that criminal trials do not involve judges 
working in a judicial capacity.249 Therefore, broad, U.S.-style 
discovery does not appear necessary for a judge to carry out his 
or her core adjudicative duties, even in the United States. 
Second, U.S. practice strongly reflects the notion that the 
taking of evidence is a quintessentially private activity.250 Not 
only do federal and state rules of civil procedure place the re-
sponsibility for gathering evidence firmly within the hands of 
the parties or their attorneys,251 but U.S. judges seldom ask for 
particular evidence or witnesses to be introduced at trial, even 
if the court is entitled to do so.252 Although U.S. practice differs 
                                                                                                                                     
 248. See LEW ET AL., supra note 32, ¶ 22-49; El Ahdab & Bouchenaki, supra 
note 15, at 73; Strong, Discovery, supra note 74, at 510–11; S.I. Strong & 
James J. Dries, Witness Statements Under the IBA Rules of Evidence: What to 
Do About Hearsay?, 21 ARB. INT’L 301, 313 (2005). 
 249. See David A. Sklansky & Stephen C. Yeazell, Comparative Law With-
out Leaving Home: What Civil Procedure Can Teach Criminal Procedure, and 
Vice Versa, 94 GEO. L.J. 683, 714–15 (2006). 
 250. See Strong, Consensual, supra note 30, at 160. 
 251. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26; Noyes, supra note 27, at 611; Paulson, supra 
note 25, at 514 (discussing Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 
Notably, the fact that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure place certain re-
strictions on the ability of the parties to shape their own procedure does not 
preclude the possibility that autonomy exists in other regards. See id. (dis-
cussing Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). Thus, for example, 
the limitation on party autonomy in Rule 29 regarding the timing of certain 
discovery-related activities does not necessarily bar other types of procedural 
agreements relating to the taking of evidence. See FED. R. CIV. P. 29(b) (“[A] 
stipulation extending the time for any form of discovery must have court ap-
proval if it would interfere with the time set for completing discovery, for 
hearing a motion, or for trial.”). Instead, that provision simply reinforces the 
notion that party autonomy cannot be exercised in a way that affects the re-
lationship between the parties and the court. 
 252. See FED. R. EVID. 614, 706. The right to call fact witnesses is exercised 
more often in the criminal context than in the civil context. See FED. R. EVID. 
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from that of most civil law nations, where the taking of evi-
dence is considered a public task,253 the U.S. approach is con-
sistent with that of other common law countries.254 
Third, judges in the United States do not second-guess the 
parties’ tactical decisions regarding the presentation of evi-
dence during trial.255 Although courts occasionally exercise 
their inherent powers in matters relating to the presentation of 
evidence, most acts of judicial intervention appear to focus on 
curtailing abusive litigation practices rather than promoting 
the court’s own views about what evidence should be presented 
and how.256 
Similar analyses can be conducted with respect to other types 
of procedural agreements, such as those involving a “trial on 
stipulated facts or on summary judgment rather than oral tes-
timony”257 or those eliminating the opportunity for an appeal 
on the merits.258 However, both the Seventh and Third Circuits 
specifically stated that parties could enter into contracts con-
cerning these procedures, which suggests that parties can 
agree to limit or eliminate certain procedural practices (such as 
oral testimony and cross-examination) that are typically con-
ceived of as central to the common law legal tradition.259 In-
                                                                                                                                     
614 advisory committee’s note to subdivision (a). Courts seldom appoint their 
own expert witnesses. See FED. R. EVID. 706 advisory committee’s note; 
Strong, Consensual, supra note 30, at 160. 
 253. See Hazard, Secrets, supra note 15, at 1682. 
 254. See Andrews, supra note 182 (discussing English practice). Indeed, 
English courts have allowed parties to obtain evidence by means not other-
wise known at English law. See ADRIAN BRIGGS, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 38 (2d 
ed. 2008). 
 255. See Strong, Consensual, supra note 30, at 160. 
 256. See FED. R. EVID. 614, 706 (noting the right of the court to question fact 
and expert witnesses); Joseph J. Anclien, Broader Is Better: The Inherent 
Powers of Federal Courts, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 37, 46 (2008). 
 257. Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493, 503 (D. Del. 
2012), aff’d, 733 F.3d 510 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1551 (2014); 
see also DDI Seamless Cylinder Int’l, Inc. v. Gen. Fire Extinguisher Corp., 14 
F.3d 1163, 1165–66 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 258. See DDI Seamless Cylinder, 14 F.3d at 1165; Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 
503. 
 259. See BORN, ICA, supra note 3, at 1786. Using “tradition” as a touchstone 
for legal analysis is highly problematic. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Dumbo’s 
Feather: An Examination and Critique of the Supreme Court’s Use, Misuse, 
and Abuse of Tradition in Protecting Fundamental Rights, 48 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 923, 928–30 (2006). 
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deed, U.S. courts appear to have long been capable of altering 
common law rules, even those that are of a longstanding na-
ture.260 Therefore, when considering what constitutes a core 
adjudicative duty, courts and commentators must be careful 
not to assume that a particular practice is central to the adju-
dicative function simply because it has traditionally been 
available in U.S. litigation.261 
C. Interim Conclusions 
The preceding analysis suggests that although states may 
have a legitimate interest in protecting the fundamental prin-
ciples of institutional design inherent in their legal systems, 
not every judicial procedure affects public, structural concerns. 
Instead, some procedures arise solely between the parties and 
therefore are entirely private as a matter of both theory and of 
practice. 
At this point, courts and commentators agree that parties 
should not be able to alter matters touching on the administra-
tion and operation of the courts. However, there do not appear 
to be any reasons to justify a prohibition on procedural con-
tracts concerning matters that arise solely between the parties. 
Furthermore, these types of procedural agreements can even 
reflect certain positive virtues, including an increase in pre-
dictability in international commerce and a possible reduction 
of certain public costs. 
Although the preceding discussion paints a largely positive 
view of procedural contracts in international litigation, some 
courts may nevertheless resist party autonomy in procedural 
matters, either because of concerns about perceived encroach-
ments on judicial prerogatives or because of worries about what 
constitutes a “proper” or adequate procedure. The first of these 
                                                                                                                                     
 260. See Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 382 (1933) (“That this court 
and the other federal courts, in this situation and by right of their own pow-
ers, may decline to enforce the ancient rule of the common law under condi-
tions as they now exist, we think is not fairly open to doubt.”); DDI Seamless 
Cylinder, 14 F.3d at 1166; see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533–34 
(2004) (allowing courts to tailor proceedings that did not fall within the man-
datory core of constitutional due process); Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, No. 11 
Civ. 0691 (LAK), 2013 WL 5548913, *1–3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2013) (requiring 
parties to provide written witness statements instead of affirmative oral tes-
timony in appropriate cases). 
 261. See Bone, supra note 30, at 1386–88. 
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two matters should be dispensed with relatively easily, since 
the United States Supreme Court has shown little patience for 
judicial hostility to party autonomy, particularly in situations 
involving international commerce. However, the second issue 
could be problematic, since courts are duty-bound to protect the 
parties’ fundamental procedural rights. These sorts of substan-
tive concerns are taken up in the next section. 
III. SUBSTANTIVE CONCERNS ABOUT PROCEDURAL AUTONOMY 
IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LITIGATION 
The previous section suggested that courts and commentators 
must look past surface considerations to determine whether 
and to what extent a particular procedural practice affects core 
structural concerns. This same kind of in-depth approach is 
necessary when analyzing substantive concerns about private 
procedural contracts in international commercial litigation. 
However, rather than focusing on matters of institutional de-
sign, substantive analyses focus on questions relating to indi-
vidual rights and the principles of due process and procedural 
fairness. 
Although it is critically important for courts and commenta-
tors to consider substantive concerns relating to procedural au-
tonomy in international commercial litigation, the process can 
involve some methodological difficulties. For example, it can be 
challenging to even identify what the relevant substantive 
norms are because due process and procedural fairness are typ-
ically considered as a matter of domestic rather than interna-
tional or transnational law.262 
Though daunting, the problem is not insurmountable, since 
there may be another body of law that can help identify the due 
process norms that apply in international commercial litiga-
tion. For example, international commercial arbitration is ex-
tremely well-developed in terms of its procedural norms and 
has already been shown to have a structural connection with 
                                                                                                                                     
 262. The development of an international norm of due process is somewhat 
more advanced in the criminal law context. See LARRY MAY, GLOBAL JUSTICE 
AND DUE PROCESS 1–17 (2011) (suggesting domestic due process standards 
should be extended to international law and recognized as jus cogens); Rich-
ard Volger, Due Process, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 929, 939, 945 (Michel Rosenfeld & Andras Sajo eds., 
2012). 
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international commercial litigation.263 Therefore, it may be that 
there is a substantive link between the two processes as well. 
That issue is considered in the following sections. 
A. International Commercial Arbitration as a Framework for 
Analysis 
There are several reasons why international commercial ar-
bitration might be able to provide an appropriate standard for 
evaluating substantive concerns relating to procedural con-
tracts in transnational litigation. First, as the discussion on 
structural concerns demonstrated, numerous commentators 
have identified a jurisprudential connection between procedur-
al contracts in litigation and procedural contracts in arbitra-
tion.264 While the precise nature of that relationship has not yet 
been defined,265 the fact that there is a structural connection 
suggests the possible presence of a substantive affiliation as 
well.266 
                                                                                                                                     
 263. See KURKELA & TURUNEN, supra note 6; GEORGIOS PETROCHILOS, 
PROCEDURAL LAW IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION ¶¶ 4.85–.94 (2004); S.I. 
STRONG, RESEARCH AND PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION: SOURCES AND STRATEGIES 71–137 (2009) [hereinafter STRONG, 
RESEARCH] (providing bibliographic information). 
 264. See ALI & UNIDROIT, supra note 10, at 17; Bone, supra note 30, at 
1333; Dodge, supra note 30, at 781; Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 30, at 
1106–07; Hoffman, supra note 7, at 428; Resnik, supra note 11, at 599. 
 265. Some commentators have suggested that “the analytical problems in-
volved in opting out of litigation [and into arbitration] are quite distinct from 
those arising inside the courtroom” while other scholars have taken the view 
that “parties’ greater ability to contract out of federal and state procedural 
rules entails the lesser power to modify it.” Hoffman, supra note 7, at 391, 
395 (citations omitted). 
 266. One commentator has identified a number of procedural requirements 
that apply in both litigation and arbitration. For example, 
[j]udicial and arbitral decision-makers are required to render a 
judgment or award, following representations from the parties. Six 
fundamental principles are associated with this relationship be-
tween the adjudicator and the parties: (i) the adjudicator’s impartial-
ity and (ii) independence; (iii), the adjudicator’s duty to treat the par-
ties equally, (iv) to listen to both sides and to respect each party’s 
right to controvert evidence or legal submission, and (v) the duty to 
reach a reasoned decision within (vi) a reasonable time. 
More generally, the numerous fundamental and important principles 
of civil justice can be arranged under these five headings, which are 
the five constellations of procedural principles: (1) advice and access: 
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Some commentators would object to this methodology due to 
a belief that arbitrators use different analytical techniques 
than judges.267 For example, these commentators suggest that 
arbitrators routinely disregard precedent and draft awards 
that are bereft of any sort of legal reasoning.268 Setting aside 
the question of whether those practices still arise in domestic 
U.S. arbitration, it is clear that these allegations do not apply 
in international matters.269 
Instead, international commercial arbitration is universally 
agreed to be a highly legalistic procedure involving extremely 
detailed written and oral submissions outlining what are often 
highly sophisticated legal arguments.270 Arbitral tribunals typ-
ically issue fully reasoned awards that explain the arbitrators’ 
substantive and procedural decisions in great detail.271 Many of 
                                                                                                                                     
empowering the parties; (2) conditions for sound decision-making; (3) 
an efficient process; (4) a fair process; and (5) upholding judgment. 
Of these numerous principles, none can be regarded as detached 
from the judicial process. 
Andrews, supra note 182. 
 267. See Bone, supra note 30, at 1386–88; Hoffman, supra note 7, at 391, 
395; see also supra notes 160–64 and accompanying text. 
 268. See Bone, supra note 30, at 1386–88. Bone also describes a somewhat 
outmoded domestic U.S. practice (the non-neutral arbitrator) that does not 
exist in the international realm, where independence, impartiality and neu-
trality are required. See BORN, ICA, supra note 3, at 1494–1507; Bone, supra 
note 30, at 1387. 
 269. See STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 32, at 4–5. 
 270. See id.; Roger P. Alford, The American Influence on International Arbi-
tration, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 69, 69, 73 (2003); Eric Bergsten, The 
Americanization of International Arbitration, 18 PACE INT’L L. REV. 289, 294, 
301 (2006); Born, Adjudication, supra note 10, at 877; Lucy Reed & Jonathan 
Sutcliffe, The “Americanization” of International Arbitration?, 16 MEALEY’S 
INT’L ARB. REP. 36 (2001); Steven Seidenberg, International Arbitration Loses 
Its Grip: Are U.S. Lawyers to Blame?, 96 A.B.A. J. 50, 54 (2010). 
 271. See BORN, ICA, supra note 3, at 1871–72; Bone, supra note 30, at 
1387–88. Indeed, some parties complain that arbitral awards are too long. 
See Pierre Lalive, On the Reasoning of International Arbitral Awards, 1 J. 
INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 55, 55 (2010). Although the style of the award may 
vary depending on whether the decision-maker comes from a common law or 
civil law background, arbitral tribunals are nevertheless acting in a judicial 
manner. See S.I. Strong, Research in International Commercial Arbitration: 
Special Skills, Special Sources, 20 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 119, 143 (2009) [here-
inafter Strong, Sources]; see also supra note 247 and accompanying text (de-
scribing the different analytical approaches of civil law and common law law-
yers). 
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these awards are subsequently published in denatured (anon-
ymized) form,272 which allows scholars to determine whether 
and to what extent arbitrators comply with the law. Detailed 
examination of these awards demonstrates a tradition of rigor-
ous attention to legal argument and authority, similar to the 
approach adopted by judges.273 
Notably, the debate about due process in international com-
mercial arbitration is not limited to principles enunciated in 
arbitral awards and scholarly commentary. Instead, national 
judges from around the world often consider questions of pro-
cedural fairness as a result of various types of ancillary litiga-
tion.274 As described further in the discussion below, the unique 
nature of international commercial arbitration requires na-
tional courts and arbitral tribunals to adopt a highly consistent 
set of due process standards that applies in both arbitral and 
judicial contexts and in different countries. Furthermore, the 
concept of procedural fairness in international commercial ar-
bitration is developed through a highly iterative process that 
involves both public and private adjudicators, although judges 
necessarily have the final say about such issues. As a result, 
discussions about the proper bounds of procedural autonomy in 
international commercial arbitration appear highly relevant to 
similar debates concerning international commercial litigation. 
Support for the analytical methodology adopted in this Arti-
cle can also be found in judicial decisions such as Delaware Co-
alition for Open Government v. Strine.275 Although that case 
focused primarily on confidentiality concerns within the con-
text of U.S. constitutional law, Judge Roth’s discussion of in-
ternational commercial arbitration (rather than one of the var-
ious forms of domestic arbitration) supports this Article’s use of 
international commercial arbitration as a guide to internation-
al norms of procedural fairness.276 
                                                                                                                                     
 272. See STRONG, RESEARCH, supra note 263, at 45, 83–85. 
 273. See BORN, DRAFTING, supra note 2, at 9; LEW ET AL., supra note 32, 
¶ 24-55; Bone, supra note 30, at 1388; Christoph A. Hafner, Professional Rea-
soning, Legal Cultures, and Arbitral Awards, 30 WORLD ENGLISHES 117, 117–
28 (2011) (describing differences between civil law and common law reason-
ing). 
 274. See STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 32, at 37–87 (discussing various ways 
in which judges become involved in arbitration). 
 275. See Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 276. See Strine, 733 F.3d at 525 (Roth, J., dissenting). 
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Another compelling reason to rely on international commer-
cial arbitration involves the high degree of esteem with which 
it is held in the business and legal worlds. Despite recent con-
cerns about increasing formalism and costs,277 international 
commercial arbitration is generally considered to be one of the 
great success stories of the procedural realm.278 Not only are 
the various conventions associated with international commer-
cial arbitration among the most widely accepted treaties in the 
world (indeed, the most successful of these, the United Nations 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Ar-
bitral Awards [more commonly known as the New York Con-
vention] has been signed or ratified by 149 state parties),279 but 
private parties typically prefer arbitration as a means of resolv-
ing their cross-border business disputes.280 Furthermore, the 
widespread approval and perceived legitimacy of the proce-
dures used in international commercial arbitration have led 
numerous countries to adopt a treaty-based form of arbitration 
(investor-state arbitration) that draws heavily on the proce-
dural rules developed in the private commercial context.281 
The amount of public and private support for international 
commercial arbitration is impressive. However, what may be 
even more important for purposes of this Article is the way in 
which the norms associated with international commercial ar-
bitration have become embedded in domestic law, either direct-
                                                                                                                                     
 277. These concerns focus more on issues of cost than issues of procedural 
irregularity. See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text. 
 278. See supra note 32. 
 279. See United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 217, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [here-
inafter New York Convention]; Status: Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958), U.N. COMM’N ON 
INT’L TRADE LAW (UNCITRAL), http:// 
www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status
.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2012) [hereinafter New York Convention Status]; 
William W. Park & Alexander A. Yanos, Treaty Obligations and National 
Law: Emerging Conflicts in International Arbitration, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 251, 
257 (2008). Other treaties in this field are also well-recognized, although 
those agreements are primarily regional in nature. See BORN, ICA, supra 
note 3, at 91–109. 
 280. See BORN, ICA, supra note 3, at 68–71. 
 281. See LUCY REED ET AL., Preface to the Second Edition of GUIDE TO ICSID 
ARBITRATION, at xi (2nd ed. 2010); Andrea K. Bjorklund, The Emerging Civili-
zation of Investment Arbitration, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1269, 1272 (2009). 
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ly282 or indirectly through the adoption of national legislation 
based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Com-
mercial Arbitration (“Model Arbitration Law”).283 Although 
commentators suggest that it is often difficult for international 
legal norms to become incorporated into national law,284 the 
process appears to have been very successful in the area of in-
ternational commercial arbitration.285 
Both the various conventions on international commercial 
arbitration and the Model Arbitration Law reflect a high de-
gree of respect for the parties’ procedural autonomy.286 Howev-
er, parties cannot act with unfettered discretion. Instead, “pro-
cedural autonomy [in international commercial arbitration] is 
qualified . . . by the mandatory requirements of applicable na-
                                                                                                                                     
 282. This process is easier in monist states but also occurs in dualist re-
gimes. See James A.R. Nafziger, Book Review: Dinah Shelton, ed., Interna-
tional Law and Domestic Legal Systems: Incorporation, Transformation, and 
Persuasion, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 901, 902 (2013); S.I. Strong, Monism and Du-
alism in International Commercial Arbitration: Overcoming Barriers to Con-
sistent Application of Principles of Public International Law, in BASIC 
CONCEPTS OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: MONISM AND DUALISM 547, 555–57, 
563–68 (Marko Novaković ed., 2013). 
 283. See UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 
U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, 18th Sess., Annex I, U.N. Doc. A/40/17 
(June 21, 1985), revised by Rep. of the U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, 39th 
Sess., June 17–July 7, 2006, Annex I, art. 34, U.N. Doc. A/61/17, U.N. GAOR, 
61st Sess., Supp. No. 17 (2006) [hereinafter Model Arbitration Law]. The 
Model Arbitration Law was designed to be consistent with the terms of the 
New York Convention and thus with public international law relating to in-
ternational commercial arbitration. See New York Convention, supra note 
279; Model Arbitration Law, supra, Explanatory Note to 1985 version, paras. 
47, 49; BORN, ICA, supra note 3, at 115–21; William W. Park, The Specificity 
of International Arbitration: The Case for FAA Reform, 36 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1241, 1243 (2003). 
 284. See René Provost, Judging in Splendid Isolation, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 
125, 153 (2008). 
 285. See Frédéric Bachand, Court Intervention in International Arbitration: 
The Case for Compulsory Judicial Internationalism, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 83, 
83; Zekoll, supra note 43, at 1348–51 (discussing “state-sanctioned party au-
tonomy” in international commercial arbitration); see also EMMANUEL 
GAILLARD, LEGAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 26 (2010) (suggest-
ing international commercial arbitration is consistent with a theory of “strict 
State positivism”). 
 286. See New York Convention, supra note 279; Model Arbitration Law, 
supra note 283; BORN, ICA, supra note 3, at 82–83, 91. 
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tional law (subject to applicable international limits).”287 These 
requirements are reflected in certain well-established norms 
that are created and respected by both courts and arbitral tri-
bunals.288 
The jurisprudential connection between litigation and arbi-
tration suggests that arbitration law may be able to provide 
certain insights into the boundaries of procedural autonomy in 
litigation. This is particularly true in the cross-border business 
context, since the law relating to international commercial ar-
bitration is far more developed than the law relating to inter-
national commercial litigation.289 Therefore, this Article ana-
lyzes the substantive concerns relating to procedural contracts 
by using examples drawn from international commercial arbi-
tration. 
                                                                                                                                     
 287. BORN, ICA, supra note 3, at 1749. One of the more salient discussions 
regarding the difference between domestic and international principles of 
public policy, including procedural public policy, is found in a series of reports 
by the International Law Association concerning public policy as a bar to en-
forcement of international awards. See Int’l Law Assn. Comm. on Int’l Com-
mercial Arb., Interim Report on Public Policy as a Bar to Enforcement of In-
ternational Arbitral Awards (2000), available at http://www.ila-
hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/19; Int’l Law Assn. Comm. On Int’l Com-
mercial Arb., Final Report on Public Policy as a Bar to Enforcement of Inter-
national Arbitral Awards (2002), available at http://www.ila-
hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/19; Strong, Due Process, supra note 98, at 
67–70. 
 288. Arbitrators’ respect for international procedural norms exists not only 
as a matter of informal acculturation but also as a result of what is often seen 
as a duty to produce an enforceable award. See Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Dis-
covery: Lawyers’ Views of Its Effectiveness, Its Principal Problems and Abuses, 
1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 787, 792–93; Günther J. Horvath, The Duty of the 
Tribunal to Render an Enforceable Award, 18 J. INT’L ARB. 135, 135 (2001); 
see also GAILLARD, supra note 285, at 53 (discussing the comparative and it-
erative elements of the transnational rules method). Arbitrators know that if 
they exceed the limits of procedural fairness, their awards will be unenforce-
able, which is not the parties’ contracted-for outcome. See Horvath, supra, at 
137–38. Hence, there is an implicit duty on the part of the arbitral tribunal to 
conform with judicial norms of due process and procedural fairness. See id. at 
145–48. 
 289. See infra notes 294–98 and accompanying text. 
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B. Limits of Procedural Autonomy in International Commercial 
Arbitration 
1. Sources of Authority Describing Procedural Fairness in In-
ternational Commercial Arbitration 
When considering the limits of procedural autonomy in in-
ternational commercial arbitration, it is useful to begin by 
identifying the relevant legal authorities.290 Professor Matti 
Kurkela and Santtu Turunen have suggested that a “prima fa-
cie order of sources . . . for identifying lex proceduralia or 
transnational due process requirements in arbitration” in-
cludes 
1) The New York Convention 
2) Human rights conventions 
3) International soft law concerning arbitration 
4) Principles of law formulated from various national proce-
dural laws.291 
The first item on the list—the New York Convention—has 
been characterized as “constitutional” in nature, an interpreta-
tion that has arisen at least in part because the New York 
Convention plays a role comparable to that of a national consti-
tution “in mediating between private autonomy (or liberty) and 
governmental regulatory interests.”292 Although the New York 
                                                                                                                                     
 290. See KURKELA & TURUNEN, supra note 6, at 10–11. 
 291. Id. at 11; see also New York Convention, supra note 279. “Lex proce-
duralia” can be described as a set of procedural norms that are analogous to 
the substantive law known as lex mercatoria. See KURKELA & TURUNEN, supra 
note 6, at 7–8. Extensive commentary exists regarding the content and his-
torical development of the lex mercatoria, and it may be that some of these 
principles would be equally applicable to the development of the lex proce-
duralia. See BERGER, supra note 6; Mary B. Ayad, Harmonization of Custom, 
General Principles of Law and Islamic Law in Oil Concessions, 29 J. INT’L 
ARB. 477, 488–90 (2012) (suggesting lex mercatoria fulfills the requirements 
of Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties); Emman-
uel Gaillard, Transnational Law: A Legal System or a Method of Decision 
Making?, 17 ARB. INT’L 59, 59–72 (2001); Maniruzzaman, supra note 6, at 
665; see also supra note 6. 
 292. Gary B. Born, Arbitration and the Freedom to Associate, 38 GA. J. INT’L 
& COMP. L. 7, 22 (2009) [hereinafter Born, Associate]; see also New York Con-
vention, supra note 279; Peter B. Rutledge, The Constitutional Law of Inter-
national Commercial Arbitration, 38 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 2 (2009). This 
constitutional function is also reflected in national laws of arbitration, which 
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Convention does not discuss procedural autonomy directly, a 
number of key principles can be derived from Article V, which 
describes the grounds upon which an objection to recognition 
and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award can be based.293 
Article V is relatively general in nature (another characteris-
tic that the New York Convention shares with many national 
constitutions),294 but the principles are further interpreted and 
applied in judicial decisions and arbitral awards that are re-
produced in detail in various yearbooks and databases.295 Simi-
lar information has been gathered on judicial decisions constru-
ing the Model Arbitration Law, which was designed to be con-
sistent with the terms of the New York Convention and which 
has been adopted in whole or in part in nearly 100 jurisdic-
tions, including a number of U.S. states.296 
                                                                                                                                     
would include statutes based on the Model Arbitration Law. See generally 
Model Arbitration Law, supra note 283; Born, Associate, supra, at 22. 
 293. See New York Convention, supra note 279, art. V; KURKELA & 
TURUNEN, supra note 6, at 10. 
 294. See New York Convention, supra note 279, art. V; Born, Associate, su-
pra note 292, at 21. The content of the various due process provisions are 
discussed in more detail below. See infra notes 330–53 and accompanying 
text. 
 295. See UNCITRAL, Dissemination of Decisions Concerning UNCITRAL 
Legal Texts and Uniform Interpretation of Such Texts: Note by Secretariat, ¶¶ 
8, 16, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/267 (Feb. 21, 1985); STRONG, RESEARCH, supra note 
263, at 72–88; ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION 
CONVENTION OF 1958: TOWARDS A UNIFORM JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 2–3 
(1981); Pieter Sanders, Foreword to INT’L COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION, ICCA’S GUIDE TO THE INTERPRETATION OF THE 1958 NEW YORK 
CONVENTION v, vi (2011); Barbara Steindl, The Arbitration Procedure—The 
Development of Due Process Under the New York Convention, AUSTRIAN ARB. 
Y.B. 255, 255–82 (2008). For example, UNCITRAL has compiled a database 
known as CLOUT (Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts), which contains judicial 
decisions from all over the world construing the Model Arbitration Law and 
the New York Convention. See Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts (CLOUT), 
UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/case_law.html (last visited 
Apr. 13, 2014); see also New York Convention, supra note 279; Model Arbitra-
tion Law, supra note 283; STRONG, RESEARCH, supra note 263, at 85–87 (dis-
cussing CLOUT). Other databases also exist. See 1958 NEW YORK 
CONVENTION GUIDE, http://newyorkconvention1958.org (last visited Apr. 8, 
2014). 
 296. See New York Convention, supra note 279; Model Arbitration Law, 
supra note 283, Explanatory Note to 1985 version, paras. 47, 49; UNCITRAL, 
Status: UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 
(1985), with Amendments as Adopted in 2006, 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arb
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Compilations of national court decisions concerning interna-
tional commercial arbitration have been collected for over fifty 
years and provide an important insight into how judges inter-
pret and apply mandatory principles of procedural law in the 
cross-border commercial context.297 No similar collection exists 
with respect to the limits of procedural autonomy in civil litiga-
tion.298 
Kurkela and Turunen suggest that information regarding the 
limits of procedural autonomy in international commercial ar-
bitration can also be gleaned from “different kinds of soft law, 
institutional rules, other international conventions, model 
laws, human rights laws, and general procedural principles.”299 
Indeed, some commentators believe that human rights instru-
ments are more important than the New York Convention to 
the question of procedural rights, since the synallagmatic char-
acter of the New York Convention gives it a lesser stature than 
documents discussing universal human rights norms.300 
Several international human rights instruments, including 
the United Nations Universal Declaration on Human Rights 
(“Universal Declaration”), the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), and the European Convention 
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“European 
Convention”), apply to arbitration (albeit indirectly) and there-
fore could shed some light on questions relating to procedural 
                                                                                                                                     
itration_status.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2014) (including adherents to both 
versions of the Model Arbitration Law); BORN, ICA, supra note 3, at 115–21; 
STRONG, RESEARCH, supra note 263, at 85–87 (discussing CLOUT); Park, su-
pra note 283, at 1243. 
 297. See New York Convention, supra note 279; Model Arbitration Law, 
supra note 283; STRONG, RESEARCH, supra note 263, at 85–87; VAN DEN BERG, 
supra note 295, 2–6; Sanders, supra note 295, at vi; Steindl, supra note 295, 
at 255–82. 
 298. Some comparative studies exist relating to procedural rights in crimi-
nal matters, and some commentators have suggested that useful comparisons 
can be made across the civil law-criminal law divide. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, 
Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying International 
Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions, 
3 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 235, 253–92 (1993); Sklansky & Yeazell, supra 
note 249, at 684–85. However, no studies have actually applied this theory in 
the international commercial context. 
 299. KURKELA & TURUNEN, supra note 6, at 10; see also RUTLEDGE, supra 
note 85, at 145–59. 
 300. See New York Convention, supra note 279; ALEKSANDAR JAKSIC, 
ARBITRATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 88, 221–25 (2002). 
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autonomy.301 However, these instruments are somewhat differ-
ent from the New York Convention in that they primarily ad-
dress litigation rather than arbitration,302 thereby giving rise to 
the question of whether it would not be preferable to establish 
the limits of procedural autonomy in litigation by looking di-
rectly at these particular norms rather than proceeding indi-
rectly through arbitration. 
A direct approach would have some benefits, including the 
ability to offset the argument that the New York Convention’s 
limits on procedural autonomy only apply to proceedings meant 
to recognize and enforce arbitral awards.303 However, primary 
reliance on human rights instruments gives rise to a number of 
                                                                                                                                     
301. See European Convention on Human Rights, as amended by Protocols 
Nos. 11 and 14, art. 6, opened for signature Nov 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5 [herein-
after European Convention]; International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights art. 14, Dec. 19, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 
[hereinafter ICCPR]; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A 
(III), art. 10, U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948), [hereinafter Universal Declara-
tion]; JAKSIC, supra note 300, at 23–28, 85–88; Schultz, supra note 133, at 8 
(“[A]rbitration can only be permitted . . . if some mechanism exists that en-
sures that the national arbitration framework is in conformity with the 
ECHR. Through such a mechanism, through its constraints on the national 
arbitration framework, the ECHR applies indirectly to, or more generally has 
a bearing on, arbitration.”). Some commentators dispute that conclusion. See
Adam Samuel, Arbitration, Alternative Dispute Resolution Generally and the 
European Convention on Human Rights: An Anglo-Centric View, 21 J. INT’L
ARB. 413, 416–19, 426–27 (2004) (arguing that parties consenting to arbitra-
tion waive their rights under Article 6(1) of the ECHR); Schultz, supra note
133, at 7–8. A considerable amount of discussion has focused on the applica-
bility of Article 6 of the European Convention to arbitration. See European
Convention, supra, art. 6; KURKELA & TURUNEN, supra note 6, at 10; LEW ET 
AL., supra note 32, ¶¶ 5-57 to 5-67; Vasil Marmazov & P.V. Pushkar, Is There 
a Right to Fair Settlement of a Case by Means of Arbitration, as Guaranteed 
by the European Convention on Human Rights?, 2 L. UKR. 52, 52–64 (2001), 
available at http://eurolaw.org.ua/publications/ukrainian-journal-of-
european-studies/5-2011/42-is-there-a-right-to-fair-settlement-of-a-case-by-
means-of-arbitration-as-guaranteed-by-the-european-convention-on-human-
rights. 
302. See European Convention, supra note 301, art. 6; ICCPR, supra note
301, art. 14; Universal Declaration, supra note 301, art. 10; JAKSIC, supra 
note 300, at 23–28. 
303. See JAKSIC, supra note 300, at 77, 176, 88. Of course, this argument 
can also be answered by the recognition that the due process norms applica-
ble in international commercial arbitration reflect certain mandatory proce-
dural principles that are consistent across national borders. See infra notes
338–42 and accompanying text. 
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practical problems. First, a number of these instruments are 
not directly applicable in domestic litigation304 or are only ap-
plicable in a limited number of legal systems.305 As a result, 
these instruments provide little assistance in determining 
whether and to what extent the various procedural principles 
are broadly recognized or reflected in domestic law.306 
Second, most treaty language is relatively general in na-
ture.307 Although this is a problem shared by the New York 
Convention, there are very few judicial decisions construing 
human rights instruments’ procedural protections in the civil 
litigation context. Those decisions that do exist are typically 
rendered by international tribunals of limited jurisdiction ra-
ther than by national courts.308 Nowhere is there a global data-
                                                                                                                                     
 304. See JAKSIC, supra note 300, at 108–09, 112; David Sloss, Legislating 
Human Rights: The Case for Federal Legislation to Facilitate Domestic Judi-
cial Application of International Human Rights Treaties, 35 FORDHAM INT’L 
L.J. 445, 446, 449–51 (2012). 
 305. For example, the European Convention is not applicable outside Eu-
rope. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, Status, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, 
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=005&CM=&D
F=&CL=ENG (last visited Apr. 13, 2014). 
 306. Some limited analyses exist in the context of criminal procedure. See 
Bassiouni, supra note 298, at 292. 
 307. See European Convention, supra note 301, art. 6; ICCPR, supra note 
301, art. 14; Universal Declaration, supra note 301, art. 10. 
 308. See New York Convention, supra note 279. Most litigation focuses on 
the meaning of Article 6(1) of the European Convention, which has been cited 
19,650 times by the European Court of Human Rights. See European Con-
vention, supra note 301, art. 6(1); CASE LAW DATABASE, EUROPEAN COURT OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS, http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en 
(searching under “Article 6-1”) (last visited Nov. 6, 2013). However, the Unit-
ed States is not a state party to the European Convention, so the jurispru-
dence arising out of the European Court of Human Rights is not applicable in 
the United States. See European Convention, supra note 301, art. 19; Council 
of Europe, supra note 305. Furthermore, although many of the due process 
provisions of the European Convention are the same or similar to other in-
ternational instruments that have been signed by the United States (such as 
the Universal Declaration and the ICCPR), it is unlikely that U.S. courts 
would find the case law of the European Court of Human Rights persuasive. 
See European Convention, supra note 301; ICCPR, supra note 301; Universal 
Declaration, supra note 301; Oona A. Hathaway et al., The Treaty Power: Its 
History, Scope, and Limits, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 239, 260, 319–20 (2013) (dis-
cussing U.S. adherence to, including conditions attached to, the Universal 
Declaration and the ICCPR); see also Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Politi-
cal Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 86 (2005) (decrying use of foreign and inter-
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base or collection of cases relating to how these principles are 
interpreted and applied by national courts in international 
commercial disputes. Therefore, human rights instruments 
provide useful insights into discussions relating to the limits of 
procedural autonomy, but cannot compete with the depth or 
breadth of analyses arising out of international commercial ar-
bitration. 
2. An International Customary Law of Procedure 
Some commentators have described the extensive amount of 
information relating to due process and procedural fairness in 
international commercial arbitration as constituting a type of 
lex specialis.309 While a lex specialis may be controlling in its 
own field, those norms typically have little or no applicability 
in other areas of law.310 However, experience in other contexts 
suggests that it is possible for a lex specialis to grow beyond its 
original scope of application and take on the attributes of cus-
tomary international law or to “interpret the terms of another, 
more general norm.”311 Furthermore, strict segregation of the 
relevant legal principles may be inappropriate or impracticable 
in cases where there is a particularly strong connection be-
tween two areas of law, as is the case between mandatory pro-
cedural norms in international commercial arbitration and in-
ternational commercial litigation.312 Therefore, it appears pos-
sible to use judicial and arbitral authorities describing proce-
dural limits in international commercial arbitration as a means 
                                                                                                                                     
national law); Antonin Scalia, Commentary, International Judicial Tribunals 
and the Courts of the Americas: A Comment with Emphasis on Human Rights 
Laws, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1119, 1122 (1996) (same). 
 309. See New York Convention, supra note 279; Model Arbitration Law, 
supra note 283; JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 387–89, 410–11 (2003); Bachand, supra note 285, at 84. 
 310. See PAUWELYN, supra note 309, at 387–89, 410–11. 
 311. Id. at 410–11; see also Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Em-
pire’s New Clothes: Political Economy and the Fragmentation of International 
Law, 60 STAN. L. REV. 595, 611 (2007); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Investment 
Agreements and International Law, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 123, 129 
(2003) ( “[T]he BIT movement has moved beyond lex specialis (or better, leges 
speciales) to the level of customary law effective even for non-signatories.”); 
Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work? An Eval-
uation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 67, 114–15 (2005). 
 312. See supra notes 264–74 and accompanying text. 
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of identifying a customary international law that also describes 
the limits of procedural autonomy in international commercial 
litigation. 
The concept of a customary international law of procedure 
appears to have been first proposed by Professor Thomas 
Wälde when he suggested that various decisions of the Europe-
an Court of Human Rights could be said to constitute a “cus-
tomary international law of procedure.”313 In Wälde’s view, 
principles relating to Article 6 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights should be considered to apply in investment ar-
bitration by virtue of Article 52(1)(d) of the Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Na-
tionals of Other States (ICSID Convention),314 which discusses 
annulment of an investment award on the basis of a serious 
departure from a fundamental rule of procedure.315 Notably, 
                                                                                                                                     
 313. Thomas W. Wälde, Procedural Challenges in Investment Arbitration 
Under the Shadow of the Dual Role of the State; Asymmetries and Tribunals’ 
Duty to Ensure, Pro-actively, the Equality of Arms, 26 ARB. INT’L 3, 11 (2010); 
see also European Convention, supra note 301, art. 6. Wälde’s point also rais-
es the question of whether certain procedural practices should be considered 
to constitute a form of jus cogens that is applicable in both arbitration and 
litigation. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679; JAKSIC, supra note 300, at 35–43; 
MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, INT’L LAW COMM’N STUDY GRP. ON FRAGMENTATION, 
FRAGMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 2.5.3, 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/55/fragmentation_outline.pdf; Anja Lindroos, 
Addressing Norm Conflicts in a Fragmented Legal System: The Doctrine of 
Lex Specialis, 74 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 27, 28–29 (2005); Wälde, supra, at 10–11. 
At this point, the principle of jus cogens is still under development, and there 
are those who would claim that jus cogens refers only to substantive rights. 
See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 510–12 (7th ed. 
2008). However, other commentators have argued that certain procedural 
norms can and should be included within the concept of jus cogens because 
they arise as a matter of necessity to give effect to various substantive norms. 
See Sévrine Knuchel, State Immunity and the Promise of Jus Cogens, 9 NW. J. 
INT’L HUM. RTS. 149, 29–30 (2011). Thus, the notion of a type of “procedural 
jus cogens” is not outside the realm of possibility, although a discussion of 
that point is beyond the scope of the current Article. 
 314. See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between 
States and Nationals of Other States art. 52(1)(d), Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 
1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention]; Wälde, supra note 
313, at 10–11. 
 315. See ICSID Convention, supra note 314, art. 52(1)(d); LEW ET AL., supra 
note 32, ¶ 28-104 (noting that the fundamental rules of procedure include 
“rules of natural justice such as the right to be heard, equal treatment of the 
parties and impartiality of the arbitrators”); Wälde, supra note 313, at 10–11. 
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the concept of a serious departure from a fundamental or man-
datory rule of procedure is also implicitly recognized in Article 
V of the New York Convention.316 
Wälde’s hypothesis that the boundaries between arbitration 
and litigation are relatively fluid with respect to procedural 
fairness is consistent with the perspective advanced in this Ar-
ticle and by other courts and commentators.317 However, 
Wälde’s proposal began with judicial norms and moved to arbi-
tration. The question is whether it is possible to make a similar 
leap from arbitration to litigation. 
Such a move appears possible pursuant to a three-step analy-
sis. First is the recognition, as enunciated by Professor Ian 
Brownlie, that “collections of municipal cases” are critical to 
the “assessment of the customary law.”318 The various compila-
tions of domestic court decisions relating to international com-
mercial arbitration would appear to qualify as “collections of 
municipal cases” within Brownlie’s meaning.319 This interpre-
tation appears to apply even though the rights in question 
arise initially as a matter of international law, since the vari-
ous principles are incorporated into national law and, in some 
cases, are even interpreted in light of domestic constitutional 
norms.320 
Second, to be recognized as customary international law, a 
particular practice must be of sufficient duration, reflect a de-
gree of uniformity and consistency, be of a general nature, and 
be accepted as law.321 Although a detailed analysis of each of 
these four elements is beyond the scope of the current Article, 
the fundamental procedural norms recognized in the law relat-
ing to international commercial arbitration appear to meet 
                                                                                                                                     
 316. See New York Convention, supra note 279, art. V; see also infra notes 
330–53 and accompanying text. 
 317. See ALI & UNIDROIT, supra note 10, at 17; Schultz, supra note 133, 
at 7–8 (discussing the 2001 decision of the Swiss Federal Tribunal in Abel 
Xavier v. UEFA). 
 318. BROWNLIE, supra note 313, at 52. 
 319. Id.; see also Bachand, supra note 285, at 84; Lowenfeld, supra note 
311, at 129–30; Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 311, at 114–15. 
 320. See supra notes 282–85 and accompanying text (discussing domestic 
application of international law). Although judges are supposed to interpret 
the various instruments in light of international legal principles, courts will 
sometimes consider core procedural protections in light of domestic constitu-
tional norms. See Strong, Due Process, supra note 98, at 59–60. 
 321. See BROWNLIE, supra note 313, at 7–8. 
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each of these requirements.322 For example, the procedural pro-
tections embodied in international commercial arbitration have 
been recognized since 1959, when the New York Convention 
came into force.323 While the international arbitral community 
is continually striving to improve consistency of interpretation 
in national courts,324 the various principles are currently con-
strued in a relatively uniform manner and are recognized as 
binding.325 Furthermore, the various norms are of a general 
nature, as discussed in more detail below.326 
                                                                                                                                     
 322. See id. at 6–7 (discussing evidence of international custom); KURKELA 
& TURUNEN, supra note 6, at 10–11. 
 323. See New York Convention Status, supra note 279. 
 324. Although a number of these initiatives come from the private sector, 
public bodies such as UNCITRAL have also tried to promote consistency in 
the interpretation and application of various UNCITRAL texts on interna-
tional commercial arbitration. Not only did UNCITRAL promulgate the Mod-
el Arbitration Law in order to increase the consistent application of the prin-
ciples found in the New York Convention in jurisdictions around the world, it 
also adopted a formal recommendation concerning the interpretation of the 
form requirements found in the New York Convention and the application of 
national law to matters relating to the enforcement of foreign arbitral 
awards. See New York Convention, supra note 279, arts. II(2), VII(2); Model 
Arbitration Law, supra note 283; UNCITRAL, Recommendation Regarding 
the Interpretation of Article II, Paragraph 2, and Article VII, Paragraph 1, of 
the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, U.N. Doc. A/61/17; GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 17, Annex II (July 7, 
2006); Park, supra note 283, at 1243; S.I. Strong, What Constitutes an 
“Agreement in Writing” in International Commercial Arbitration? Conflicts 
Between the New York Convention and the Federal Arbitration Act, 48 STAN. 
J. INT’L L. 47, 51 (2012). Judicial training efforts, including those by the Fed-
eral Judicial Center, the International Council for Commercial Arbitration 
(ICCA), and the Organization of American States (OAS), have also attempted 
to make international commercial arbitration more consistent. See STRONG, 
GUIDE, supra note 32; New York Convention Roadshow, ICCA, 
http://www.arbitration-icca.org/NY_Convention_Roadshow.html (last visited 
Apr. 7, 2014); International Commercial Arbitration: Award Enforcement, 
OAS, http://www.oas.org/en/sla/dil/international_commercial_arbitration.asp 
(last visited Apr. 13, 2014). 
 325. See BORN, ICA, supra note 3, at 5; S.I. Strong, Beyond the Self-
Execution Analysis: Rationalizing Constitutional, Treaty and Statutory Inter-
pretation in International Commercial Arbitration, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 499, 
525–27 (2013) [hereinafter Strong, Beyond] (discussing UNCITRAL studies 
on international consistency in international commercial arbitration). Some 
aspects of the New York Convention are directed specifically to national 
courts themselves. See New York Convention, supra note 279, art. II(3); 
Strong, Beyond, supra, at 519–20. 
 326. See infra notes 330–53 and accompanying text. 
1098 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 39:3 
The third and final step requires norms that have been de-
veloped and recognized in the arbitral context to be transferred 
to the judicial realm. This, of course, is the most controversial 
aspect of this proposition. However, courts and commentators 
have suggested that litigation and arbitration operate as func-
tional equivalents at a structural level,327 which would suggest 
that it would be appropriate to extend those analogies into the 
substantive arena. Indeed, regardless of whether arbitration is 
framed as a substitute for or alternative to judicial proceed-
ings,328 individual parties would appear entitled to the same 
core procedural protections. 
Notably, the emphasis in this discussion is on certain funda-
mental norms, since it is well-established that parties in arbi-
tration surrender some types of procedural protections that 
would normally be available as a matter of domestic law.329 
Since the propriety of this final step can be better analyzed in 
context, the discussion continues with an analysis of the con-
tent of procedural fairness norms in international commercial 
arbitration. 
3. Content of Procedural Fairness Norms in International 
Commercial Arbitration 
Describing the content of the various norms of procedural 
fairness in international commercial arbitration is a relatively 
straightforward affair and begins with Article V of the New 
                                                                                                                                     
 327. See Michaels, supra note 160, at 342, 357 (describing equivalence func-
tionalism); see also Schultz, supra note 133, at 2 (noting “awards are recog-
nised as equivalents to judgments”). 
 328. See EDMONSON, supra note 234, § 1:1, at 1-3, § 1:3, at 1-8 to 1-9; Buys, 
supra note 234, at 93–94; Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 11, at 535–37; May-
er, supra note 234, at 26; Stempel, supra note 234, at 260; Sternlight, supra 
note 234, at 1673; S.I. Strong, Discovery Under 28 U.S.C. §1782: Distinguish-
ing International Commercial Arbitration and International Investment Arbi-
tration, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 295, 348–49 (2013) (framing arbitration as 
a form of concurrent jurisdiction); Strong, First Principles, supra note 234, at 
241–45. 
 329. See Richard C. Reuben, Process Purity and Innovation: A Response to 
Professors Stempel, Cole, and Drahozal, 8 NEV. L.J. 271, 281–82 (2007) [here-
inafter Reuben, Process] (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 
U.S. 20, 31 (1991), and Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)). 
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York Convention.330 That provision states in relevant regard 
that 
1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, 
at the request of the party against whom it is invoked, only if 
that party furnishes to the competent authority where the 
recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that: 
. . . 
(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was 
not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbi-
trator or of the arbitration proceedings or was other-
wise unable to present his case; or 
. . . 
(d) The . . . arbitral procedure was not in accordance 
with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such 
agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the 
country where the arbitration took place. . . . 
2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also 
be refused if the competent authority in the country where 
recognition and enforcement is sought finds that: 
. . . 
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would 
be contrary to the public policy of that country.331 
Thus, the New York Convention suggests that the procedure 
chosen by the parties may not violate fundamental norms in-
                                                                                                                                     
 330. See New York Convention, supra note 279, art. V. Article V also ad-
dresses the invalidity of the arbitration agreement or the incapacity of the 
parties, see id. art. V(1)(a); matters not falling within the scope of the arbitra-
tion agreement, see id. art. V(1)(c); appointment of the arbitral tribunal, see 
id. art. V(1)(d); awards that have not yet become binding or that have been 
set aside, see id. art. V(1)(e); and the non-arbitrability of the subject matter of 
the dispute, see id. art. V(2)(a). However, these matters are not procedural in 
the same way that the issues described in Articles V(1)(b), V(1)(d), and 
V(2)(b) are. See id. arts. V(1)(b), V(1)(d), and V(2)(b). 
 331. Id. art. V. The concepts reflected in Article V(1) “safeguard the parties 
against private injustice,” whereas those found in Article V(2) “serve[] as an 
explicit catchall for the enforcement of a country’s own vital interests.” Park 
& Yanos, supra note 279, at 259. Sometimes matters of procedural fairness 
are discussed under Article V(1) and sometimes they are elevated to Article 
V(2)(b), which allows application of the public policy of the forum state, albeit 
through an international lens. See New York Convention, supra note 279, art. 
V; Strong, Due Process, supra note 98, at 59–60. 
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volving proper notice, presentation of one’s case, or public poli-
cy.332 The Convention also recognizes that states may include 
certain additional procedural safeguards in their arbitration 
laws,333 although the parties may contract out of those provi-
sions.334 
These provisions have been construed on numerous occasions 
by courts from around the world, and the decisions have been 
collected in various databases and yearbooks.335 Scholars and 
arbitrators have also played an active role in identifying the 
boundaries of procedural fairness in arbitration.336 The depth 
and breadth of case law, arbitral awards, and commentary in 
this field prohibit a comprehensive independent analysis of the 
underlying principles in the current Article.337 However, the 
discussion does not need to be very detailed in order to make 
the necessary points. 
Commentators agree that the concept of due process in inter-
national arbitration “refers to a number of notions with varying 
                                                                                                                                     
 332. See New York Convention, supra note 279, art. V. Other aspects of ar-
bitral law indicate that parties are entitled to a tribunal that is impartial, 
independent, and neutral, although those principles are not specifically men-
tioned in the New York Convention. See id.; BORN, ICA, supra note 3, at 
1494–1507; Andrews, supra note 182; see also supra notes 235, 266 and ac-
companying text. 
 333. Arbitration laws are not the same as rules of civil procedure. See 
STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 32, at 14. National rules of civil procedure do not 
apply in arbitration, unless the parties have an explicit agreement to that 
effect. See InterCarbon Berm., Ltd. v. Caltex Trading & Transp. Corp., 146 
F.R.D. 64, 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
 334. See New York Convention, supra note 279, art. V(1)(d). For example, 
parties may contract out of the right to obtain judicial review of the merits of 
an arbitral award under the English Arbitration Act 1996. See Arbitration 
Act, 1996, c. 23, § 69 (Eng.). 
 335. See New York Convention, supra note 279, art. V; see also supra note 
295 and accompanying text. National courts have also construed similar pro-
visions under the Model Arbitration Law. See Model Arbitration Law, supra 
note 283; see also supra note 295 and accompanying text. 
 336. Scholarly commentary holds a particular place of prestige in interna-
tional commercial arbitration due to civil law influences and the private na-
ture of the arbitral procedure. See Strong, Sources, supra note 271, at 150–51. 
Arbitral awards are also an excellent source of information about the proce-
dures used in arbitration. See id. at 142–43. 
 337. Entire books have been devoted to the subject of due process in inter-
national commercial arbitration. See KURKELA & TURUNEN, supra note 6; see 
also JAKSIC, supra note 300, at 227–44; PETROCHILOS, supra note 263, 
¶¶ 4.85–4.94; see also Steindl, supra note 295, at 255–82. 
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names under different national laws, including natural justice, 
procedural fairness, the right or opportunity to be heard, the 
so-called principle de la contradiction and equal treatment.”338 
This principle “is often understood as a ‘hard’ rule of law, a 
kind of a core or foundation of all other procedural rules, the 
violation or disregard of which will lead to unenforceability of 
the award or decision given.”339 “In many national laws this 
core is described as ordre public or public policy.”340 
These principles are considered fundamental or mandatory in 
nature.341 Thus, 
[t]he parties cannot . . . waive the irreducible core of proce-
dural guarantees, such as the right to an independent and 
impartial court, the right to a fair trial and the due process of 
law which are sine qua non for liberty, dignity, justice and 
primarily for the maintenance of the precedence of the rule of 
law principle.342 
The non-waivable nature of these concepts suggests that they 
are as applicable in litigation as they are in arbitration. 
Although the content of these norms is extremely consistent 
at its core, the arbitral regime tolerates a certain amount of 
diversity in how these principles are protected.343 Variations 
arise as a result of the autonomy exercised by the parties in 
their arbitration agreements and choice of institutional rules of 
procedure, as well as through default provisions contained in 
                                                                                                                                     
 338. Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Globalization of Arbitral Procedure, 36 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1313, 1321 (2003) (citations omitted). 
 339. MATTI S. KURKELA & HANNES SNELLMAN, DUE PROCESS IN 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1 (2005). 
 340. Id. at 4. 
 341. However, it is not clear whether the rights are always constitutional in 
nature. See id.; KURKELA & TURUNEN, supra note 6, at 10; Jane S. Schacter, 
Courts and the Politics of Backlash: Marriage Equality Litigation, Then and 
Now, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1153, 1203 (2009) (discussing subconstitutional na-
ture of certain public policies); Stephen M. Schwebel & Susan G. Lahne, Pub-
lic Policy and Arbitral Procedure, in COMPARATIVE ARBITRATION PRACTICE AND 
PUBLIC POLICY IN ARBITRATION, VIII ICCA CONG. SER. (1986 New York) 205, 
209 (Pieter Sanders ed., 1986) (discussing public policy’s constituent ele-
ments); James Y. Stern, Note, Choice of Law, the Constitution, and Lochner, 
94 VA. L. REV. 1509, 1524 (2008) (noting public policy exceptions to enforce-
ment of foreign judgments have at times been framed as subconstitutional in 
nature). 
 342. JAKSIC, supra note 300, at 218. 
 343. See Schultz, supra note 133, at 9. 
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the relevant national arbitration law.344 Arbitral tribunals also 
retain a great deal of discretion to adopt procedures that are 
tailored to the dispute at hand.345 
Although international commercial arbitration permits a sig-
nificant amount of procedural diversity, parties seldom operate 
outside of certain relatively well-established parameters.346 
Much of the procedural standardization in arbitration arises as 
a result of the widespread use of institutional rules of proce-
dure, which are similar in most regards and which harmonize 
some of the key differences between common law and civil law 
legal systems.347 Thus, international arbitral proceedings typi-
cally feature certain common law elements (such as cross-
examination of witnesses, limited exchange of documents be-
tween the parties, and a single evidentiary hearing) as well as 
various civil law features (such as the use of adverse inferences 
and early submission of documentary evidence).348 
Some commentators have suggested that international com-
mercial arbitration differs from litigation because parties in 
arbitration can select certain procedures, such as documents-
only or fast-track arbitration, that are not generally available 
in court.349 However, judicial analogues can be found for most, 
if not all, of these purportedly unique arbitral mechanisms. For 
example, some jurisdictions have created “rocket dockets” that 
simulate fast-track arbitration.350 Other courts allow litigation 
to proceed on a documents-only basis if the parties consent to 
such procedures.351 As a result, the differences between arbi-
                                                                                                                                     
 344. See BORN, ICA, supra note 3, at 1785–94; LEW ET AL., supra note 32, 
¶¶ 21-5 to 21-18. 
 345. See LEW ET AL., supra note 32, ¶¶ 21-12 to 21-13. Though potentially 
broad, arbitral discretion is largely circumscribed in practice by party agree-
ment as well as by the norms and principles described in various treatises, 
rules, and arbitral awards, and therefore is not completely unbounded. See 
STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 32, at 19. 
 346. See O’Connor & Drahozal, supra note 9. 
 347. See BORN, ICA, supra note 3, at 1785–92; LEW ET AL., supra note 32, 
¶¶ 21-33 to 21-39; O’Connor & Drahozal, supra note 9. 
 348. See BORN, ICA, supra note 3, at 1785–92. 
 349. See id. at 1232 n.442; see also Schultz, supra note 133, at 6–7 (discuss-
ing expedited arbitration). 
 350. See Carrie E. Johnson, Rocket Dockets: Reducing Delay in Federal Civil 
Litigation, 85 CAL. L. REV. 225, 233–37 (1997). 
 351. See The Pennsylvania Tax Appeals Process and Suggested Reform, 8 
PITT. TAX REV. 5, 10 (2010); Daniel F. Solomon, Summary of Administrative 
Law Judge Responsibilities, 31 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 475, 476, 
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tration and litigation appear to be diminishing, at least in the 
cross-border commercial context. 
Furthermore, the literature suggests that most forms of pro-
cedural autonomy in arbitration do not result in a violation of 
international due process norms, even when the parties have 
agreed to limit the use of certain types of procedures typically 
found in their home jurisdiction and adopt practices more rou-
tinely seen in other legal traditions.352 This phenomenon sug-
gests that procedural fairness can exist even in the midst of 
procedural diversity, a conclusion that is as relevant in inter-
national commercial litigation as in international commercial 
arbitration.353 
4. Comparison of Arbitral and Constitutional Standards of Due 
Process 
Some people might resist the notion that due process norms 
can be transferred from arbitration to litigation because arbi-
tration is considered to constitute a form of “rough justice” that 
grants only minimal due process protections.354 However, the 
idea that arbitration reflects a type of mandatory procedural 
minimum works to the benefit of the current analysis, since 
that principle can also be used to describe the outer bounds of 
procedural autonomy. The relevance of arbitral due process 
minimums to litigation is even more apparent given that the 
                                                                                                                                     
501 (2011) (discussing how parties in administrative disputes can waive their 
right to a hearing); see also Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, No. 11 Civ. 0691 
(LAK), 2013 WL 5548913, *1–3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2013) (using witness state-
ments instead of affirmative oral testimony, which is more often seen in in-
ternational commercial arbitration than in litigation); CPR Economical Liti-
gation Agreement, supra note 37, § 7.4 (waiving oral argument in many types 
of motion practice). 
 352. See supra notes 347–48 and accompanying text. 
 353. The same conclusions could be drawn from decisions relating to the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, which also look to broad 
principles of procedural fairness rather than similarities of particular proce-
dural practices. See Strong, Judgments, supra note 14. However, analyses of 
these decisions can be extremely difficult because courts are considering more 
than procedural fairness. See id. (noting the role that reciprocity, public poli-
cy, and other issues play in decisions relating to foreign judgments). The rela-
tively limited nature of procedural review in arbitration makes the analysis 
easier and more transparent. See BORN, ICA, supra note 3, at 2739. 
 354. See Reuben, Process, supra note 329, at 281–82 (citing Gilmer v. Inter-
state/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991), and Mitsubishi Motors 
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)). 
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core, non-derogable norms that are considered to form a “‘hard’ 
rule of law” in international commercial arbitration bear a 
striking resemblance to certain basic constitutional principles 
of procedural fairness. 355
Domestic standards of constitutional due process356 have tra-
ditionally been considered inapplicable to arbitration because 
arbitration does not constitute state action per se.357 Neverthe-
less, Professor Peter Rutledge has suggested that “constitu-
tional principles have seeped into arbitration through other 
mechanisms,” thereby establishing a de facto need for arbitra-
tion to comply with U.S. law regarding procedural due pro-
cess.358 This “seepage” occurs through a variety of means, in-
cluding public policy provisions in various international trea-
ties and national laws concerning international commercial ar-
bitration.359
Professor Richard Reuben has also identified a connection be-
tween U.S. constitutional law and arbitration based on a theory 
of shared state action.360 Although arbitration is technically a 
private form of dispute resolution, Reuben sees courts as be-
coming increasingly involved in overseeing, facilitating, and 
enforcing arbitration agreements.361 Reuben believes this pub-
                                                                                                                                     
 355. KURKELA & SNELLMAN, supra note 339, at 1. 
356. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334
(1976) (stating “‘(d)ue process,’ unlike some legal rules, is not a technical con-
ception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances” and 
noting that “[d]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections 
as the particular situation demands” (citations omitted)); Fuentes v. Shevin, 
407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972); Niki Kuckes, Civil Due Process, Criminal Due Process, 
25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 8–9 (2006). The discussion here will focus on U.S. 
law, although a comparative analysis of different jurisdictions would eventu-
ally be useful.
357. See RUTLEDGE, supra note 85, at 144–45. The one exception to this 
general proviso is court-annexed arbitration, which clearly constitutes state 
action. See id. at 131; see also Amy J. Schmitz, Nonconsensual + Nonbinding 
= Nonsensical? Reconsidering Court-Connected Arbitration Programs, 10
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 587, 603–06 (2009).
 358. RUTLEDGE, supra note 85, at 145–59.
359. Id.
360. See Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of 
Alternative Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 
956–58 (2000). 
361. See id.
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lic element is enough to trigger a duty to apply constitutional 
standards of procedural fairness in arbitration.362 
These commentators’ views have some notable support from 
Lord Neuberger, President of the Supreme Court of the United 
Kingdom, who recently stated that arbitrators have “a duty to 
act judicially” because they “are participating in the rule of 
law” when they are deciding cases.363 Interestingly, this obliga-
tion is owed not only “to the parties to the arbitration, but . . . 
also . . . to the public.”364 While this principle has obvious struc-
tural implications,365 it also carries important substantive ram-
ifications, since it suggests that procedural practices in arbitra-
tion cannot drop below the minimum necessary for the rule of 
law.366 
Regardless of whether one believes that constitutional prin-
ciples must, or simply, may be applied in arbitration, it is nev-
ertheless possible to consider whether and to what extent arbi-
tral standards of due process are currently consistent with U.S. 
constitutional norms. For example, basic procedural norms in 
arbitration focus primarily on the opportunity to be heard 
(which includes notice), equality of arms, and use of an impar-
tial adjudicator.367 Interestingly, Professor Niki Kuckes has ar-
gued that 
the essential element of procedural due process [in the United 
States], as clearly established in civil settings, is that notice 
and a hearing must ordinarily precede any governmental dep-
                                                                                                                                     
 362. See id. 
 363. Lord Neuberger, Address to Property Arbitrators at the ARBRIX An-
nual Conference, London (Nov. 12, 2013), 
http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/docs/speech-131112.pdf. 
 364. Id. 
 365. For example, Lord Neuberger takes the view that arbitrators “are giv-
ing effect to the parties’ contract in accordance with substantive and proce-
dural legal principles,” which contradicts assertions by certain commentators 
that arbitrators do not interpret and apply legal precedent. Id.; see also Bone, 
supra note 30, at 1386–88; supra notes 360–64 and accompanying text. 
 366. See Andrews, supra note 182; Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the 
Rule of Law, 43 GA. L. REV. 1, 7–9 (2008) (discussing procedural aspects of the 
rule of law); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in 
Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1997) (discussing four concep-
tions of the rule of law); supra note 266. 
 367. See Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 338, at 1321–22; Strong, Due Pro-
cess, supra note 98, at 53–75; Maureen A. Weston, Universes Colliding: The 
Constitutional Implications of Arbitral Class Actions, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1711, 1770 (2006). 
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rivation of a liberty or property interest. . . . [I]t is useful to 
refer to the notice-and-hearing model as a “civil” model of due 
process because it is in civil settings that this test is clearly 
established as the single constitutional approach to procedur-
al due process.368 
This description not only provides a useful retrospective 
analysis of how U.S. courts have behaved in the past, it also 
suggests how courts might act in the future. For example, 
[w]hen a majority of Justices in Hamdi agreed on the core re-
quirements of procedural due process, . . . they applied a clas-
sic civil formulation—the right to notice and an opportunity to 
be heard before an impartial adjudicator—as the correct con-
stitutional approach to due process even for the executive de-
tention of enemy combatants, a new and controversial civil 
setting.369 
Hamdi therefore suggests that this basic standard of proce-
dural fairness in civil litigation will be adopted in other types of 
novel circumstances, including, it is assumed, in cases involv-
ing individualized procedural contracts.370 Hamdi also demon-
strates a certain amount of consistency between judicial and 
arbitral standards relating to procedural due process, thereby 
suggesting that the corpus of authority concerning procedural 
fairness in international commercial arbitration may be relied 
upon to define procedural fairness in international commercial 
litigation.371 
However, Hamdi is lacking in one notable regard.372 Alt-
hough arbitral standards of procedural fairness require equali-
ty of arms between the parties, Hamdi makes no mention of 
that particular principle.373 This omission may simply be due to 
                                                                                                                                     
 368. Kuckes, supra note 356, at 8–9 (footnotes omitted). Although notice 
appears to be a core element of due process in both litigation and arbitration, 
some authorities have suggested that parties may alter the means by which 
notice is given or even waive notice altogether. See Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. 
v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 316 (1964); Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, 
Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 331, 351 (1996) (discussing 
cognovit notes). 
 369. Kuckes, supra note 356, at 8–9 (footnotes omitted) (discussing Hamdi 
v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004)). 
 370. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533. 
 371. See id. 
 372. See id. 
 373. See id. 
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the fact that Hamdi was more concerned with constitutional 
notions of procedural due process rather than equal protection 
per se.374 However, this lacuna may also be attributed to the 
fact that the concept of “equality of arms” is better developed in 
international jurisprudence than in domestic U.S. case law.375 
The international understanding of “equality of arms” is not 
precisely synonymous with equal protection under the U.S. 
Constitution.376 For example, the notion of “equality of arms” 
involves “the fundamental principle that a party should be af-
forded a reasonable opportunity to present its case in condi-
tions that do not place it at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis 
its adversary.”377 While U.S. equal protection analyses incorpo-
rate some of these principles, the primary emphasis in U.S. civ-
il litigation is on ensuring access to the courts378 rather than on 
addressing the kinds of procedural disadvantages that can 
arise when parties come from different legal systems.379 Focus-
ing on access makes sense in a domestic system where a trans-
substantive and purportedly uniform code of procedure is as-
sumed to assuage most, if not all, outcome-determinative dis-
parities that could arise between parties.380 However, cross-
                                                                                                                                     
 374. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533; Scott W. Howe, 
The Troubling Influence of Equality in Constitutional Criminal Procedure: 
From Brown to Miranda, Furman and Beyond, 54 VAND. L. REV. 359, 384 & 
n.128 (2001). 
 375. See Martha F. Davis, Participation, Equality, and the Civil Right to 
Counsel: Lessons from Domestic and International Law, 122 YALE L.J. 2260, 
2264–65 (2013). 
 376. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 377. Davis, supra note 375, at 2264–65. 
 378. See Helen Hershkoff, Poverty Law and Civil Procedure: Rethinking the 
First-Year Course, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1326, 1332–33 (2007). Many of the-
se actions have been unavailing, even in cases arising under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; 
Hershkoff, supra, at 1332–33. Equal protection claims also involve group 
identity, although some commentators have suggested that those injuries 
have “migrated” to the realm of due process. See Joseph Blocher, Rights To 
and Not To, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 761, 806 (2012). 
 379. For example, a number of procedural advantages can arise as a result 
of differences relating to the taking of evidence, preparation of witnesses, and 
evidentiary privileges. See, e.g., Berger, Privileges, supra note 16, at 517–18 
(discussing evidentiary privileges); Strong & Dries, supra note 248, at 311–12 
(discussing the presentation of evidence); Wälde, supra note 313, at 17–36 
(discussing cases involving state parties). 
 380. See Marcus, Past, supra note 76, at 374, 376–80 (discussing purposes 
of trans-substantivity and disconnect with uniformity). 
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border litigants experience different sorts of issues, and, as 
parties in international commercial arbitration have found, a 
more flexible approach may be necessary to address various 
substantive and structural imbalances that arise.381 Indeed, 
“[a]s transnational litigation continues to become the bread and 
butter for more and more lawyers, the absolute insistence on 
the application of the procedural law of the forum seems less 
and less justified without some form of a more complete choice 
of law analysis.”382 
Further discussion of the substantive validity of any particu-
lar procedural practice is beyond the scope of the current Arti-
cle, since due process analyses cannot be conducted in the ab-
stract.383 However, courts appear entirely capable of addressing 
any concerns that might arise, either through contract-based 
challenges (such as those based on unconscionability)384 or via 
the inherent power of the court.385 Indeed, the process by which 
such rulings can be made is even easier in litigation than in 
                                                                                                                                     
 381. See, e.g., Berger, Privileges, supra note 16, at 517–18; Strong & Dries, 
supra note 248, at 311–12; Wälde, supra note 313, at 17–36. 
 382. Anton, supra note 87, at 489; see also BORN, DRAFTING, supra note 2, at 
1 (suggesting procedure can have an effect on the outcome of a dispute). 
 383. See JAKSIC, supra note 300, at 227 (“[T]he right to a fair hearing repre-
sents an independent procedural guarantee whose contents are open and is to 
be determined in each particular case.”); see also id. at 230 (“[I]t is unlikely to 
expect that one could evaluate in abstracto the compliance of the arbitral 
process as a whole with the requirements of the right to a fair trial as laid 
down in Articles 6(1) of the EHRC and 14(1) of the Political Covenant respec-
tively.”). Future analyses might consider the concept of procedural fairness 
from a socio-psychological perspective. See Nancy A. Welsh et al., Why Theory 
Matters in Investor-State Dispute Resolution Processes, 42 WA. U. J.L. & POL’Y 
(forthcoming 2014). 
 384. This approach has been effective in eliminating procedural unfairness 
in domestic arbitration. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 
1740, 1746 (2011); Rent-A-Center West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S.Ct. 2772, 
2780–81 (2010). For example, it has been suggested that the concept of equal-
ity in litigation might be so fundamental that it cannot be contracted around 
as a matter of public policy. See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 291, 
249–50 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 385. See Matter of Dunleavy, 769 P.2d 1271, 1272 (Nev. 1988) (noting in-
herent judicial powers include the “power to take actions reasonably neces-
sary to administer justice efficiently, fairly, and economically”); Anclien, su-
pra note 256, at 43. 
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arbitration, since the court has both initial and continuing ju-
risdiction over the parties.386 
C. Interim Conclusions 
The preceding section has explored the idea that internation-
al commercial arbitration can provide an appropriate and use-
ful means of identifying the substantive limits of procedural 
autonomy in international commercial litigation. This hypothe-
sis is based not only on the functional similarities between ar-
bitration and litigation, but also on the fact that international 
commercial arbitration has a well-developed body of law de-
scribing certain mandatory procedural minimums from which 
the parties may not derogate. Since parties may not contract 
around these norms in arbitration, it is logical to conclude that 
parties in litigation would also be prohibited from altering the-
se procedures. 
The transferability of arbitral norms to litigation is also sup-
ported by a content-based analysis. Although the standards de-
scribed herein are relatively general in nature, arbitral stand-
ards of due process appear very similar to domestic principles 
of constitutional due process. While it will eventually be neces-
sary to conduct a more extensive analysis of other nations’ fun-
damental procedural norms, one would expect the research to 
show a relatively high degree of consistency between the outer 
bounds of procedural autonomy in international commercial 
arbitration and the limits of autonomy in national and interna-
tional litigation, since the standards that have been developed 
in international commercial arbitration have been generated by 
long-term comparative analyses of domestic and international 
law. 
IV. LOGISTICAL CONCERNS 
Although parties will need to consider carefully whether and 
to what extent a particular procedural practice is amenable to 
customization before entering into an agreement involving that 
issue, this Article takes the view that, generally speaking, pro-
cedural contracts are possible in international commercial dis-
                                                                                                                                     
 386. Concerns about procedural fairness can arise at the beginning or end of 
an arbitration and can be heard by either a court or an arbitral tribunal, alt-
hough courts always have the final say on such matters. See STRONG, GUIDE, 
supra note 32, at 37–41, 65–66, 73–85. 
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putes as both a structural and substantive matter. This conclu-
sion should increase the number of procedural contracts that 
appear in practice, since some of the uncertainty about the en-
forceability of such contracts has now been eliminated. 
However, the fact that procedural contracts appear enforcea-
ble as a general matter does not mean that parties should start 
drafting those sorts of provisions without any further concerns. 
Instead, parties need to consider a number of logistical issues 
before entering into an agreement purporting to alter the pro-
cedures used in a particular court. 
A. Standalone Versus Embedded Agreements 
Experience with arbitration agreements and forum selection 
clauses suggests that procedural agreements can either be in-
corporated into a larger transactional document or memorial-
ized independently.387 To some extent, parties’ preference for a 
particular type of contract may be driven by various external 
factors, such as when the agreement is made.388 
However, one issue that may arise in cases of embedded pro-
visions is whether the procedural agreement survives allega-
tions that the contract in which the procedural provision is 
found is invalid, illegal, void, or voidable. Such claims have not 
proven unduly problematic in situations involving forum selec-
tion clauses or arbitration agreements, but this is a matter that 
may need to be considered with respect to private procedural 
contracts.389 
B. Pre-Dispute Versus Post-Dispute Agreements 
Experience with arbitration agreements and forum selection 
clauses suggests that parties may be most likely to enter into a 
procedural agreement before the dispute arises, since tactical 
considerations (either real or perceived) may preclude an 
                                                                                                                                     
 387. See COCA, supra note 22, art. 3(d); BORN, DRAFTING, supra note 2, at 
37. 
 388. See infra notes 390–94 and accompanying text. 
 389. For example, the arbitral principle of separability ensures the continu-
ing validity of an embedded arbitration agreement even if the larger contract 
is said to be invalid, illegal, or terminated. See BORN, DRAFTING, supra note 2, 
at 136. While this principle is likely applied to forum selection provisions as 
well, there is far less authority on that point. See id. However, COCA will 
resolve some of these issues once that instrument comes into force. See 
COCA, supra note 22, art. 3(d); see also supra note 22. 
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agreement on procedural matters once hostilities have be-
gun.390 However, pre-dispute agreements may not be suitable 
in all circumstances, either because the parties do not have a 
pre-existing contractual relationship or because of policy con-
cerns about waiving or amending certain procedural rights pri-
or to the time the dispute arises.391 
A full analysis of potential policy issues is beyond the scope of 
the current Article. However, future inquiries might focus on 
the adequacy of information at the time of contracting and ine-
qualities in bargaining power.392 A number of these matters 
have been considered in the arbitral context,393 and it is likely 
that courts will consider procedural contracts in a similar 
light.394 
C. Customized Clauses Versus Model Agreements 
Parties seeking to draft a private procedural agreement must 
also decide whether to create their own customized clause or 
rely on model language found elsewhere. Here, previous prac-
tice provides no clear guidance. For example, arbitration 
                                                                                                                                     
 390. See Bone, supra note 30, at 1349; see also BORN, DRAFTING, supra note 
2, at 37. 
 391. See RUTLEDGE, supra note 85, at 184–89; Davis & Hershkoff, supra 
note 11, at 527–29; Dodge, supra note 30, at 766; Kapeliuk & Klement, Ex 
Ante, supra note 30, at 1493–94 (noting public and private implications of 
timing decisions); see supra notes 186–90 and accompanying text. 
 392. See Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 11, at 527–29; Kapeliuk & Klement, 
Ex Ante, supra note 30, at 1493–94. Although many scholars focus on wheth-
er pre-dispute waivers are appropriate in situations where there is incom-
plete information, attention must also be paid to the possibility that post-
dispute waivers could be deemed invalid as the result of judicial pressure. See 
Heenan v. Sobati, 96 Cal. App. 4th 995, 1003 n.5 (2002). 
 393. See RUTLEDGE, supra note 85, at 184–89. For example, some countries 
do not permit consumers to enter into pre-dispute arbitration agreements 
because of concerns about imbalances of power. See Council Directive 
93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, 1993 O.J. 
(L 95) 29; JONATHAN HILL, CROSS-BORDER CONSUMER CONTRACTS 206–07, 215 
(2008); Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Creating a Market for Justice; A Market 
Incentive Solution to Regulating the Playing Field: Judicial Deference, Judi-
cial Review, Due Process, and Fair Play in Online Consumer Arbitration, 23 
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1, 56 (2002). 
 394. See Hoffman, supra note 7, at 391, 412–13 (noting arbitration and liti-
gation exhibit analytical similarities as well as dissimilarities). But see Kape-
liuk & Klement, Ex Ante, supra note 30, at 1493–94 (discussing public impli-
cations). 
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agreements are typically based on well-known model clauses, 
since those provisions have been tested over time and are less 
likely to be found ambiguous or invalid.395 In contrast, forum 
selection clauses are more likely to be drafted on an individual, 
case-by-case basis, although standard language also exists in 
this context.396 
To some extent, the decision of whether to use a customized 
clause versus a model agreement may depend on the complexi-
ty of the procedure at issue. While it may seem counterintuitive 
to use a model agreement in more intricate situations, in-
creased complexity often results in an increased opportunity for 
error.397 Therefore, parties may be better served by using a pre-
existing model if they intend to alter a large number of proce-
dural practices. 
The choice between customized and model language may also 
depend on the amount of institutional support for a particular 
process. The widespread popularity of international commercial 
arbitration has led to the proliferation of model arbitration 
agreements drafted by arbitral organizations.398 Parties there-
fore have a number of different models from which to choose.399 
Even though the same amount of institutional support does not 
yet exist for private procedural contracts, parties seeking guid-
ance in the drafting process can nevertheless consult several 
different sources for ideas regarding useful language.400 
1. CPR Model Civil Litigation Prenup 
Parties seeking assistance in drafting a private procedural 
contract might begin by looking at the CPR Economical Litiga-
tion Agreement, more commonly referred to as the CPR Model 
Civil Litigation Prenup.401 Although this agreement is extreme-
ly detailed, the focus is primarily on discovery issues, which 
has the happy consequence of avoiding many of the concerns 
relating to the core adjudicative duties of the court or possible 
interference with the relationship between the court and the 
                                                                                                                                     
 395. See BORN, DRAFTING, supra note 2, at 37–38; RUTLEDGE, supra note 85, 
at 200. 
 396. See BORN, DRAFTING, supra note 2, at 36. 
 397. See id. at 38. 
 398. See id. at 37–38. 
 399. See id. 
 400. See Noyes, supra note 27, at 640–45 (listing various alternatives). 
 401. See CPR Economical Litigation Agreement, supra note 37. 
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parties.402 The agreement is specifically tailored to commercial 
disputes and includes various provisions that are sensitive to 
the particular demands of cross-border litigation, even though 
the agreement appears to contemplate a U.S. forum.403 
The Model Civil Litigation Prenup has not yet been judicially 
considered, despite the respect with which CPR is held in the 
legal world and the relatively limited scope of the agreement 
suggest that courts may be inclined to uphold the provision.404 
Nevertheless, some commentators have argued that the discov-
ery process includes some public elements, and it is possible 
that some courts may also adopt that perspective.405 
CPR suggests that parties adopt the Model Civil Litigation 
Prenup by inserting certain standard language in their trans-
actional document.406 The provision may be amended by the 
parties, although such revisions should be made with caution, 
since they run the risk of creating an ambiguous or otherwise 
pathological clause.407 CPR has attempted to avoid any ques-
tions about the separability of the Model Civil Litigation 
Prenup from the underlying contract by including language 
specifically indicating that the procedural agreement will sur-
vive claims relating to “the breach, termination or validity” of 
the substantive contract.408 
                                                                                                                                     
 402. See id. §§ 9–12; see supra note 245 and accompanying text (noting dis-
covery is perhaps the easiest procedure to alter). However, some problems 
could arise with respect to the timing of certain submissions, since some 
commentators have suggested that amendment of court dates could imper-
missibly infringe on the judge’s role. See CPR Economical Litigation Agree-
ment, supra note 37, § 5; Paulson, supra note 25, at 476. 
 403. The agreement’s discussion of jury waivers, depositions, and the work 
product doctrine all suggest a U.S.-centric perspective, since those are all 
quintessential U.S. concerns. See CPR Economical Litigation Agreement, 
supra note 37, §§ 2, 11, 12.2.5. However, references to foreign privacy laws 
demonstrate a sensitivity to non-U.S. legal principles. See id. § 12.2.5 (dis-
cussing the European Union’s Data Protection Directive). 
 404. See CPR Economical Litigation Agreement, supra note 37. 
 405. See supra notes 246–47 and accompanying text. 
 406. See CPR Economical Litigation Agreement, supra note 37. 
 407. See id.; BORN, DRAFTING, supra note 2, at 38. 
 408. CPR Economical Litigation Agreement, supra note 37; see also BORN, 
ICA, supra note 3, at 353–54 (discussing separability in the arbitral context). 
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2. The ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil Proce-
dure 
As useful as the CPR Model Civil Litigation Prenup may be, 
it is largely limited to discovery concerns.409 Parties seeking a 
more comprehensive procedural agreement may find inspira-
tion in the ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil 
Procedure or the affiliated Rules of Transnational Civil Proce-
dure, which were compiled by the Reporters as a means of 
“providing greater detail and illustrating concrete fulfillment of 
the Principles.”410 Although no U.S. court appears to have con-
sidered either the Principles or the Rules in an actual litiga-
tion, the respect with which the ALI and UNDROIT are held 
worldwide might increase the likelihood that a court will en-
force a procedural agreement based on the Principles or 
Rules.411 
The ALI/UNIDROIT Principles and Rules of Transnational 
Civil Procedure were specifically designed for use in interna-
tional commercial disputes, which may make this framework 
particularly attractive to parties involved in cross-border 
transactions.412 Potential litigants may also be drawn to the 
ALI and UNIDROIT approach because of its respect for the 
various substantive concerns discussed in this Article.413 
As a general matter, the ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of 
Transnational Civil Procedure do an excellent job in protecting 
the core elements of procedural fairness discussed in this Arti-
cle.414 Thus, the parties’ ability to present their case is guaran-
teed by provisions requiring “notice . . . by means that are rea-
sonably likely to be effective” as well as language protecting 
“the right to submit relevant contentions of fact and law and to 
offer supporting evidence” and the ability to “have a fair oppor-
                                                                                                                                     
 409. See CPR Economical Litigation Agreement, supra note 37. 
 410. ALI & UNIDROIT, supra note 10, at 99. The Rules are meant “to be 
interpreted in accordance with the Principles of Transnational Civil Proce-
dure and applied with consideration of the transnational nature of the dis-
pute,” thereby creating an “autonomous mode of interpretation, consistent 
with the principles and concepts by which they are guided.” ALI & 
UNIDROIT, supra note 10, at 100. 
 411. See id. at xiii–xxii (listing reporters, advisers, and members of the var-
ious working and consultative groups); Glenn, supra note 21, at 490–91. 
 412. See ALI & UNIDROIT, supra note 10, at 16. 
 413. See supra notes 246–47 and accompanying text. 
 414. See ALI & UNIDROIT, supra note 10, at 20–24, 41. 
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tunity and reasonably adequate time to respond to contentions 
of fact and law and to evidence presented by another party, and 
to orders and suggestions made by the court.”415 Equality of 
arms is similarly protected by language requiring “equal 
treatment and reasonable opportunity for litigants to assert or 
defend their rights” and the “avoidance of any kind of illegiti-
mate discrimination, particularly on the basis of nationality or 
residence.”416 Proceedings are also open to the public, except for 
good cause.417 
However, some problems do exist. For example, the Princi-
ples are somewhat general, and it may be difficult for parties 
and courts to put the various concepts into practice.418 Alt-
hough the Rules were meant to provide more detail so as to al-
low parties to implement the Principles, the Rules were not 
meant to be comprehensive in nature, and some confusion may 
arise as to which procedures apply in any given situation.419 
Other issues may arise at the structural level. For example, 
some aspects of the Principles and Rules could be interpreted 
as affecting public rather than purely private concerns.420 
While problematic elements could be excised from the parties’ 
agreement, extensive alterations could very well create ambi-
guities that could result in an unenforceable agreement. 
                                                                                                                                     
 415. Id. at 22–23. 
 416. Id. at 20–21. 
 417. See id. at 41–42. 
 418. See id. 
 419. See id. at 99–100; GARNETT, supra note 20, at 68–69. 
 420. A considerable amount of debate could arise as to what aspects of liti-
gation relate only to the relationship between the parties. Some of the more 
promising provisions would likely involve the taking and presentation of evi-
dence. See ALI & UNIDROIT, supra note 10, at 128–47. Rules relating to the 
constituent elements of the statement of claim (complaint) and statement of 
defense could be seen as either public or private in nature. See id. at 111–13. 
Although settlement offers are typically considered to be a private matter in 
the United States (with the exception of settlements of class actions, which 
require court approval), the ALI/UNIDROIT rule regarding settlement con-
tains certain public elements. See id. at 117–20; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
Furthermore, provisions requiring a single concentrated hearing could run 
afoul of traditions developed in civil law systems, although civil law courts 
could consider those practices waivable. See ALI & UNIDROIT, supra note 
10, at 144–46. Rules regarding the rescission and enforcement of a final 
judgment could also be seen as affecting issues of institutional design and the 
state sovereign prerogative. See id. at 152–55. 
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As a result, parties should only adopt the ALI/UNIDROIT 
Principles and Rules of Transnational Civil Procedure with 
caution.421 Courts are more likely to uphold individualized pro-
cedural contracts if those agreements do “not do violence to the 
interests of society and the judiciary,”422 and it is not yet clear 
whether and to what extent the Principles and Rules focus only 
on matters of private concern.423 
3. Partial Adoption of Another State’s Procedural Rules 
Another possibility for parties seeking to customize their liti-
gation procedures involves the partial adoption of another 
state’s procedural rules. Wholesale incorporation of a foreign 
state’s procedural code would be impossible, since there is no 
way a forum court could or would allow foreign law to control 
structural matters involving judicial administration or the re-
lationship between the court and the parties.424 Furthermore, 
precedent from the world of international commercial arbitra-
tion suggests that the parties’ decision to have a dispute heard 
in a particular venue should be given some weight, even in the 
face of language purporting to adopt foreign procedural law.425 
However, a judge may be willing to apply foreign procedural 
law to govern certain specific aspects of the relationship be-
tween the parties themselves. 
Even a limited choice of foreign procedural law would be not 
be without controversy, since conflict of laws analyses currently 
“limit the scope of party autonomy to the chosen state’s sub-
stantive law and exclude its procedural law.”426 However, the 
                                                                                                                                     
 421. See ALI & UNIDROIT, supra note 10; GARNETT, supra note 20, at 69. 
 422. Paulson, supra note 25, at 478. 
 423. See ALI & UNIDROIT, supra note 10. 
 424. BORN, DRAFTING, supra note 2, at 161. 
 425. See Union of India v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 
48 (Q.B.D.) 50–51 (Eng.). The English court resolved the issue by allowing 
foreign procedural law to apply to “internal” aspects of the arbitral proceed-
ing, while “external” matters (i.e., those involving the relationship between 
the arbitration and the courts) remained subject to the law of the arbitral 
seat. See id. This distinction between internal and external matters would 
also make sense in the litigation context, in that internal matters (i.e., those 
involving the parties inter se) could be made subject to a procedural contract 
while external matters (i.e., those involving judicial administration and the 
relationship between the parties and the court) could not. 
 426. SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, CODIFYING CHOICE OF LAW AROUND THE 
WORLD: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS *29 (chapter 3.IV.E) 
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traditional conflict of law rule has caused numerous problems 
over the years, since “the line between substance and proce-
dure is not drawn in the same way in all systems, nor is the 
line always clear in each system.”427 Statutes of limitations 
have been particularly troublesome for both courts and com-
mentators, although other problems also exist.428 
Interestingly, the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws 
provides some support for partial adoption of foreign procedur-
al law.429 For example, the Restatement indicates that “[a] 
court usually applies its own local law rules prescribing how 
litigation shall be conducted even when it applies the local law 
rules of another state to resolve other issues in the case” be-
cause “[e]normous burdens are avoided when a court applies its 
own rules, rather than the rules of another state, to issues re-
lating to judicial administration, such as the proper form of ac-
tion, service of process, pleading, rules of discovery, mode of 
trial and execution and costs.”430 This approach is adopted, at 
least in part, because “the burdens the court spares itself would 
have been wasted effort in most instances, because usually the 
decision in the case would not be altered by applying the other 
state’s rules of judicial administration.”431 
Although the initial presumption is in favor of the procedural 
law of the forum court, the Restatement recognizes that many 
procedural practices “fall into a gray area between issues relat-
ing primarily to judicial administration and those concerned 
                                                                                                                                     
(forthcoming 2014); see also Regulation (EC) No. 593/208 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to con-
tractual obligations (Rome I), art. 1(3), 2008 O.J. ( L 177) 6; ALI & 
UNIDROIT, supra note 10. 
 427. SYMEONIDES, supra note 426, at *29 (chapter 3.IV.E). 
 428. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 & cmts. a, b 
(1971); COLLINS ET AL., supra note 1, ¶¶ 7-002 to 7-058; SYMEONIDES, supra 
note 426, at *29–30 (chapter 3.IV.E). 
 429. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 (1971). While 
opponents to private procedural contracts may claim that the Restatement 
requires the law of the forum to govern various procedural issues (such as 
those involving questions of notice, pleading, etc.), those aspects of the Re-
statement can be interpreted as indicating that a private procedural contract 
relating to those matters should be upheld to the extent permitted by local 
law. See id. §§ 123–38. 
 430. Id. § 122 & cmt. a. 
 431. Id. However, as noted previously, procedure can sometimes affect the 
outcome of a dispute. See supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text. 
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primarily with the rights and liabilities of the parties.”432 When 
determining which law to apply, courts may consider a number 
of factors, including 
whether the issue is one to which the parties are likely to 
have given thought in the course of entering into the transac-
tion. If they probably shaped their actions with reference to 
the local law of a certain state, this is a weighty reason for 
applying that law rather than the local law of the forum the 
plaintiff has chanced to select.433 
Other relevant concerns may include public and private inter-
ests in making the dispute resolution process less expensive, 
less time-consuming, and less unpredictable.434 As indicated in 
this Article, private procedural contracts can not only increase 
predictability in international commercial litigation,435 they can 
also save expenditures by the parties and the court.436 There-
fore, private procedural contracts would appear to be consistent 
with the Restatement, particularly if the parties specifically 
chose to have certain principles of foreign procedural law ap-
ply.437 
4. Partial Adoption of Arbitral Rules 
Finally, some commentators have suggested that parties 
seeking to create an individualized procedural contract in liti-
gation could simply adopt various rules of arbitration.438 This is 
                                                                                                                                     
 432. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 & cmt. a (1971). 
 433. Id. 
 434. See supra notes 48–95 and accompanying text (noting the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s interest in avoiding unpredictability in international commer-
cial transactions). 
 435. See supra notes 48–95 and accompanying text. 
 436. See supra notes 167–85 and accompanying text. 
 437. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 & cmt. a 
(1971). 
 438. See Noyes, supra note 27, at 642–44. Interestingly, the 
ALI/UNIDROIT Rules of Transnational Civil Procedure are in some ways 
both more and less detailed than arbitral rules of procedure. See ALI & 
UNIDROIT, supra note 10, at 100–56; see BORN, ICA, supra note 3, at 1753–
55, 1782–85 (discussing general provisions of arbitral rules). The 
ALI/UNIDROIT Rules are more detailed in that they cover a wider range of 
issues and in a somewhat more comprehensive manner. For example, provi-
sions regarding the taking and presentation of expert and fact evidence are 
far more detailed than many arbitral rules discussing the same subject. But 
the rules also lack the specificity of arbitral rules concerning, for example, the 
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an intriguing notion, particularly given the thesis advanced 
here that international commercial arbitration can provide use-
ful insights into the outer boundaries of procedural autonomy 
in litigation.439 
In many ways, arbitral rules of procedure would provide a 
useful starting point for parties, since most rule sets include 
detailed yet flexible provisions on various practical matters 
such as deadlines for written submissions, the use of fact and 
expert witnesses, etc.440 Not only are these rules tailored to the 
particular needs of parties in international commercial dis-
putes, they also feature a useful degree of procedural harmoni-
zation while complying with mandatory rules of due process 
and procedural fairness.441 
However, arbitral rules do not provide a perfect fit for parties 
seeking to identify model language for procedural contracts. 
Not only are arbitral rules generally too long to be reproduced 
in their entirety in a transactional document,442 they also in-
clude various structural provisions that would be inappropriate 
in a litigation context.443 While the offending language could be 
omitted so as not to infringe on matters of public concern, par-
ties would need to be careful not to create any ambiguities as a 
result.444 Therefore, it appears as if parties should avoid adopt-
ing arbitral rules when attempting to create a procedural con-
tract for use in court. 
                                                                                                                                     
various deadlines relating to the parties’ submissions. See ALI & UNIDROIT, 
supra note 10, at 110–15, 139–47; BORN, ICA, supra note 3, at 1783. 
 439. See infra notes 264–89 and accompanying text. 
 440. See BORN, ICA, supra note 3, at 1783; LEW ET AL., supra note 32, ¶ 21-
10. 
 441. See BORN, ICA, supra note 3, at 169–70, 1753–55; GAILLARD & SAVAGE, 
supra note 229, ¶ 1272; see also supra notes 330–86 and accompanying text. 
 442. See BORN, DRAFTING, supra note 2, at 38. Any attempt to incorporate 
these rules by reference could very well lead to arbitration rather than litiga-
tion, since the rules are generally not used to modify court proceedings. See 
id. 
 443. These provisions address the relationship between the arbitration and 
the court or between the parties, the tribunal, and/or the arbitral institution. 
See BORN, ICA, supra note 3, at 1753–55, 1782–85 (discussing general provi-
sions of arbitral rules); STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 32, at 18–19. 
 444. See BORN, DRAFTING, supra note 2, at 38. 
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CONCLUSION  
As the preceding discussion has shown, private procedural 
contracts give rise to a number of structural, substantive, and 
logistical concerns. However, none of the issues raised in this 
Article has suggested that parties are or should be considered 
incapable of altering some of the procedural rules used in court 
proceedings. To the contrary, it instead appears possible to al-
low procedural autonomy in some matters while nevertheless 
preserving important state interests in the administration of 
justice and the relationship between the courts and the parties. 
Much of the analysis conducted herein has been very general 
in nature. As such, the discussion does not provide specific an-
swers as to whether and to what extent particular procedural 
practices are amenable to private contract. However, it is 
hoped that the general methodology adopted herein demon-
strates how courts, commentators, and counsel can identify the 
appropriate limits of procedural autonomy. 
This Article has focused primarily on international commer-
cial litigation because those matters typically involve a higher 
degree of procedural and substantive unpredictability due to 
the disparate backgrounds of the parties. However, many of the 
points made here are also applicable to domestic disputes. In-
deed, one of the key authorities supporting procedural autono-
my in litigation—Delaware Coalition for Open Government v. 
Strine—arose in the domestic context.445 
There are numerous ways of analyzing private procedural 
contracts, and all of them—theoretical, practical, contractual, 
and procedural—have merit. However, this Article has taken 
the view that the best way to consider these matters is by dif-
ferentiating between structural concerns, which affect public 
questions of institutional design, and substantive concerns, 
which focus on questions of individual liberty and procedural 
due process. Only by parsing through the underlying public 
and private interests can these issues truly be understood. 
More work is undoubtedly needed in this area of law. For ex-
ample, it would be useful to consider how structural analyses 
regarding the public and private aspects of litigation would 
play out in civil law jurisdictions. Similarly, it would be helpful 
to know whether the due process norms established in interna-
                                                                                                                                     
 445. See Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493 (D. Del. 
2012), aff’d, 733 F.3d 510 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1551 (2014). 
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tional commercial arbitration are consistent with minimum 
procedural protections in jurisdictions other than the United 
States. Both of these inquiries will help determine how ac-
ceptable private procedural contracts would be around the 
world and whether such contracts could or would ever replace 
international commercial arbitration as a realistic method of 
exercising procedural autonomy. 
This Article has taken the view that private procedural con-
tracts provide litigants with the means of structuring their 
business affairs in an orderly manner while simultaneously re-
specting issues of institutional design and due process. As a 
result, these sorts of agreements serve both public and private 
interests. Although courts and commentators still need to flesh 
out the precise boundaries of party autonomy on a procedure-
by-procedure basis, that work should proceed secure in the un-
derstanding that the concept of procedural choice of law should 
be valued and protected as much as the notion of substantive 
choice of law. 
